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Urban megaprojects are at the core of cities’ re-imaging and marketing. As large-
scale development projects, they are considered as a globalization product, marked 
by a search for spectacle and visibility. In Dubai, UMPs have constituted in recent 
years the main tool in drawing a city image that aims to compete with the world 
global cities. Through UMPs, an economy based on spectacle and fascination is 
being deployed, within a complex system of governance that encompasses family 
ties, business logic and individualist visions. UMPS are not exceptions or isolated 
developments, they are in Dubai, a mean through which the city is expanding and 
being managed. 
UMPs are here the backbone public planning instrument to what we can call a 
UMPs-based approach to planning and development. Paradoxically, it is these very 
large projects, usually associated to urban fragmentation that allow, through their 
form and processes, the emergence of forms of regulation that articulate actors, 
institutions, interests, resources, spaces and scales. 
These adaptations and negotiations are orchestrated in a strategic pilotage manner, 
through informal, often unveiled ad hoc regulatory spaces. The ultimate goal is to 
ensure a certain synchronization between temporalities and project through a 
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Cities are increasingly at the centre of economic growth strategies and are considered a 
platform for economic competition, mainly through large and particular urban 
interventions. Frequently, these interventions involve large urban developments, often 
called urban megaprojects. In the context of inter-city competition, urban megaprojects 
are seen as a vehicle for revitalization, restructuring and attraction; they have been 
described as ‘one of the most visible and ubiquitous urban revitalization strategies 
pursued by city elites in search of economic growth and competitiveness’ (Swyngedouw 
et al., 2002). They are at the core of economies of fascination (Schmid, 2009; Bryman, 
1999), spectacle and city marketing (Ashworth, 2009; Avraham, 2002; Eshuis & Klijn, 
2012). 
Similar to the large monuments and engineering masterpieces of the nineteenth century 
and the skyscrapers of the early twentieth century, megaprojects are icons of managerial 
and technical prowess in the production of the contemporary city. Their large scale and 
functional complexity provide them a significant cognitive power that puts them at the 
center of current strategies of metropolization in many cities around the world. In this 
context where city politics have shifted from regulation and welfare issues to re-imaging 
and marketing the city, large urban development projects are seen as a product of a ‘shift 
to urban entrepreneurialism’ relying on public-private partnerships for promoting urban 
growth and development (Harvey, 1989). 
 
Defining Urban Megaprojects (UMPs) 
Megaprojects are not new (Lehrer & Laidley, 2008; Orueta & Fainstein, 2008); it is 
possible to identify undertakings on this scale in earlier periods that display a variety of 
forms and contents. Whether in the context of post- World War II reconstruction or of 
the mega structures movement of the 1960s, megaprojects were often symbolic of social 
amelioration and technological progress.  
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The beginning of the 1990s witnessed a new type of large project characterized by high 
complexity and cost and requiring complicated financial and partnership procedures. In 
their contemporary version, urban megaprojects are flexible and diverse rather than 
singular and monolithic (Lehrer & Laidley, 2008; Olds, 2002), and encompass tourism, 
sports, finance, leisure and residence functions. In most cases, these urban megaprojects 
include one or more famous architecture signature buildings. 
Terms used to designate urban megaprojects have varied according to place, time and 
author; examples include ‘urban mega-projects’ (Olds, 2002), ‘large-scale urban 
projects’ (Lehrer & Laidly, 2008), ‘entrepreneurial urban projects’ (Ben-Joseph, 2009), 
‘global urban projects’ (Marshall, 2003), ‘large urban development plans’ (Sager, 2011), 
‘urban complex projects’ (Arab, 2004), ‘complex real-estate projects’ (Priemus et al., 
2008), and in more overstated appellations, ‘cities within a city’ (Samarai & Qudah, 
2007), and ‘satellite cities’1 (Percival & Waley, 2012; Abaza, 2011).  
Clearly, exceptional size is a major criterion in the definition, followed by the mixed-use 
and the ‘integrated’ aspects of such projects. Some authors focus on the complexity side 
of the projects’ contents and contexts (Orueta & Fainstein, 2008; Premius et al., 2008), 
others on their linkage to globalization where the projects transcend local conditions and 
adhere to universal codes (Marshall, 2003), while yet others highlight the technological 
aspect mobilized within these projects (Brown et al., 2009).  
In analysing megaprojects, infrastructure projects such as large airports, metro and ports 
projects are often included. In many essays as well, the term ‘megaproject’ includes high 
towers, and single buildings. It is often used in the media as well as the scientific 
literature to designate different objects. Therefore, it is important to define what we 
mean by ‘megaproject’ in the context of this research. 
First, the term as used in this research does not include large-scale urban projects that 
are strictly limited to the implementation of an infrastructure. In fact, one can find a 
large number of infrastructure projects that require huge budgets and high technical 
prowess and that generate consequently a high financial risk (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). 
                                                
1 The comparison with satellite cities takes roots from the closed and introverted aspect of these projects. 
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However, they are very different in their development, design and implementation from 
multifunctional urban projects where the project’s contents and uses and the political 
dimension have a much greater bearing on the development of operations. Second, we 
differentiate, following Arab (2004), these megaprojects from large architectural 
projects and "agglomeration" projects or "territory" projects. Although architectural 
projects can have an undeniable symbolic and iconic dimension and can mobilize 
significant funds, they do not have the complex implementation dimension that is 
intrinsic to urban projects, with all their implications in terms of complexity of actors 
and political consequences.  
Similarly, "agglomeration" projects or "territory" projects, such as strategic metropolitan 
or regional development projects, are different from urban megaprojects. They lack 
direct connection with the site realities of a localized operation. Remaining on the side 
of strategic choices, they often do not have to deal with operational challenges. The most 
significant of these challenges is the moving complexity of an urban environment, its 
actors’ whims and interests and its changing economic dynamics.  
The most typical characteristics of megaprojects identified in the literature (Frick, 2005; 
Priemus et al., 2007, 2008) are termed the ‘6 Cs’: Colossal in size and scope; 
Captivating because of the project’s size, engineering achievements and possibly its 
aesthetic design; Costly, in that costs are typically underestimated and increase over the 
life of the project; Controversial, as project participants negotiate funding and mitigation 
packages, engineering and aesthetic design plans, and pursue construction; Complex, a 
factor which breeds risk and uncertainty in terms of design, funding and construction; 
and laden with Control issues related to who are to be the key decision-makers. 
Olds (2002) considers, based on an analysis of megaprojects in Europe, North America, 
Asia and Australia, that these have many similarities: they are modelled on each other; 
developed and planned by architects, planners and other experts who have experience of 
working on previous or on-going megaprojects around the world; developed with both 
explicit and implicit internationalization strategies in mind; marketed to overseas firms 
and high income individuals for subsequent lease or purchase; and designed to 
symbolize a global urban ‘utopia’ for the twenty-first century (Olds, 2002). 
The main characteristic of this type of project is its complexity, especially in terms of 
actors involved and the various difficulties encountered at the implementation level. 
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These are operations that bring together a large number of actors from different 
disciplines and cultures. The role and status of many of these actors, in the fragmented 
and complicated process of the project, are of necessity only temporary and partial. The 
arrangements and implementation often require complex and particular measures in 
order to successfully cope with regulatory frameworks.  
Similarly, securing funding and allocating responsibilities among stakeholders is not a 
simple task. This is why many authors see financial and political risk as inherent in this 
type of project and among its main characteristics (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Premius et al., 
2008; Bourdin, 2002; Salet et al., 2013). 
The megaproject for us is a large urban2 development project that is specific for its size, 
complexity and duration. While localized, it is inscribed in a specific dynamic of 
metropolitan - even global - development at a broader scale. Thus it is related, for some 
scholars, to the emergence of the neoliberal city (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Sager, 2011) 
or, for others, in a less trenchant analytical tone - to metropolitan development and its 
needs and strategies (Salet and Gualini 2006; Bourdin and Prost, 2009). 
 
Urban Megaprojects, an ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism tool 
Despite criticism concerning their costs, risks and impacts, UMPs are becoming 
increasingly a common urban tool in various contexts. However, the studies on UMPs 
do not correspond to their expansion worldwide. There are many successful studies on 
megaprojects; however, this subject is still marked by imprecision and ambiguity. 
                                                
2 We recognise that the word ‘urban’ in connection with a project connotes a complexity of actors, 
ranging across both private and public actors, and acknowledge that it cannot carry the same meaning in 
the Dubai context. Barthel (2008) considers that the word ‘urban’ used in European contexts cannot be 
applied to the Arab world in this sense, where usually megaprojects are governed and piloted by 
developers and rulers. However, in this text, the adjective ‘urban’ is used to differentiate the megaprojects 
from infrastructural projects. 
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The approach adopted in individual researches is often one based on case studies 
analysed from the angle of actors’ role, the new contexts of globalization (Altshuler & 
Luberoff, 2003; Barthel, 2008, 2010; Lehrer & Laidly, 2008; Salet, 2007; Shatkins, 
2008; Swyngedouw et al., 2002), or the management of these projects (Browne et al., 
2009). They are also analyzed through their evolution in history (Orueta & Fainstein, 
2008; Lin, 2007), their morphology, impact, costs, and the social issues they imply 
(Carmona, 2006; Fainstein, 2008, Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Salet et al., 2013; Flyvbjerg, 
2005; Marshall, 2003; Jia et al., 2011; Olds, 2002; Priemus & Flyvbjerg, 2007; Kim et 
al., 2009; Priemus, 2008; Priemus et al., 2008; Shatkins, 2011; Van Marrewijk et al., 
2008). 
The analytical framework of the production of megaprojects in the scientific literature is 
mostly dominated by approaches that link, almost systematically, the emergence of these 
new urban objects to the dynamics of globalization and neoliberalism. These analyses 
are often based on theories of political economy. These theories emphasize the impact of 
changes in production modes, financialization3 and the dominant role of private actors, 
factors that are put forward to explain the contemporary changes in cities’ production 
processes, and therefore in the emergence of UMPs. 
Considered as expressions of neoliberal urban planning policies, urban megaprojects are 
understood in the light of concepts such as ‘glocal states’ (Swyngedouw 1996) and 
‘glocal fixes’ (Brenner & Theodore 2002).  UMPs became specific tools seeking to 
attract international capital and investments through space-based interventions. 
The majority of these projects, be it in Europe, in America, in Southern Asia or in the 
Arabic world, often portrayed as prototypes (Marshall, 2003), have many similarities. 
These similarities can be seen at the morphological level, in the financing modes or the 
public-private partnerships they involve, and more particularly in the objective of 
attracting multinational users and investments in a context of inter-city competition 
(Fainstein, 2008; Lehrer & Laidly, 2008; Diaz & Fainstein, 2008; Barthel, 2010). 
                                                
3 Financialization’ is defined in ‘Oxford Dictionaries’ as the process by which financial institutions, 
markets, etc., increase in size and influence. 
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Despite these similarities, urban megaprojects are at the same time the product of 
specific factors such as sociopolitical and economical contexts and professional milieus. 
They are ‘emerging urban forms powerfully shaped by place-specific geographies, 
cultural preference and social structure’ (Shatkins, 2011).  
Indeed, in the literature, urban megaprojects are examined through two different angles. 
From one side, they are considered as globalized city fragments, given the 
internationalization of capital and the circulation of images and models. These images 
and models are the results of the globalization of ideas, the standardization of norms, the 
important role of mobile professionals and the new ‘global’ practices of increasingly 
diverse populations.  
From the other side, megaprojects are considered as specific products of particular 
contexts. They are at the same time products of specific local governances and the 
reflection of local norms and references. As manifestations of neoliberal urban policies, 
urban megaprojects transform, adapt or mutate in different contexts (Brenner & 
Theodore, 2002).  
In fact, neoliberal urban policies are often analysed in relation to a geographical context, 
the particularities of which filter and transform the neoliberal logic (Hackworth & 
Moriah, 2002). It is in light of these observations that many scholars have defined an 
‘actually existing’ neoliberalism in order to designate the important variations the 
interpretation and application of this concept have to undergo in each city. Based on this 
literature on contingency in neoliberal urban policies, UMPs can be understood as 
globalization’s fragment as well as the product of a local context.  
Consequently, despite UMPs having become a worldwide phenomenon, the plethora of 
economic, cultural and political factors varies between one context and another. In the 
Arabic world, for example, UMPs have a particular dimension. They constitute a major 
component within the development and extension of cities. In Dubai, the focus of the 




‘Fascinating’ UMPs in Dubai: a lever for a new urban planning and 
development approach 
UMPs, along with rapid urban growth, have transformed Dubai in the last two decades. 
Scholars describe this transformation as a shift from a fishing and trading village to a 
cosmopolitan, regionally significant twenty-first century city, that is a leading tourism, 
mass communication, transit and finance hub, and a city present on the world stage as 
global (Pacione, 2005; Lavergne, 2002, 2009; Malty & Dillon, 2007; Haines, 2011; 
Acuto, 2010, 2011; Chu, 2007). It is this rapid evolution, from pre-industrial to 
industrial and then post-industrial center (Acuto, 2010; Pacione, 2005), moving from 
basic economic activities to an oil-based economy and then to a diversified economy, 
that distinguishes Dubai as a ‘product of a super-fast urbanism’ (Bagaeen, 2007, p.174). 
A number of factors have contributed to this transformation. Some are related to Dubai’s 
strategic location and others to the ‘openness politics’ adopted by the city’s rulers. 
Its spectacle and monumentality have prompted descriptions of the city as in a ‘frantic 
quest for hyperbole’ (Davis, 2007, p.54), and as a place where ‘superlatives had become 
a way of life’ (Walters et al., 2006, p.79). In only a decade, Dubai has built for itself a 
city map and skyline that are recognized worldwide. The spectacle in architecture can be 
seen through artificial islands, record-breaking towers, and the high number of large-
scale developments. Dubai is often portrayed as a product of neoliberalism, since its 
policies are mainly oriented toward the market, with extreme measures such as 
elimination of taxes and deregulation in the context of urban and economic frameworks.  
In this context, urban megaprojects are not only a constitutive part of the city’s branding 
policies aiming at creating a city label and image contributing to the city’s development 
and extension, they also contribute to the deep transformation of its urban morphology. 
In the last fifteen years, these megaprojects, built at a record speed, have profoundly 
modified the urban landscape in Dubai. They have been also the most tangible 
expression of the city’s metropolization, or what has been called the ‘Dubai miracle’ 
(Hardy, 2008; Walters et al., 2006; Lasnier & Chancel, 2010).  
The city’s general urban morphology can be compared to an assemblage of 
megaprojects, implanted in the city either individually or through agglomerations. 
Located in different parts of the city, close to the urban fabric that existed before the 
construction boom and far from the old centre towards the inland desert, Dubai’s 
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megaprojects do not follow clear urban expansion logic. The result is a fragmented 
urban fabric that looks more like an uncompleted urban puzzle.  
This urban fragmentation is not only a reflection of a specific real estate market or 
particular development agendas, it reflects a socio-cultural system that is also marked by 
a social fragmentation (Kanna, 2011). In fact, even if some authors interpret urban 
fragmentation strictly as a spatial and geographical phenomenon (see for example 
Burgess, 2005), some others consider that elements of urban fragmentation encompass 
spatial, socio-spatial, political and economic issues (Navez Bouchanine, 2002; Bénit et 
al., 2007).  
This amplification of many aspects such as seeking metropolization, the plethora of 
neoliberal politics, the rapidity and particularity in urban transformation and extension, 
the impact of fascination, the abundance of capital, the power and monopoly of the 
urban actors all contribute to portray Dubai as a place that makes more visible dynamics 
that may be less visible in other contexts.  
Even if Dubai shares many similarities with other GCC cities, a set of particularity 
characterizes its history, its socio-political system and its economy. Since the early 
beginning of the city, in the nineteenth century, Dubai rulers were known for their 
openness to other cultures, their ambitious plans for their city, and their ability to 
centralize and control all aspects of urban and political life. 
Many authors have analysed a number of Dubai’s most spectacular urban megaprojects, 
some considered to be the icons of Dubai’s circulated image, like the Palm Islands and 
the World Islands (Picon-Lefèvre, 2013; Elsheshtawy, 2004; Jensen, 2013). There has 
also been a focus on its free zone megaprojects  (Malty & Dillon, 2007), and Dubailand 
Megaproject (Walters et al., 2006).  
While the Dubai experience has attracted many authors, there is no text that focuses 
exclusively on megaprojects. Dubai’s UMPs have been examined in some studies 
without constituting the main object of analysis, being treated instead along with 
governance aspects or through an architectural perspective. There is no scholarly work 
that aims to analyse the characteristics of Dubai UMPs with reference to a sufficiently 
large database. Moreover, it is important to underline the lack of systematic analyses that 
examine the role of the megaprojects within the broader urban dynamics of the city.  
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We consider that the particularity of Dubai’s UMPs cannot be examined in isolation 
from the urban and global dynamics of the city and its actors. Indeed, from one side, 
Dubai is extending through megaprojects, and from the other side, the city is governed 
as well by megaprojects. Dozens of megaprojects constitute the heart and the 
development engine of various parts of the city.  
Moreover, the numerous real estate developers affiliated to the monarchical political 
system, a plethora of financial policies, land control and strategic plans all implicate and 
are orchestrated through megaprojects.  
Therefore, the particularity of our study lies in analysing the UMPs within the totality of 
the system inside which they exist. UMPs, in their morphological and managerial 
dimensions, will be studied as a product of a particular socio-political system, and of a 
network of actors that connects political leaders, real estate companies, regional 
developers, and international consultancy firms.  
We believe that megaprojects cannot be understood as isolated interventions linked to 
various culturally and economically globalized networks, but have to be examined as 
both a product and a catalyst of local urban dynamics. They also cannot be understood in 
isolation from interrelations between actors in terms of their specificities and roles, and 
the manifestation of these in terms of physical and morphological characteristics as well.  
Based on all that, we argue that Dubai urban megaprojects, as reflections of 
globalizing and neoliberal policies, constitute not only territorial processes and 
forms, specifically rooted in the local context, but the primary instrument of the 
city’s development, and a way to control, manage and orient its urban process. 
Similar to major highway projects, train stations, major squares, parks and public spaces, 
that have a structural role within the city, megaprojects in Dubai seem to be contributing 
to the implementation of a new approach in urban planning and new urban policies 
centred around the project’s materiality. In this perspective, strategic planning and 
regulation, basic elements of modern urban planning, may be present but seem to be 




Research questions  
This leads to many questions: 
1- What are the specific contextual factors that have contributed to the emergence and 
the adoption of urban megaprojects as a primary tool in the urban production of Dubai? 
2- How have these urban megaprojects impacted the city’s urban dynamics and its urban 
form? And how are they structured in terms of morphology? 
3- How are megaprojects contributing to forging a particular planning approach in the 
city, at the strategic approach level, the implementation of main infrastructure networks 
level, as well as the regulatory framework level? 
 
Research Methodology 
We have adopted three types of methodology in order to provide answers to the research 
questions. These are observation, documentation and interviews. 
To undertake observation, we visited Dubai twice, in 2012 and in 2013, in October, 
given the moderate climate in this month, for a period of three weeks on each visit. 
Apart from the interviews that will be detailed below, the major component of the 
observation comprised visits to a wide selection of locations in the city: 
Visiting a large number of megaprojects. Megaprojects were selected based on 
accessibility, a consideration that generally excluded construction sites and gated 
communities. Some of the sites selected were easily accessible by metro and some 
others by taxi. Some projects, such as Business Bay, that was still a construction site, 
were not accessible. However, visiting the upper part of Burj Khalifa, the highest tower 
in the city (and at that time, the world) afforded us the opportunity to undertake a 
photographic survey of the surrounding projects. It was not possible to walk around all 
megaprojects, and hence many were visited only by car. The scale of sites and high 
temperature in the inland desert made walking relatively difficult. However, we were 
able to systematically photograph buildings, roads and open space, with a focus on 
public/private limits where possible. 
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During our stay, we had the occasion to stay in the Dubai Marina project, one of the case 
studies in this research. This stay was key in providing us sufficient time to do all the 
needed observations and surveys, such as the content, building heights, the road network, 
the tramline that was under construction during the visit, and other aspects related to 
users, accessibility and morphology. 
We also visited twice, in 2012 and in 2013, the annual expo Dubai Cityscape, an 
important mega-event in the domain of construction and real estate, where entrepreneurs, 
developers and firms exhibit, through large models, panels and video presentations, their 
planned and built projects. This expo constituted another way to survey the on-going 
major projects. 
Visiting the old centre of Dubai: walking in the souks allowed us to discover and observe 
the users, the functions, the architectural typology, and the city scale. Walking also 
facilitated the taking of notes and photos. Since the old souks in Dubai were not to be 
morphologically analysed in this research, locations to be visited were selected randomly 
and notes and photos were not taken systematically.  
Observing the locations along the banks of the creek, through a ride in a water taxi. This 
excursion allowed us to observe and take photos of the modern projects that are taking 
place, in contrast to the existing old urban fabric. Photos focused on the buildings as well 
as open green spaces alongside the creek. It was also important to understand the various 
transport means that are managed by RTA, the roads and transport authority in Dubai, that 
serve the creek from one side, and connect the old part with ‘new Dubai’. 
In the documentation part, we have used several tools in order to collect related data, from 
the relevant scholarly literature, the grey literature (reports), photos and maps. 
Literature review: it focuses on the scholarly articles and books that examine Dubai and 
the GCC in general, from various disciplines, with a focus on morphology, history, 
governance, geography and economy. We have also drawn from some books purchased 
from a book expo during our visit; these books were mainly written by the Sheikh, 
focusing on his dreams and visions of Dubai, and others providing a photographic survey 
of the city. 
Websites and blogs have constituted for us an important source of data. These mainly 
focus on Dubai, and less frequently on worldwide real estate. Websites and blogs were 
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very informant about projects, such as details concerning developers, content, phasing and 
masterplans. They are also important sources of historical photos, aerial views and maps. 
While the interviewed firms, Dubai municipality and other authorities such as TECOM 
were reluctant to provide us with maps and photos, these were relatively freely accessible 
online.  
Systematic review of periodicals such as MEED that specialise in real estate within the 
GCC and north Africa region, and ENR, a revue that is more international with a focus on 
the firms and projects in the domain of architecture and construction, were also important 
sources. 
Concerning maps, we have found some online and some on OpenStreetMap, while others 
were bought from private offices in Dubai that specialise in commercial GIS and 
mapping. A number of maps used in this research were taken from the ‘Dubai 2020 Urban 
Masterplan’, an official report purchased from Dubai Municipality. Aerial views were 
mainly uploaded from Google Earth. The aerial views provided by Google Earth back to 
2002 were very useful in analysing the city’s expansion. However, Google Earth does not 
go in history beyond 2000 for some major city parts, or even beyond 2003 for others.  
As for the interviews, we identified prior to the site visits the international consultancy 
firms that are involved in our first list of identified megaprojects. Referring to blogs and 
websites was key in completing this task, as the consultants are rarely mentioned on the 
official websites of megaprojects. Moreover it was common to find conflicting 
information due to the continuous changes of consultants over the duration of a project. 
This posed a major challenge to identifying the consultant who produced the master plan 
for each project. Given the complexity of megaprojects, and the involvement of a large 
number of consultants, identifying the consultant in the domain of urban planning seemed 
to prove confusing even for specialised blogs. In order to resolve this issue, we have 
cross-referenced many sources where possible, and part of the data was provided after the 
interviews. 
In accessing the interviewees within the firms we have identified the professionals in 
urban planning department or in architecture department when there is not a planning one. 
We have done that through visiting the firms’ websites, and then calling the offices that 
are either in Dubai or in Abu Dhabi, the larger emirate in the UAE. From another side, 
and knowing some aspects of the professional aspects, through friends, relatives and 
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colleagues who live or work there, access to some interviewees was made easier. In 
general, the majority of contacted persons were available for interviews. Only two firms 
claimed that they do not have time for interviews. We have also contacted Dubai 
Municipality and TECOM for interviews. Interviews were possible after an official 
demand and appointment. We tried to contact key developers, such as EMAAR, Nakheel 
and Dubai Properties. Only EMAAR has provided us an interview, and this only 
happened after a recommendation from a friend in Dubai Municipality. In total we have 
interviewed around 40 persons, in the selected firms, in Dubai Municipality, TECOM and 
EMAAR.  
Other type of interviews was 10 to 15 minutes unplanned interviews with people in Dubai 
Cityscape. Those were selected upon their availability, and were project managers, public 
relations staff, sales managers and others. A total of ten quick interviews was possible. 
The third type of interviews is an informal one, through unplanned meetings with friends, 
colleagues or relatives who work in Dubai, and in particularly in the domain of 
construction and real estate. Even if not structured, these meetings were important in 
providing us general data about Dubai, the key developers, the social and political 
contexts’ characteristics and other related aspects. 
In the different sections of this research, relevant methodologies were used. In each 
section, the used methodology will be further detailed when needed. In the final 




This research will be structured into three main chapters: 
Following the introduction, the first chapter analyses the context’s elements that have 
contributed to the emergence of megaprojects in Dubai. In the first part of this chapter, the 
rapid urban extension and the spectacular growth of the city marked by speculation and 
the quest of spectacle is highlighted. The second part focuses on urban governance in 
Dubai. Aspects such as political centralization around the Sheikh - as governor, manager, 
controller of land, royal funds and major parastatals - are presented, as well as the 
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multitude of authorities and the overlapping prerogatives. Links between this urban 
governance and urban development are examined. In the third part of this chapter, we 
examine the particularities of urban planning practice that is marked by a lack of local 
expertise and the dominance of international consultancy firms. The presence of these 
firms in GCC is deeply linked to the specific development history of the region. The 
primary role of these firms in contributing to the emergence of megaprojects in Dubai is 
analysed. The solid presence of these firms as well as their integration and their adaptation 
to the various particularities of the local context is illustrated. 
Chapter two examines the impact of megaprojects on the city of Dubai, and their 
contribution to the evolution of its driving urban dynamics. Therefore, megaprojects are 
studied at two different spatial scales. First, and based on a database of 36 megaprojects, 
the particularities of these projects are highlighted, and compared to an existing literature 
on GCC’s megaprojects and more particularly on Dubai’s megaprojects. At a smaller 
scale, and based on four megaprojects, main morphological characteristics will be 
analysed, as well as internal and external dynamics in relation to the surrounding context. 
It will be demonstrated that physical and morphological aspects of megaprojects are key 
elements in the creation of the project’s image, its relation to the city and its managerial 
aspects. 
In chapter three, the megaprojects-based urban planning is examined as a specific 
approach. As an urban instrument, UMPs are analysed as located somewhere between 
urban planning and urban design. A comparison between these two different approaches 
will be made in order to illustrate aspects of megaprojects that can be more relevant to 
urban planning and/or urban design. It will be argued that megaprojects are more a type of 
physical planning, and will be further examined through a comparison with similar 
physical approaches. Then, we go through the role of the UMPs as planning instruments, 
and we examine challenges, successes and failures of articulating them with other 
planning instruments, mainly urban networks planning and strategic planning, within the 
Dubai’s UMPs-based approach. In the second part of this chapter, we focus on the UMP 
as a public policy instrument. The procedural aspect is hence examined through Dubai 
Marina project, a case study that we consider as representative of the city’s megaprojects. 






Specific urban history, particular governance and a 
customized expertise as main factors contributing to the 














































The rapid development process in GCC and particularly in Dubai is not characterized by 
spectacular speed alone. It is about a ‘qualitatively different’ development pattern to 
those experienced by European countries, for example, where the economic foundation 
of societies went from agriculture to industrialization, to the ‘information society’ and 
finally to the present ‘knowledge economy’ (Hvidt, 2009).  
Dubai is portrayed as trying to leapfrog intermediate stages and transition directly from a 
pearling/fishing/trading economy to a knowledge economy4 (Ewers & Malecki, 2010; 
Hvidt, 2009). In GCC in general, this quick transformation can be related to the record 
oil revenues that have generated a great need to find destinations for the surplus of 
capital.  
The study of Haussman’s Paris by Harvey (2003) linked its urban transformation to 
accumulation of capital. That analysis can be compared to Dubai, given the similarity in 
the transformation of the urban space and its relationship to the transformation of the 
real estate markets and the circulation of financial surplus from oil rents to the circuit of 
the built environment, or the ‘second circuit’ (Buckeley & Hanieh, 2014). 
‘Much like Haussman’s Paris, Dubai’s property markets have been fundamentally 
transformed through the financialization, commodification and internationalization of 
the fixed components of the urban landscape’ (Buckeley & Hanieh, 2014; p.156).  
The reliance on urban megaprojects as a main engine in the financialization and 
commodification of the city space and the real estate market can only be examined in the 
context of the city’s urban history and recent trends in its economic policy. It is also the 
case that the specific governance and the ruling logic of Al Maktoum family are deeply 
intertwined with the urban history and management of the city through its extension and 
development phases. 
The governing elite, headed today by one of the descendants of the ruling family, Sheik 
Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (Dubai’s ruler and the UAE Prime Minister) has 
                                                
4 The concept ‘knowledge economy’ remains vaguely defined. It can be understood as the latest stage in 
the evolution of the global capitalist economy. This stage is marked by technological innovations and the 
globally competitive need for innovation based on the research community such as labs, universities, etc.  
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held solid control over the expansion, development and strategic choices adopted by the 
emirate. Indeed, many writings on Dubai’s governance highlight the intrinsic role played 
by this family in shaping Dubai’s status and image. Hence examining this specific 
governance system is fundamental to understanding how urban megaprojects have 
become the privileged urban tool highly encouraged by this politico-economical system. 
From another angle, it is also important to examine who are the professional actors who 
facilitate the undertaking of these UMPs, which require a level of technical expertise and 
prowess that is in severely short supply in Dubai and the GCC context in general.5  
This chapter will examine these three axes, introducing first the particular urban history 
and development of Dubai, with its speedy transformation driven by a quest for 
spectacle and records. Secondly it examines the various facets of the governance system, 
highlighting the main powerful actors, the Sheikh and the parastatals, and the relative 
weakness of public authorities. Thirdly it examines the stock of expertise and knowledge 
in Dubai, focusing on the major role played by the international consultancy firms in 
architecture and urban planning. 
 
1 History)and)particular)urban)extension))
In Dubai6, the first forms of urbanization can be traced back to the nineteenth century, 
making it a relatively recent city. Dubai has witnessed a very fast urban transformation 
that placed it on the map of world metropolises within a few short decades 
(Elsheshtawy, 2013; Pacione, 2005; Schmid, 2009). Dubai developed around a natural 
creek that for a long time constituted, for geographical and economic reasons, the 
location’s raison d'être. The first harbor and commercial activities developed gradually 
                                                
5 Dubai’s urban and infrastructure projects have always relied on external expertise, notably regional 
(Lebanese consultancy firms, for example) and British (such as Halcrow), but also some from farther afield. 
This aspect will be developed in the third part of this chapter.  
6 Some historical references consider that the name ‘Dubai’ is constituted from two words: ‘Du’ and  ‘bayt’. 
Du could signify two, in Indian or Persian language, while ‘bayt’ means house in Arabic. This interpretation 
considers that it is about the existence of two houses on each side of the creak. Another explanation 
considers that Du-bay means two bays, or two seas, in reference to the creek and its two sides. 
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on the creek’s banks and the centre of the city formed from the urban extensions and 
densification that took place (Wirth, 2002).  
 
Fig 1.1: GCC countries, Yemen not being part of the council 
Since 1950, Dubai’s population has grown about a hundredfold, from 20,000 to 1.9 
million inhabitants (as estimated in 2010), and its urban fabric has expanded to 
approximately 400 times the original area (Dubai Municipality, 2012). Before 1960, 
Dubai comprised collections of mud houses and shelters made from palm fronds. The 
oldest building, Al Fahidi Fort, now preserved as the Dubai Museum, was built in 1799 
(see fig. 1.2 and fig. 1.3). From the eastern and western sides of the creek, Deira and Bur 
Dubai began to grow and extend. Dubai also extended starting from the nineteenth 




Fig 1.2: Al-Fahidi Fort, one of the remaining old buildings in Dubai. Built in 1799. The 
photo dates back to 1936. (Source www.medubai.com, accessed on 29 December 2015) 
 
 
Fig 1.3:Al Fahidi Fort transformed into Dubai Museum. Photo taken in 2013. (Source: 
www.dubaidhow. Accessed on 29 December 2015). 
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The city centre of Dubai, around the historical creek, came to be very densely built, 
developing in a longitudinal direction along the main axis, Sheikh Zayed Road, that 
links Dubai to Abu Dhabi to the southwest. Major developments and mega towers 
emerged gradually along this axis and a linear city has been created linking the old part 
around the creek to Jebel Ali Free Zone in the southwest (fig. 1.5). Once this axis 
reached saturation, two directions remained for future development in Dubai: towards 
inland desert areas and out to sea. In an effort to maximize waterfronts with tourist 
appeal, the city witnessed the creation of artificial islands. 
 
                 
Fig 1.4: Aerial view of Dubai, taken in 1951, showing the three separate parts of the 
city: Deira, Bur Dubai and Shindaga. (Source: www.rmmeera.wordpress.com. Accessed 
on 29 December 2015) 
 
Contrary to the views circulated by several critics who portray urban development in 
Dubai as random and merely the product of the imagination of its successive governors, 
the urban extension of Dubai must be examined in the light of the shifting contexts that 
have marked its history since the end of the nineteenth century.  
This transformation has been shaped by several factors, notably Dubai’s geographic 
location on an ancient commercial road, the discovery of oil, and the open policies 
adopted since the first phases of urban development. These ambitious policies promoted 
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openness to globalization, the first impact of which was to bring about a spectacular 
urban growth. 
 
Fig 1.5: Sheikh Zayed Road, the main axis along which the city of Dubai extended. (Source: 
Ziaian, 2012) 
 
At the same time, against a background of regional instability (Arab-Israeli conflicts, 
Persian Gulf conflicts), Dubai had always played the role of peaceful haven where it is 
safe to do business (Acuto, 2010; Wirth, 2002; Davis, 2007; Cusset, 2007). The city has 
therefore built on its ability to diversify and opportunely define its role according to 
regional and international needs. Moreover, through a myriad of incentives, such as free 
zones and low taxation, Dubai has become a ‘commercial entrepot’ (Pacione, 2005; 
Elsheshtawy, 2004), and a top immigrant hub, where a philosophy of economic 
liberalism prevails. 
The commercial and financial activities have generated an important urban expansion, 
marked by awe-inspiring megaprojects and architectural firsts. These urban 
transformations have deeply changed the city’s dynamics and image. 
Dubai is exemplary of a city that, in spite of modest assets, shows an astute capacity in 
the optimization of its geographical position, its human capital, and a set of natural 
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resources that are relatively limited in comparison to those of its neighbors. Dubai is 
often portrayed as having the judicious ability to adapt to the changing political and 
economic situation of its context. Several researchers consider that its rise has largely 
depended on its capacity to benefit from the international conflicts that have marked the 
oil-rich Persian Gulf in the last thirty years, as well as a dominant philosophy of 
economic liberalism that encourages entrepreneurial activity (Sampler & Eigner, 2013; 
Pacione, 2005; Lavergne, 2009). 
1.1 Geographic location and open policies  
Dubai is today considered as the “Eastern gate” to the Middle East (Elsheshtawy, 2012): 
the principal hub where the majority of regional and international investments are being 
made. Relatively far from playing host to a set of strategic activities for the globalized 
economy as the global cities of New York, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore 
do, it is nevertheless the platform for meeting and exchange between three worlds: Iran, 
the Indian sub-continent and the Arab world (Elsheshtawy, 2012).  
Geography is of course one factor that contributes to this. But it is also, and especially, a 
policy of very long standing of the Maktoums, the royal family of Dubai, to implement 
modern infrastructure projects and socio-economic networks that have contributed to the 
emergence of the city as an international platform of exchange.  
As far back as the nineteenth century, this family chose to base the economy of Dubai on 
trade and focus on attracting foreign investment, mainly from Iran and India. 
Generations of Indian and Iranian merchants settled in Dubai, attracted by the open 
policy. Even today, the majority of local citizens have Iranian roots (Schmid, 2009; 
Kanna, 2011). Therefore, be it through familial or commercial networks, Dubai is in a 
privileged position to become the principal partner of these important worlds of 
emerging economic potential.  
A map of Dubai that dates back to the year 1822 shows that the city at this time is a 
small village located on the banks of a creek’s sides (see fig. 1.6). Constituting part of 
the sites that extend along the southern coast of the Persian gulf, between Qatar and 
Oman, localities like Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Um Al Qaiwan and Ras Al Khaymah (see fig. 
1.7) were then places of fishing and seafaring, a strip of land protected from the winds 
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Fig 1.6: A sketch map of Dubai, dated 1822. The population at this date was only 1200 
inhabitants. (Source: Dubai Municipality, 2011) 
 
Although pearling was the principal activity of those communities, even at the outset the 
economy of Dubai was not based on it. It was rather oriented towards trade, transport 
and services, already outlining the bases of a tertiary economy reflecting a liberal policy.  
In 1902, the traffic linking India with Gulf destinations was almost completely moved 
from ports in Persia to Dubai following the former’s decision to impose higher tariffs. 
The government of Dubai concurrently reduced its own taxes and Dubai was declared a 




Fig 1.7: The seven emirates constituting the United Arab Emirates. (Source: 
Cadène & Dumortier, 2011) 
 
Following similar policy tightening by Iran after World War II, many Iranian merchants 
and other businessmen felt compelled to move permanently to Dubai in order to benefit 
from the low taxes and liberal policies of the city (Ibid). Several more migratory waves 
took place thereafter, especially from India and Africa, and a number of merchant 
districts were built around the creek. Merchants of various nationalities then accepted 
Dubai’s offer to permanently establish on lands located at the edges of the creek, in 
order to build houses for their families.  
There had also been migratory waves at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
comprising not only Persians but Iraqis, Bahrainis and Pakistanis; these have turned 
Dubai into a city with multiple social classes and ethnic groups (Elsheshtawy, 2013). 
Over two centuries these merchants have established networks of transnational links, 
mobilizing their financial resources and their experience, and thereby transforming 
Dubai into a hub of commercial routes prefiguring the role that the city has today. 
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1.2 The Oil discovery 
As has happened in all GCC countries, the discovery and exploitation of oil in Dubai 
have secured revenues capable of financing a rapid process of urban development. The 
trade-based economy that replaced the pearl-based commerce was boosted by the oil 
discovery and the related industries that emerged from 1966. Nevertheless, oil revenues 
in Dubai are far less than those of Abu Dhabi. In 2008, the oil production in Abu Dhabi 
was 2,524,626 barrel/day, while in Dubai it was only 240,000 barrel/day (Cadène & 
Dumortier, 2011).  
However, oil revenues were sufficient to fund necessary infrastructure projects. Towards 
the end of the 1960s, following the oil discovery, several large projects were developed 
aiming at the construction of a modern infrastructure (and a modern identity7). These 
years were marked by oil exploitation activity that generated a significant increase in 
population and therefore also of important human and financial resources for the city. 
Thus, the oil income made it possible for the government of Dubai to enroll in big 
infrastructure and industrial projects that were crucial for economic and urban 
development, such as the construction of Rashid Port, the aluminum industries, the port 
of Jebel Ali and its industrial zone (see fig. 1.8 and 1.9). In 1985 the free zone of Jebel 
Ali was established, hosting regional and international companies benefiting from low 
taxes and procedures’ simplification. 
 New spaces are urbanized and the city expands, benefitting from the outputs of the oil 
resources. At the beginning of the 1980s, new residential zones were built outside the 
limits of the old districts constituting the old city, along the coast in the direction of 
Jebel Ali.  
                                                
7 Kanna (2011) considers that the post-oil era was marked by a shift towards constructing a new ‘Arabic’ 
identity. ‘Older Dubayyans often speak Arabic, Persian, and South Asian languages; local cuisine is largely 
Indian-derived; and local dress, at least in the pre-oil era, was a mix of Indian Ocean and Persian influences 
rather than Arabian, as it is today. Arab identity in the post-oil period has been constructed largely in 




Fig 1.8: Rashid Port at the creek’s mouth. Above: Rashid Port in 1950 (Source: 
https://mykaleidoscopecolours.wordpress.com/category/downtown-dubai/ accessed on 9 






Fig 1.9: The urban expansion of Dubai. The map shows Jebel Ali Harbor and industrial 




Fig 1.10: Dubai skyline featuring some of the main buildings along Sheikh Zayed Road 
in 2013; on the left Burj al Arab. (Source: Oula Aoun). 
 
Moreover, a new skyline appeared, with the emergence of the urban corridor along Sheikh 
Zayed Road, the principal axis that connects Dubai to Abu Dhabi, constituting the New 
Dubai, and accommodating a great number of skyscrapers, hotels and governmental 
buildings (see fig.1.10). The city invested in aviation, highways, and maritime projects. 
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1.3 Towards a metropolis city  
‘Until recently, Dubai rapid urbanization was not dictated by population growth, but it 
was economically driven by attracting foreign investment and activities aiming at 
developing a long term sustainable economic base…’ (Dubai Municipality, 2012). 
Large projects in Dubai have always been, since the era of Rashid Al Maktoum, a form 
of anticipation of a future modern development rather than a simple response to 
population needs. 
Even after the discovery of oil, the emirate did not stop at black gold. Since the 1990s, 
the Emirate has sought to diversify its economic activities in order to reduce its 
dependence on declining oil reserves. In 2005 for example, oil and gas revenues 
accounted for less than 6% of Dubai’s revenues, while 25% were from aviation related 
services, 22,6% from real estate and construction and over 40% from trade and finance 
services (Dubai Municipality, 2012) 
With the turning of the 21st century, Dubai embarked on further change at an impressive 
pace. The city engaged in an ambitious policy of competition with the world 
metropolises. Architectural and spectacular urban forms are among the tools that it 
deploys for this purpose. The ‘Vision Statement’ in ‘Dubai Urban Development 
Framework for 2020 and beyond’ confirms these orientations: Dubai as competitive city, 
a seamlessly connected city, sustainable across generations, a city of growth and change 
with beautiful and inspiring places, a home to an intercultural society and a city of ideas, 
creativity and culture.  
Focusing on a strategy that aims for an economy of fascination, it has initiated dozens of 
spectacular megaprojects that have vied for the status of world-firsts. In this way, Dubai 
affirms an identity as business and tourism destination with regional and international 
outreach. Downplaying its limited oil reserves, it engages in an economic development 
based on the diversification of its services sector, and an economy that has profoundly 
transformed the real-estate sector through its financialization and internationalization.  
This strategy of economy diversification is initially based on urbanization and the 
transformation of the capitals towards the sector of the built environment (Buckley & 
Hanieh, 2014). 
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1.4 Metropolization and neoliberal urban policies  
In general, the quest of metropolization is not specific to Dubai. Many cities around the 
world consider metropolization as a desired goal and ideal horizon (Roncayolo, 1993). 
They develop urban and economic policies that help put them on the map of cities that 
“matter” at the regional – and even international – level in the new globalized economy.  
This optimism underlying metropolization is associated with “a will to change, 
innovation and mobility” (Ibid.) that would mark contemporary cities more clearly than 
any concentration of infrastructures or activities. However, in spite of its ubiquity, the 
word ‘metropolization’ remains an ambiguous term (Leroy, 2000). It indicates at the 
same time the processes of economic, spatial and cultural transformation connected with 
globalization, and the strategies implemented by urban actors in order to support and 
direct these processes.  
In the case of Dubai, in addition to the economic dimension, the strategic choice of 
openness carries a socio-political dimension that itself constitutes a main factor in the 
rapid metropolization of the city. It has made Dubai a cosmopolitan city in the Arabian 
Peninsula and attracted hundreds of thousands of foreigners.  
This political choice was assumed historically by Maktoums vis-a-vis Arab nationalism. 
Kanna (2011) even invokes a “post-Arabic” identity for Dubai, where an economy 
marked by entrepreneurialism and liberal policies has often been in contrast with most of 
the neighboring countries.  
This amalgam between the geographical and the political are not insignificant. Urban 
and economic policies that constitute the basis of certain strategies of metropolization 
are often presented as if they were unavoidable. The choice open to cities is either to 
adapt to the new global economic constraints, through structural changes of their 
economies and strategies to attract capital and the “creative class” (Florida, 2003), or be 
relegated to the bench of “losers”, marginalized and deprived of resources. This is at the 
core of the ideology behind what certain authors (Hackworth, 2007; Peck et al., 2009; 
Peck & Brenner, 2011; He & Wu, 2009; Christophers, 2008; Sager, 2011) designate as 
neoliberal urban planning.  
The urban authorities are invited to vacate their responsibilities for planning and piloting 
economic and territorial development, and to prioritize support for private economic 
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initiative instead, in particular through deregulation and minimization of taxes, and to 
confine themselves to assuming responsibility for the development and ensuring funds 
for the investments, which support the operations of the private actors.  
From this point of view, the case of Dubai may seem emblematic. This small port on the 
coast of the Persian Gulf was propelled in less than two decades, through an unrelenting 
strategy of metropolization, to the status of one of the main economic nodes in the 
region. ‘Dubai must be understood as an international city that forms part of broader 
urban and natural systems’ (Dubai Municipality, 2012).  
However, although it borrows massively from the arsenal of neoliberal urban policies, 
the Dubai model of urban development has its specificities at the governance level, and 
its own tools, and at the core of these tools are the megaprojects. Combining fascination, 
urban marketing, technical prowess, phenomenal urban growth and specific governance, 
the case of Dubai appears like a laboratory for a new and particular mode of 
metropolization. 
1.5 Dubai’s development and urban tools: the urban megaproject as main 
engine of Dubai Model 
Through the history of the city, successive governments have deployed various urban 
tools in order to manage urban growth. Starting from the middle of the twentieth 
century, development has been managed through the provision of public services and 
infrastructure, the construction of public buildings, the creation of various strategic 
plans8 (Elshestawy, 2013; Pacione, 2005; Wirth, 2002; Dubai Municipality, 2012), 
defining the axes of growth, ‘zoning’, and regulations aimed at managing the housing 
sector for nationals and their access to land (Pacione, 2005). 
                                                
8 As the main planning authority since 1950, Dubai Municipality has prepared and/or commissioned the 
following plans: Dubai’s first masterplan by John Harris in 1959, the second masterplan by John Harris in 
1971, the Comprehensive Development Plan for Dubai Emirate by Doxiadis in 1980, the Dubai Urban 
Structure Plan for 2012 horizon by Parsons-Harland Bartholomew & Associates in 1990, the Amended 
Structure Plan for 2012 horizon by Dubai Municipality in 2003, the Dubai Urban Development framework 
(DUDF) for 2020 and beyond by UURBIS and WSP in 2009, and Dubai 2020 Urban Masterplan by 
AECOM in 2012. 
 32 
However, in the last decades, following a phenomenal growth that has exceeded all the 
guiding strategies, the plans and other urban tools have rapidly become obsolete. ‘Since 
the adoption of its previous urban structure plans in 1995 and 2003, Dubai’s 
development commitments have extended beyond the boundary of such plans’ (Dubai 
Municipality, 2012). 
 
1.5.1 Provision of infrastructure 
Since the 1990s, Dubai has further improved its infrastructure networks through the 
extension of the road network, metro and tram projects, and new airports. 
The network of modern infrastructure with which the city has been endowed is an 
important asset not enjoyed by other Gulf countries (Ramos, 2010). In addition to the 
road network, there is an electricity grid, telephone and medical infrastructure, a potable 
water supply network and an airport connecting the city directly to several Western 
destinations. These elements of infrastructure constituted an advantage for various 
American and European companies in their establishment plans in Dubai (Elshestawy, 
2013). 
1.5.2 Schematic and Master Plans 
In 1960, Dubai adopted its first Master Plan, made by the English architect John Harris, 
which had as a main objective the modernization of the city. At that time the city had no 
modern infrastructure, lacking even elementary items such as a road network. This plan 
was made a few years before the discovery of oil (see fig.11). It aimed to initiate a 
rational and not very ambitious scale of development, based on defining zones for 
residential, industrial and public buildings. 
‘The situation of Dubai in the 1960 was quite primitive. The city had no paved roads, no 
utility networks and no modern port facilities. Water was only available from cans 
brought into town by donkeys. Travelling to Dubai from London took several days in 
unreliable piston-engine planes with overnight stops. Communication was also difficult. 
There were few telephones and cables were sent by radio. The Masterplan developed by 
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Harris aimed at rectifying this by addressing some fundamentals: a map, a road system 
and direction for growth’ (Elsheshtawy, 2013). 
 
Fig 1.11: Dubai’s first master plan prepared by John Harris in 1959, focusing mainly on 
modernizing the city through infrastructure (Source: Elsheshtawy, 2013). 
In this stage – from 1959 to 1970 – development followed the Harris master plan and 
was limited to the city core and its close surrounds.  
A second master plan was developed by Harris in 1971, after the oil discovery and the 
accelerated extension of the city had begun; it had more ambitious objectives, such as 
the construction of Port Rashid at the mouth of the creek, the construction of a tunnel 
beneath the creek at its lower reaches, and two bridges across the creek connecting the 
two city parts. Harris’ second master plan considers for the first time a residential zone 




Fig 1.12: Chronology of the various master plans and strategic plans for Dubai city 
(Source: Oula Aoun) 
 
Several plans were done in order to orient and control the city’s rapid development (See 
fig. 1.12). Dubai Urban Master Plan for 2012 and above is another key master plan (See 













































































































































































































Fig 1.14: Amended Master Plan for 2012 horizon 
 
However, the majority of these areas were for industrial functions around the Jebel Ali 
zone, agricultural in the middle, while large zones were designated for future 
development beyond 2012. The 2003 Dubai Structural Plan (see fig. 1.14) shows for the 
first time artificial palm islands in the sea. Palm Deira, currently the biggest of these, 
was not yet planned. 
The structure plan of 1990 and the amended structure plan of 2003 were flexible enough 
to accommodate any changes, as they were based mainly on a series of nodes and axes 
guiding growth.  
However, it soon became clear, with the beginning of the 21st century and the rapid 
urban transformation experienced by the city, that these plans were not sufficient, even 
if, to some extent, the present road network and main axes of growth follow these plans’ 
recommendations.  
The Dubai Urban Development Framework was designed to tackle various issues that 
resulted from the influx of foreigners and the growing social, economic and 
environmental problems. It was also supposed to create a flexible and fully integrated 
development planning and management framework for Dubai to the year 2020 and 
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beyond. This plan was marked by an unexplained level of secrecy, and no detailed 
reports about it were issued. After only a few years it was superseded by the Dubai 2020 
Urban Master Plan.  
The Dubai 2020 Urban Master Plan seeks in addition to provide an integrated strategy in 
order to address increasing number of issues in all sectors, from infrastructure to urban 
sprawl and growing social and environmental problems. It mainly focuses on limiting 
the city’s expansion into the desert and advocates an infill approach, as well as 
prioritizing the completion of on-going megaprojects rather than commencing new ones.  
 
1.5.3 Urban Megaprojects as urban tool 
In spite of the presence of strategic plans that are supposed to guide and control the 
urban development, megaprojects seem to be taking place in the urban grid of Dubai 
without taking into account the orientations and the general tendencies of the city.  
Megaprojects spread at a speed which the strategic city plans struggle to keep up with; 
the Dubai 2020 Urban Master Plan reads like an attempt to integrate many of the already 
built or planned megaprojects under a unified vision.  
Despite the image that circulates of uncontrolled and chaotic development, the numerous 
plans that seek to guide Dubai’s development show a determination to control urban 
expansion. However, they all seem to be insufficient and easily brushed aside in the face 
of the incomparable urban expansion and hectic pace of projects already underway.   
This urban expansion, driven by a large number of megaprojects, has entailed a process 
of growth by fragments. The logic of this approach results in the construction of 
artificial islands and the locating of megaprojects as implants along and at the 
intersections of major road axes, covering the surface of Dubai.  
The establishment of megaprojects seems to follow criteria such as the accessibility to 
principal road axes or the proximity of water: along the Sheikh Zayed Road, on the axes 
that goes towards the desert inland zone, along the banks of the creek, or on the littoral. 
The proximity and connectivity with the existing urban fabric is not necessarily a 
criterion. 
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The city has a new morphological layout as a result, with several isolated megaprojects 
each introverted and claiming a certain centrality at a metropolitan scale.  
The government, as ever, favours a flexible approach towards them, according the 
various developments and urban private projects a posteriori recognition and integration 
into the latest strategic plan. Allowing this considerable latitude to the private9 sector, 
the government’s own intervention is reduced to the development of infrastructure (see 
fig.1.15) and the management of urban services. The main current urban tool that shapes 
the city’s image, the megaproject, thus remains largely out of the control of 
governmental public institutions.  
          
          
Fig 1.15: Dubai modern infrastructure: Metro line alongside Sheikh Zayed Road (Source: 
Oula Aoun) 
 
                                                
9 In the coming section, it will be explained how ‘public’ and ‘private’ have ambiguous definitions, and the 
grey area between the public and private spheres will be examined.  
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1.5.4 The fascination 
Urban megaprojects are the ultimate tool of the policy adopted in Dubai of city 
marketing, or ‘city branding’ (as per Eshuis & Edwards, 2012). This policy is 
implemented through a confluence of mega events, flagship projects and signature urban 
design (Sager, 2011). In his commentary on these practices, Kanna (2013, p.6) argues 
that it amounts to an ‘overreliance on an artistic mode of urban production’.  
Heiko Schmid (2009) considers that Dubai authorities have reproduced the model of Las 
Vegas, based on fuelling the economy through large and spectacular projects. The 
property developers in Dubai believe that, in a very competitive market, they need to 
develop unique projects; projects that are icons, visionary, daring, exceptional – projects 
that fascinate.  
This search for fascination, or the ‘technological sublime’10 (Frick, 2005) – that is 
translated in terms of a new record in surface, height, size or cost – is a principal element 
of the Dubai model. In ten years, Dubai had built Burj Al Arab, highest and most 
luxurious hotel in the world, following on completion of the largest artificial island, in 
the shape of a palm tree. Then two other larger palm-tree islands had followed. Then the 
300 islands of ‘The World’ megaproject emerged.  
To the largest shopping centres of the world, largest artificial islands, the largest 
artificial canal, the largest amusement park, and many other records, Dubai has, since 
2010, added the Burj Khalifa, the highest structure in the world, reaching 830 meters. 
However, the search for superlatives is not a goal in itself, but a means of retaining the 
attention of the media, to show that ‘all is happening in Dubai’ (Schmid, 2009).  
                                                
10 As per (2005), ‘The notion of technological sublime can be found in the work of historians Leo Marx and 
David Nye. Marx labels America’s fascination with technological advances of the nineteenth century as the 
‘rhetoric of the technological sublime’ in which language was used, particularly in literature and public 
speeches, to convey a sense of the USA’s unlimited potential in the area of progress. According to Marx, 
democracy fuelled American pursuits of new technology and inventions because it ‘invites every man to 
enhance his own comfort and status. To the citizen of democracy inventions are vehicles for the pursuit of 
happiness’ (Marx, 1964: 205). With respect to transportation technology, Marx comments, ‘To look at a 
steamboat . . . is to see the sublime progress of the race. Variations on the theme are endless; only the 
slightest suggestion is needed to elevate a machine into a “type” of progress’ (Marx, 1964: 203)’ 
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Thus, many artificial islands, skyscrapers, large urban megaprojects and big shopping 
centres are spreading across the city, aiming to create an image of a world city that is 
‘connected’ to all the latest architectural and technical trends.  
 
Fig 1.16: Typical representations of Dubai as rated by international tourists (Source: 
Schmid, 2009) 
 
In his book Economy of Fascination, which compares Dubai with Las Vegas, Heiko 
Schmid examines the power of semiotics. He shows that, for internationals, Dubai’s 
perception is related to images of a number of its many large and iconic projects (see fig. 
1.16). Fig 1.17 shows, in 2009, the power of the image of the Burj al Arab luxury 7-star 
hotel, and its intertwining with Dubai’s image. A particular image of Burj al Arab that 
became very popular is the tennis players playing ‘in the sky’, with Dubai city in the 
background. After the construction of Burj Khalifa, finished in 2010, it seems that at 830 
 41 
meters it has largely replaced the image of Burj al Arab as representative of Dubai (Fig. 
1.18). 
Through these projects that offer mixed functions, combining leisure, commercial, 
sports, educational and residential uses, the city is oriented to the middle and upper 
classes, made up to a large extent of technicians and experts coming in from the 
surrounding countries and from Europe. This international population constitutes the 
majority of the population of the city, locals constituting a minority of at most 10% of 
the population (Dubai Municipality, 2011). 
 
 
Fig 1.17: Above: Burj al Arab (Source: Oula Aoun). Below: Tennis court in the upper part 
of Burj al Arab (Source:Inhabitat.com) 
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Another element of fascination is theming, where locales within megaprojects become 
festival spaces (Dubai Festival City), leisure spaces (Dubailand), sports activity spaces 
(Motor World, Dubai Sport City), and spaces that evoke cultural and historical aspects 
(Palms, Dubai Pearls, City of Arabia, Culture Village). It is about ‘landscapes of 
simulation’ (Sassen & Roost, 1999) that are placed one beside the other, thereby 
transforming the city into a huge ‘themed park’ (Sorkin, 1992; Bryman, 2004). 
Sorkin (1992) considers that ‘theme park’ is the best term to explain the paradigm 
through which a new kind of urbanism – manipulative, dispersed, and hostile to 
traditional public space – is emerging through a homogeneous design in American cities. 
The theme park, he says, is an apparently benign environment where everything is 
structured so as to achieve maximum control and manipulation and where authentic 
interaction among people has been thoroughly removed. 
    
Fig 1.18: At the left: Burj Khalifa 830 meters tall. On the right: Burj Khalifa’s Model in 
Cityscape (Source: Oula Aoun) 
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1.5.5 Metropolization and Space Commodification  
In a globalized world where cities compete to provide a range of destinations that will 
attract different categories of users, it is becoming more and more challenging to give 
meaning to these various and scattered places. This is why economic and social actors 
mobilize semiotics, theming and fascination. Schmid (2009) considers that we can 
observe a theming of everyday life in Dubai that manifests strongly in the ways urban 
spaces are conceived and presented.  
Urban places are becoming marketed objects for sale in an increasingly competitive 
global market. For Mangin (2004), this commodification logic is what holds the 
fragmented city together, beyond its seemingly chaotic image. He considers that this 
logic is based on increased sectorization of functions and space, increased 
commodification and increased automobile travel. For him, this spatial organization 
aims first and foremost to augment the commodification potential of urban spaces.  
Dubai free zones constitute another prime example. They offer a whole spectrum of 
manufacturing, trade and services related to media, luxury, gold, finance, cars, leisure 
and various other themes. Examples of free zones will be detailed in chapter two. 
Another element that contributes towards commodification of places is the deployment 
of technological prowess. Indeed, fascination requires a high level of technology. In 
order to reach the highest, the fastest, the largest and the most luxurious, the 
technological means must be developed, and the knowledge of qualified experts must be 
brought on board.  
All is feasible in Dubai: to build artificial islands in the sea in the shape of palm trees, to 
dig channels and waterfronts, nothing constitutes a true barrier that could limit the 
audacity of a ‘starchitect’ or the vision of a Sheikh. With large financial resources and 
‘good’ experts, nothing seems to prevent Dubai from achieving what might be regarded 
as impossible in other contexts. A ski slope in the desert or calligraphy made with 
islands (Palm Deira) – through technology Dubai is transforming the desert and the sea 




We have shown in this section that the development process in Dubai is a peculiar one, 
marked by a quick transformation driven by its geographic location, the availability of 
capital, and open policies. These are related to a specific governance that dates back to 
the early phases of the city’s development. Megaprojects in this context constitute the 
main engine that contributes to the financialization and the commodification of the city. 
Dubai tries through urban megaprojects to draw the image of a metropolis city, through 
engaging in an ambitious policy of competition with the world’s best-recognized 
metropolises.  
In the next section, the various facets of governance in this specific context will be 
examined. The role of major actors in contributing to this quick urban transformation 



























‘The notion of “diversification by urbanization” entails, as a consequence of the 
strategy of connecting the real estate markets to the financial sector, the shaping of a 
capitalist class tightly linked to accumulation and real estate circuits, as well as the 
state apparatus’ (Buckley & Hanieh, 2014). 
 
The economic, political and cultural contexts in the GCC in general, and in Dubai in 
particular, are highly influenced by the monarchical system. The countries’ and cities’ 
leaders, operating with the assistance of a traditional consultative arrangement 
characteristic of tribal cultures, are the ones who decide the future, draw the strategic 
vision and select the key projects for their cities.  
As described by Davidson (2008), Dubai has a ‘hybrid’ form of government that is 
indissolubly intertwined with the ruling family’s patrimonial network, and essentially 
‘little more than an extended system of patronage’ (2008: 158) where public and private 
intermingle without clear-cut boundaries.  
Beyond the needs of end users or a democratic process, the main decisions are restricted 
to the sole governors. In Dubai, the main actors, including major real-estate developers, 
investors and free zone authorities, are part of the restricted circle of power that 
surrounds the governor and are often either members of the royal family or their allies 
and friends. 
The megaprojects are thus interrelated with a complex network of companies and 
holdings with considerable resources that are close to or controlled by the governor. The 
common goal of all these investments is to promote the city and to attract investments 
and visitors, a translation of the governor’s vision. 
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2.1 Dubai portrayed as a neoliberal city 
Neoliberalism in Dubai is characterized on the one hand by a search for modernity and 
by an attachment to a cultural authenticity and a legitimate citizenship on the other.   
Dubai seems to largely borrow from the palette of urban neoliberal policies (at least 
those listed by Sager, 2011); spectacular projects, flexible commercial and themed areas, 
loose financial and regulatory framework and introverted privatized neighbourhoods. In 
a consumerist society and a framework of free-trade ideology, neoliberal values are 
present and shared by the various actors, particularly in the economic sector and public 
institutions, who are called ‘flexible citizens’ by Kanna (2011) 11 . Managers or 
employees in large holding companies and private or semi-public enterprises, this class 
has a strong belief in market values that are equivalent for them to modernity and 
progress, reflecting what the governor of Dubai considers: ‘what is good to the merchant 
is good for Dubai’. 
Kanna (2011) contends that these flexible citizens orient themselves towards a perceived 
international modernity while not rejecting Emirati and Muslim identities. They engage 
in a ‘creative alignment of Emirati and neoliberal values’ (Kanna, 2011, p.135). Kanna 
considers them capable of believing simultaneously in the virtues of free-market 
globalization, a neoliberal kind of cosmopolitanism, and a family-state power. 
Accordingly they constitute the society’s main backers of the legitimacy of the Al-
Maktoum regime, who stand for embracing futuristic global identities while remaining 
‘authentically Emirati’. Kanna considers as well that flexible citizens in Dubai see in 
their ruler a CEO of the city, a visionary and a paternalistic chief executive. 
However, limiting the understanding of the particular development of Dubai to the 
logics of neoliberal urbanism obscures various specificities of the local context, 
especially those related to the governance of the city. 
                                                
11 ‘Fluent in Arabic, English, and sometimes other languages, well educated (in a western-style business 
curriculum), and often well-travelled. Flexible citizens do not, however, reject Emirati and Muslim 
identities. They appropriate and enact them in ways consciously different from what they see as those of 
their more conservative compatriots.’ 
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2.2 The three scales in Dubai’s governance  
In the literature and the press, Dubai is often portrayed as a success story attributable to 
the ruling dynasty and more particularly the present governor Mohammad bin Rashid. 
More rarely one finds a critical analysis of Dubai’s case and its emergence as a politico-
economical model. Ahmad Kanna, in an essay that examines, from an anthropological 
point of view, the interrelation between cultural and socio-political aspects and the urban 
processes of the city, argues that considering only Dubai’s ‘achievements’ doesn’t 
advance the analysis of social and cultural processes very far. His study considers that 
Dubai, its State and its ruling class, are products of history and social contestation 
(Kanna, 2010).  
 
2.2.1 The Sheikh (governor) as a unique reference, and the corporate 
governance style 
The literature already provides ample description of the governor’s role in Dubai and his 
surrounding circle of power.  
Planning and development is carried out in accordance with the vision of Sheikh 
Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai Emirate (Dubai Municipality, 
2012). Dubai is directly ruled by a dominant elite of individuals who are close to the 
Sheikh (Sampler & Eigner, 2003; Kanna, 2011; Lavergne, 2007; Acuto, 2010; Crot, 
2013; Malty & Dillon, 2007).  
The concomitant lack of democratic institutions is particularly encapsulated in the 
corporate governance style adopted by the Sheikh, who runs the country with the 
assistance of a close group of experts as if Dubai was his own company (Kanna, 2011). 
The Sheikh has ‘transformed his city to a corporate state with himself as CEO-for-life’ 
(Brook, 2013, p. 372), while ‘running the country not from a palace, but from a class A 
office building, like a corporate titan’ (Brook, 2013, p. 372).  ‘The State is almost 
indistinguishable from a private enterprise’ (Davis, 2006, p. 61). ‘The ruling family 
appoint senior government officials and, together, they start and manage most of the big 
initiatives in Dubai’ (Sampler & Eigner, 2003, p. 1).  
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There is no doubt that Sheikh Mohammed is the leading actor behind the rise of Dubai. 
He has been the ruling Emir since 2006, but his influence dates back to 1968 when his 
father (then ruler) Sheikh Rashid appointed him as head of Dubai Police and Public 
Security. At the age of 23 he served in the UAE government as defence minister.  
After the death of his father, his brother Sheikh Maktoum became the ruler of Dubai. 
However Sheikh Mohammed undertook growing responsibilities at the economic level. 
He was already drawing up a new strategy for the economy of Dubai when the ruler 
declared him crown prince in 1995 rather than his older brother Sheikh Hamdan, seeing 
in him large abilities and entrepreneurial visions (Schmid, 2009). In 1985, Sheikh 
Mohammed with members of Al Maktoum family had already built a commercial 
airline, Emirates. In 1995 he launched Dubai Shopping Festival and in the late 1990s he 
founded the two giant real estate companies Emaar and Nakheel, in order to start 
building large megaprojects as engines of a new flourishing tourism and real estate 
industry.  
Today, he is the main actor and the most decisive along with his small team. Key 
persons within this circle are Mohamed al Abbar12, chairman of Emaar, Ahmad Bin 
Byat13, chief executive of Dubai Holding, and Sultan Ahmad Bin Sulayem14, Chairman 
                                                
12 Mohamed Al Abbar was born in Dubai. His father was captain of a traditional trading vessel. In 1970 he 
received a government scholarship and studied finance and business administration at Seattle University. Al 
Abbar was a member of the Dubai Executive Council and the Dubai Economic Council. He was a vice 
chairman of Aluminium Company (DUBAL) and a vice chairman of Dubai World Trade Center and of 
Dubai Cable Company. Founder and chairman of Emaar Properties, he is also the founder and chairman of 
Africa Middle East Resources (AMER), a private company that works to unlock the value of natural 
resource opportunities in Africa and link them with large consumer markets in Asia. He is the chairman of 
Tradewinds Corporation, a premier leisure and hospitality owner-operator in Malaysia and a board member 
of Eagle Hills, a UAE-based real estate development company focused on large-scale projects in high-
growth international markets, and also serves on the board of Manara Developments in Bahrain. He is the 
founder and major shareholder of RSH, the leading Singapore-based pan-Asian marketer, distributor and 
retailer of international fashion and lifestyle brands. Al Abbar also sits on the board of Noor Investment 
Group, an affiliate of Dubai Group, the leading diversified financial company of Dubai Holding. 
13 Ahmad Bin Bayat is Chairman of Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company, Chief Executive 
Officer of Dubai Holding, Director General of Dubai technology and Media Free Zone Authority and a 
member of the Board of Trustees for Dubai School of Government. He previously was the Secretary-
General of the Dubai Executive Council, president of the Dubai Government Excellence Programme, 
Executive Chairman of TECOM Investments, Chairman of the Dubai Education Council, Chairman of 
Dubai Real Estate Corporation and Chairman of the Dubai Urban Planning Committee. 
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of Dubai World. It is Sheikh Mohammed who carries the vision, defines strategic 
priorities and provides means, including the essential resource of land. Indeed, the 
Maktoums have claimed the right to total territorial control since 1960. They considered 
land settled before that time as belonging to its inhabitants, while the remaining territory 
(constituting most of Dubai) was claimed by the ruling family, with accompanying 
complete control over properties and planning (Hazbun, 2008).  
Furthermore, he often authorizes exceptions to procedures and involves himself at any 
time in the process, to change the course of events. He approves procedures and projects, 
interferes with the design and impact assessments and provides procedural shortcuts. 
(Shmid, 2009). At the head of the Executive Council, a body that plays a role similar to 
a government, the Sheikh and the members of the council are a powerful actor in Dubai. 
The Executive Council is a relatively new body in the governance of Dubai, being 
founded by Sheikh Maktoum Bin Rashid in 2003. As per the official website of Dubai 
government, the role of the Executive Council is ‘to assist the Ruler in discharging his 
tasks and exercising his powers’.  
The council has a broad remit of responsibilities and prerogatives, which at the very 
least have significant potential for overlap with the responsibilities of other departments 
and authorities.  
‘The Council aims at making and updating a comprehensive strategic plan for Dubai, 
working out the annual budget of the Government of Dubai, maintaining the city’s 
security and order, providing public utilities and achieving economic and social 
progress in the city. It also drafts and oversees the implementation of the general policy 
of Dubai, takes the necessary measures for the enforcement of local and federal laws, 
approves draft laws and decrees before submission to the Ruler and establish 
government entities in the emirate and monitor the progress of work in them. The 
                                                                                                                                    
14 Sultan Ahmad Bin Sulayem was born in Dubai from a family that has a long business and political 
history. His father was a key advisor to the ruling Al Maktoum family. He studied economics in the United 
States and in 2007 became Chairman of DP World (Dubai Ports World). He was also Chairman of Dubai 
World until 2010. From beginnings as an inspector in Dubai port in 1970, to his position as Chairman of 
Dubai’s government tax-free Jebel Ali Free Zone (founded in 1985), Bin Sulayem has had key roles in 
introducing and managing the free zones in Dubai. He is currently involved in ‘Seven Tides International’, a 
diversified real estate investment and development company in Dubai. 
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Council also studies the legislation proposed by the departments and committees and 
implements what is deemed convenient. It also tracks the performance of government 
entities through Key Performance Indicators and monitors the progress made by the 
committees in implementing the strategies related to growth sectors in Dubai.’ 
(tec.go.ae. Accessed in December 2015) 
 
Fig 1.19: The members of the Executive Council in 2015, headed by Sheikh Mohammad 
and constituted from key decision makers, who hold key positions in various authorities and 
departments. (Source: http://tec.gov.ae/en/executive-council/members. Accessed in 
December 2015) 
Since 2006, crown prince Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed has been chairman of the 
Executive Council after his father Sheikh Mohammed was declared ruler of Dubai. The 
executive council had played a decisive role in the rise of Dubai. Sheikh Mohammed 
surrounded himself with his main confidantes Al Abbar, bin Bayyat, bin Sulaym and Al 
Gergawi, who respectively chair the Maktoum parastatal firms Emaar, Tecom (the 
Chairman and Members of the Executive Council: 
• His Highness Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Crown Prince of Dubai and 
Chairman of the Executive Council 
• His Highness Sheikh Maktoum bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Deputy Ruler of Dubai, 
First Deputy Chairman of the Executive Council 
• His Highness Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, Second Deputy Chairman of the Executive 
Council 
• HH Sheikh Hasher bin Maktoum Al Maktoum, Director General of Dubai Media Department 
• His Excellency Lieutenant General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, Deputy Chief of Police and Public 
Security 
• His Excellency Mohammed Ibrahim Al Shaibani, Director General of HH the Ruler's Court 
• His Excellency Humaid Mohammed Obaid Al Qatami Chairman of the Board of Dubai Health 
Authority  
• His Excellency Major General Khamis Mattar Khamis Al Muzainah, Commander in Chief of Dubai 
Police 
• His Excellency Issam Issa Al Humaidan, Attorney General 
• His Excellency Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, Chairman of Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation 
• His Excellency Hussain Nasser Lootah, Director General of Dubai Municipality 
• His Excellency Mattar Mohammed Al Tayer, Chairman and Executive Director of the Roads and 
Transport Authority  
• His Excellency Sami Ahmad Dhaen Al Qamzi, Director General of the Department of Economic 
Development 
• His Excellency Saeed Mohammed Al Tayer, Managing Director and CEO of Dubai Electricity and 
Water Authority 
• His Excellency Helal Saeed Almarri, Director General of Dubai’s Department of Tourism and 
Commerce Marketing 
• His Excellency Dr. Hamad Bin Al Sheikh Ahmed Al Shaibani, Director General of the Department of 
Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities 
• His Excellency Sultan Butti Bin Mejren, Director General of Dubai Land Department 
• His Excellency Abdulrahman Saleh Al Saleh, Director General of the Department of Finance 
• His Excellency Dr. Lowai Mohamed Belhoul, Director General of Dubai Legal Affairs Department  
• His Excellency Major General Mohammed Ahmed Al Marri, Chairman of the Commission for Social 
Development 
• His Excellency Tarish Eid Al Mansouri, Director General of Dubai Courts 
• His Excellency Abdulla Abdul Rahman Al Shaibani, Secretary General!
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media and technology free zone), Dubai Holding and Dubai World. These four key 
leaders continue to play, important leading roles in a variety of Dubai companies and 
holdings. 
The internal structure of Dubai Executive Council is similar to a government, with heads 
of institutions and departments playing ministerial roles. Some of them have a dual role 
as chairman of major holdings.  
Today, some of the council’s members still hold dual roles, Sheikh Ahmed bin Sulayem 
Al Maktoum and Sheikh Sultan Ahmed bin Saeid Al Maktoum being two examples (see 
fig. 1.19). The first is chairman of Dubai Ports World, owner of 65 marine terminals 
worldwide, and the second is chairman of Emirates Airlines, Dubai World, Flydubai (a 
low cost airline), and Noor Islamic Bank. These double roles highlight a total integration 
of the agendas of those major businessmen within the city’s official strategic visions and 
policies. In fact, differentiation between those companies and the official city authorities 
is very difficult. The Sheikh and the other members of the ruling family are owners or 
major partners in the great majority of these holding and companies.  
 
2.2.2 The Municipality, Free Zones and the multitude of authorities 
Dubai municipality is officially the main authority that is supposed to govern all urban 
development related aspects of the city. However, many authorities, such as JAFZA 
(Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority), DTMFZA (Dubai Technology and Media Free Zone 
Authority), TECOM (Dubai Technology, Electronic Commerce and Media) and others, 
that are mainly the regulatory authorities of free zones, are also major references within 
the regulatory framework.  
Free Zones in Dubai are special economic zones that have special legal and regulatory 
frameworks. They often offer tax-free conditions and other benefits for expatriate 
investors. Each zone is operated and managed by a free zone authority that has a set of 
prerogatives, such as for example offering business licenses, and setting the regulations 
at different scales. In Dubai each Free Zone specializes in one or more business industry, 
related to industry, business, media, etc.  
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It is clear that Dubai municipality was – at least in the boom years that started in 2000 
and continued up to the international financial crisis in 2008 – far from being the major 
actor in the planning and the organization of the urban spaces of the city.  
In the Dubai system, the municipality plays a reactive adjustment role: adjust the 
strategic plans so as not to fall behind the evolution of urbanization, and integrate the 
dozens of megaprojects that are developing outside its sphere of control. It plays as well 
a technical assistant role – especially in administrative matters – for some major 
developers (Schmid 2009).  
The regulatory authorities of the large free zones are powerful actors when it comes to 
the urban management of the city. Moreover, in the dozen or so years of speculation 
prior to 2008 crisis, these authorities exercised a regulatory role even over lands outside 
of their free zones and that are supposed to be under municipality control, thus 
encroaching on the prerogatives of the latter.  
Even if, after the crisis, the municipality is in a phase of preparing to retake control, it is 
clear that it is still far from being the major actor in the planning and the governing of 
the city and its urban development.  
In the 2000–2008 boom period, many developers, mainly parastatals and privates 
particularly close to the Sheikh, did not deal with the municipality as a regulatory body, 
considering municipality procedures to be too time-consuming when the Sheikh could, 
with his signature, give an absolute approval and validation in a very short time. This 
weakness at the public bodies’ level broadly reflects the loose regulatory framework. An 
aspect that is peculiar to Dubai’s governance system is the privileging of leadership and 
trust, which often replace rules and regulations: ‘Regulations are introduced only when 
they are felt necessary to reinforce trust and confidence; Sheikh Mohammad runs a lean 
government machine and is loath to slow it and Dubai down by adding layers of what he 
considers to be unnecessary bureaucracy’ (Sampler & Eigner, 2003, p. 2).  
Facing the traditional public authorities, free zones are places where special laws are 
applied (Davis, 2007; Turan, 2013). They have their own regulations, authorities and 
administrative bodies that escape administrative control. Projects inside free zones 
follow the economic and planning regulations specific to that zone, and do not have to 
seek approval from the municipality or other institutional authorities.  
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Described as ‘curved lucrative niches with their own special rules’ (Davis, 2006, p. 62), 
Dubai’s free zones each apply a special set of regulations and laws tailored to its own 
particular purpose. ‘In a legal sense, the [Dubai] free zones made traveling from 
neighbourhood to neighbourhood like moving from country to country’ (Brook, 2013, p. 
359). 
Indeed, with an aim of attracting investments, and in continuation of the policy of 
openness and flexibility maintained by the Emirate over decades, Dubai proliferates 
specialized free zones. Jebel Ali free zone is an example, with its harbour activities, 
industrial and logistic zones around the Jebel Ali Port, one of the largest ports of the 
Middle East and largest free zones in the world. Jebel Ali free zone had a modest start in 
1985 with only 15 companies. Now it has more than 7100 companies including 100 in 
the Fortune 500 (the largest U.S. corporations by gross revenue, as listed by Fortune 
magazine). It includes showrooms, warehouses, business parks, offices and on-site 
accommodations. It also offers empty lots of various sizes for short or long-term lease, 
with infrastructure (road, electricity, telecommunications) and 24-hour security already 
provided.  
Several free zones dedicated to particular activities, such as Internet city, Media city, 
Studio city, etc., form other examples. In these zones, the regulatory frameworks are 
completely different from those adopted in the emirate; they are created to cater to 
investors’ needs, by offering various procedures aiming at attracting capital, such as 





Fig 1.20: Official classification of departments, councils and authorities in Dubai: Dubai 
Municipalities is considered as a governmental department, while the Executive Council, 
much powerful, is included in the category of independent councils. (Source: 
www.dubai.ae) 
 
2.2.3 The parastatals, government-controlled developers, and the lack of limits 
between public and private 
Several holdings such as Emaar, Nakheel and Dubai Holding constitute another type of 
actors in the urban system in Dubai.  
Development can be organized through different mechanisms in Dubai, either under the 
direct authority of the State, trusted to so-called “parastatal organizations”, or entirely 
private. The use of the word ‘parastatal’, proposed by Schmid (2009), or ‘state-backed’ 
as proposed by Davis (2006), reflects the unclear limits between the private and the 
public in a situation where the majority of large holdings are ‘controlled by the 
government’ (Elsheshtawy, 2013, p. 118). It has led many critics to highlight Dubai’s 
‘non transparent government financials’ (Malty & Dillon, 2007; Brook, 2013; Davis, 
2006). The city’s vision is shaped by the Sheikh (Al Maktoum, 2012), and many 
megaprojects are proudly described by their developers as reflecting the Sheikh’s vision 
for Dubai (Walters & al. 2006; Lasnier & Chancel, 2010). 
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In Dubai, other rich families play an important role in the city’s development. For 
instance the Al Ghurair, Al Futaim and Galadari families are major investors and all 
have initiated, since the early nineties, large megaprojects. They constitute – as Kanna 
(2011) asserts – the most telling representation of the category of ‘flexible citizens’, who 
believe at the same time in market values and a paternalist regime, and have been 
leading contributors to the image of a neo-liberal and futuristic Dubai, through 
impressive investments ranging from large commercial centres to introverted urban 
megaprojects. 
Even if the majority of developments are led by government owned or parastatal real-
estate companies (such as Nakheel and Emaar), these private investors, mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, still have a significant share in city’s total investments. For 
example, Al Futtaim group is a large trading business house, that was established in 
1930 and that includes more than 65 companies in various sectors such as commerce, 
industry services and real estate. It is based in Dubai and operates at a regional level.  
One of the largest megaprojects led by Al Futtaim group is Dubai Festival City, a five 
million sqm mixed-use megaproject along Dubai Creek. Al-Futtaim Group Real Estate 
(AFGRE) is the real estate development and operations arm of Al-Futtaim Group. 
AFGRE is responsible for the ‘origination, conception, development, procurement and 
construction of megaprojects and the leasing and operation of these projects after 
completion’ (www.dubaifestivalcity.com).  
 
2.3 Between UMPs and the financial sector 
Buckley and Hanieh (2014) argue that real estate investment and rapid urbanization in 
Dubai have served as more than a spatial fix for over-accumulated capital across the 
Gulf region. They consider that recent urbanization as a set of state-led strategies aimed 
at leveraging the urbanization process to internalize and diversify the financial circuit, in 
which the regulatory liberalization of the real estate market is a strategy of the financial 
sector to direct the flow of capital from oil surplus through the real estate circuit, and 
back into the finance circuit. 
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Malty & Dillon (2007) consider that there is a significant relationship between the real 
estate in Dubai and the financial sector. The large holdings that invest in real estate 
manage other types of economic activities in various sectors, including finance, 
communication, ports and aviation.  
Roy (2011) talks about a circulatory capacity of Dubai that exceeds the city’s 
boundaries; Dubai’s capital circulates and travels. It reshapes urban landscapes across a 
wide swath of territory, from Cairo to Delhi. Moreover ‘Dubai capital enters into 
strategic partnerships with a variety of nation-states’ (Ibid). In fact, many authors have 
examined cases of UMPs developed by Dubai-based holdings in different cities, like 
Cairo (Singerman & Amar, 2006), Tunisia (Barthel, 2008), and India (Roy, 2011). In 
this sense, many authors examine the ‘Dubaization’ or the ‘Dubai effect’, through the 
weight of the large investments by big Dubai developers in many countries all over the 
world.  
Real estate companies that build these megaprojects depend on a complex network of 
companies and holding companies with considerable resources, investing in a variety of 
areas: free zones, airlines, media, transport, tourism, public works, real estate and 
finance.  
Moreover, these holdings companies project their image in terms of luxury, confidence 
and credibility. They lay out a strategy that focuses on a heavy promotion of their 
projects, stressing the quality of life they guarantee and mutual trust with their clients. 
Logos, slogans and advertising panels along these lines, as well as their flags, can be 
seen all over the city (see fig.1.21).  
Dubai World is one of the large holding companies; it is an investment company that 
manages and controls a number of sectors, the main ones being Dubai Ports, Nakheel 
and Emirates. It has investments in more than a hundred countries including USA and 
European countries. In a highly globalized economic context, these holdings aim at 
quick returns from investments in various sectors, particularly in real estate.  
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Fig. 1.21: Major parastatals in their self-promotion. (Source: Oula Aoun) 
Hence, megaprojects do not necessarily meet a real economic and social need of the city. 
They constitute a product that primarily needs to be attractive, fascinating and easy to 
sell. It is in this context that researchers link the financialization of the building sector in 
Dubai to the international crisis of 2008, an event that in turn severely affected the city 
(Bertrand, 2012; Brook, 2013).  
2.4 Unveiling the roles of various actors in the real-estate sector 
Various actors are involved in the implementation and construction of megaprojects. 
Most often, their roles overlap. In general one can broadly distinguish the roles of land 
developer, property developer, contractor and owner in an urban project. Understanding 
who these actors are in Dubai helps in understanding the particularity of the system.  
Land developers: these are the major real estate companies, examined in the previous 
three sections. Emaar, Nakheel, Dubai Properties, Dubai Holding are examples of 
parastatals in this field; Union Properties, Al Futaim are examples of private land 
developers. They are all Dubai or UAE based corporations.  
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However, while Emaar and Nakheel focus exclusively on real estate, Dubai Holding and 
Al Futaim are examples of land developers that have investments in many other sectors. 
They differ also in the fact that some of them operate only in Dubai, such as Nakheel, 
and some others, such as Emaar, operate at the regional and even the international level. 
As land developers, these actors provide the master plan and the various forms of 
infrastructure, and they prepare the plots so they are ready to be sold and built. 
Depending on the situation, they provide either broad building regulations or detailed 
ones. In several cases, such as Dubai Marina for example, the land developer (Emaar) 
retains responsibility for the management of the common and open spaces in the projects 
through specialized companies. 
Real estate developers: these are the companies that buy plots and construct the 
buildings. Damac Properties, Akar Properties, and Select Group are examples of 
property developers. They are usually private developers. Their objective is normally to 
resell the buildings. In many cases, land developers undertake the construction as 
property developers. This has been the case with some towers developed by Emaar and 
Nakheel. While it is frequently the case that the land developer develops some key plots 
in its own project, as when Emaar built several towers in Dubai Marina, occasionally a 
land developer such as Nakheel builds a tower in Business Bay, a project developed by 
Dubai Properties. Property developers are mainly in UAE or Dubai based. Other GCC 
based property developers operate as well in Dubai, such as the Saudi-based Cayan 
Group that has developed the Cayan Tower (the “Twisted Tower”) in Dubai Marina 
(Fig. 1.22). 
Contractors: These are the actors responsible for the execution of the buildings. They 
may be UAE-based or international. It is important to note that local expertise does exist 
in the construction sector; the Twisted Tower, for example, was built by the UAE-based 
contractor Arabtec. For some major towers such as Burj Khalifa, a consortium of 
multinational contractors may operate together: Arabtec, Besix (a Belgian contractor), 
and Samsung Engineering and Construction in this case. 
Owners: Owners, (or investors) can be individuals in the case of residential buildings; 
ownership of these is spread among locals, Iranians, citizens of other Arab countries, 
Indians and Western Europeans. For commercial and offices buildings too, the owners 
are of various nationalities. In some cases, key buildings are owned by investment 
corporations and managed by a specialized actor, such as the case of buildings owned by 
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Emirates Airlines and managed by Marriott Hotels. In the free zones and the free hold 
projects15, the majority of owners are international companies (Brook, 2013). 
   
Fig 1.22: Dubai twisted tower (Cayan Tower) in Dubai Marina. Developed by Cayan 
Group (KSA) and built by the contractor Arabtec. Photos taken from different angles. 
(Source: Oula Aoun) 
2.5 Public-private syncretism and ‘zero politics’ 
Two central elements mark the governance system in Dubai: a public and private 
syncretism and a total flattening of political space. 
In Dubai, we pass from public managerialism to public-private entrepreneurialism. The 
question is not even about the poor performance of the former and the need for better 
management culture, as is often suggested by those who criticize the public sector; it is 
one that goes to the very relevance of the concept of public-private separation.  
                                                
15 Projects where foreigners are allowed to buy properties. 
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Indeed, if the ultimate goal is a performance that would ensure growth and wealth, the 
same strategy and action plan should be adopted in both public action and private action. 
This logic is the core of the Dubai system, although it is in many ways the opposite of 
the neoliberalism that seeks to free the market from state intervention.  
This public-private entrepreneurialism finds its most perfect expression in Dubai. The 
vast majority of public services are privatized. In giant holding companies, including 
nearly 200 different companies that together account for the majority of service 
providers, the state is a partner and the Maktoum family and its local allies hold the 
majority of these companies. 
These holdings are managed as private companies. The state does not subsidize them. 
However, they can count on important interpersonal networks that link them and their 
leaders with leading government officials. This represents huge social capital that 
supports their development of activities at local and international levels (Schmid, 2009). 
Even if practices of good managerial governance are highlighted to emphasize that these 
holdings operate in accordance with international standards and practices, the system of 
holding companies as it functions in Dubai cannot be dissociated from the Maktoums 
and the personal vision of the Sheikh for his city. In fact, the Maktoums personally hold 
all companies that are strategic for the development of Dubai, including Emirates 
Airlines, the port of Jebel Ali, Burj Al Arab, etc. – and most importantly, the land.  
On the other hand it is in the office of the Sheikh that the strategic orientation of 
development in all sectors is defined, to be later formalized and expanded by the staff 
and the consultants of the relevant companies and holdings. In this decision-making 
system, every strategic decision is the responsibility of the Sheikh and his restricted 
circle of allies and consultants. 
The Dubai system is indeed a zero politics system. In 1930, a protonationalist movement 
of merchants, mainly Arab, who were affected by the pearl trade collapse, called for a 
modernization of society in which citizens would have greater role and the ruler would 
not have a monopoly over state resources and political decisions (Al-Sayegh, 1998).  
In 1950, again, a reformist movement inspired by the wider anticolonialism in the Arab 
world tried to challenge the ruler, and proposed a more participatory citizenship. With 
 61 
the oil wealth of the 1970s, the ruler was able to co-opt the reformists of the day and 
rebuild a new definition for nationalism. 
Moreover, the British, at that time the ‘protectors’ of the city, preferred a stability 
ensured by the Maktoums’ absolutism (Davidson, 2005). Since then, the flattening of the 
political space has been maintained by other means. As shown by Kanna (2011), those 
who wield power and their allies, upholding the ‘wisdom of the market’ and the 
entrepreneurial culture, have succeeded in implementing a practice that consolidates a 
specific citizenship culture.  
The negotiation and exchange space would become the economic one and not the 
political one. This has been done through a subtle forging of the identity of the citizens 
in Dubai and of the status of all who reside in this city. It is about a balance between an 
aspiration to enrichment for all and a paternalistic governance by the Maktoums (Kanna, 
2011), within a context of fear for the fragility of a system that only the Maktoums are 




     UMPs a reflection of specific governance 
Despite the seeming proliferation of actors, the key and decisive ones are all close to or 
even controlled by the government, or in other words, by the Sheikh. These government-
controlled developers have the role of defining the character and main uses of the city 
parts, and the relatively fewer private developers seem to follow the trend with their 
relatively less ambitious megaprojects.   
The weak role of the municipality, as a regulatory and control body, doesn’t necessary 
indicate an absence of governmental involvement, since the other less classical 
authorities (TECOM, JAFZA, and others) that control a major part of the city 
development are themselves directly controlled by the government that is as well 
managed and directed by the Sheikh. 
Analysing the political dimension surrounding Dubai’s UMPs, and more particularly the 
way the power and the land are distributed among the main developers closely related to 
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the government and to the Sheikh, helps to clarify the status of UMPs within this 
political structure. Distributing the land to the main developers in order to implement 
UMPs allows the Sheikh to confer power on the main urban actors while continuing to 
exercise control over the city’s various parts.  
The multitude of free zones, and more particularly of UMPs developed as free zones 
characterized by their own legal regulatory framework, is also expressive of the 
existence of fragmented areas of power. However, through these differentiated urban 
logics, UMPs can be seen as the means by which the city is managed, and by which the 
Sheikh allocates territory among the different players while fostering a situation where 
















These new urban landscapes that were examined in the previous parts, marked by the 
massive transformation, underlining the effect of spectacle and fascination and requiring 
a highly developed technical prowess and a sophisticated expertise, are sometimes 
described as a result of the globalization of urban policies, and sometimes they are 
considered as a specific product of the particular Dubai’s context and more generally the 
GCC context.  
These questions are hence frequently confronted in the GCC literature; are the 
spectacular and iconic projects and urban extension the reflection of a globalized world 
of urban models and references, and a pure logic of urban neo-liberalism, or the result of 
a set of cultural, social and politico-economical contexts that are highly influenced by 
the monarchical systems.  
Beyond a binary answer for these questions, this situation may be understood through 
the literature of ‘mobile urbanism’. ‘Policymaking must be understood as both relational 
and territorial, as both in motion and simultaneously fixed, or embedded in place’ 
(McCann & Ward, 2011).  
Even if urban policies are often local, grounded and tied to specific places (Friedman, 
2005; Peck and Tickell, 2002), the second half of the picture shows that contemporary 
policymaking is fundamentally shaped by a context of ‘fast policy transfer’ (Peck and 
Theodore, 2001), where ‘transfer agents’ (Stone, 2004), including, among others, 
politicians, practitioners, activists and consultants are transferring knowledge about 
urban policies around the world. 
The broader category of these transfer agents, called in the literature ‘the transnational 
capitalist class’ (TCC), is defined as people and organizations from many countries 
operating at a transnational level, with relationships to transnational social spaces 
(Sklair, 2005; Olds, 2001; Robinson & Harris, 2000; Carroll, 2009). The international 
firms in the domain of engineering and consultancy are considered as part of this class. 
Designated also as Global Intelligence Corps (GIC) (King, 1990, Olds, 2001, Rimmer, 
1991), the role of these international consultancy firms is more and more crucial 
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worldwide. The emergence of transnational clients, coupled with the development of 
communication technologies, have enabled these firms to become a global powerful 
actor, spreading office networks worldwide, following the grid of powerful cities (Knox 
& Tailor, 2005; Faulconbridge, 2010). 
International consultancy firms in the domain or urban planning (ICFUP) – that include 
architectural and engineering oriented firms- constitute a main agent in widening 
channels of cross-border policy transfer (Peck, 2003), contributing at transferring 
policies, practices, models and references that would be translated into urban forms.  
However, these transferred elements are the subject of an adaptation process, relative to 
each local context. Even in the literature on mobile policies and policymaking, the word 
‘transfer’ is defined as a ‘socio-spatial, power-laden process in which policies are 
subject to change and struggle as they are moved’ (McCann & Ward, 2011). 
Studies on knowledge mobility and policy transfer underline different levels of transfer. 
They differentiate between transfer, diffusion and learning (Stone, 2004). While 
‘transfer’ involves – as it was defined previously- processes of struggle and change, 
‘Diffusion’ describes a trend of successive or sequential adoption of a practice, policy or 
programme. It is contagious rather than chosen and it connotes spreading, dispersion and 
dissemination of ideas or practices from a common source or point of origin (Ibid). 
Stone (2004) considers as well that the diffusion has its limitations since it does not say 
a lot about how policies or practices are altered during processes of adoption. ‘Learning’ 
is defined by Stone (2004) as occurring when ‘policy-makers adjust their cognitive 
understanding of policy development and modify policy in the light of knowledge 
gained from past policy experience’. In his essay on Knowledge transfer in the Arab 
Emirates and the other Gulf states, Ewers (2013) discusses to what extents the imported 
expertise can be a lever to local capacity development. Levels of learning – according to 
Ewers vary between sectors, the financial sector being the sector with high level of local 
learning via interaction with foreign experts. In this same line, this article aims at 
discussing as well the level of learning within local context that can be identified via the 





Fig 1.23: The images shows an example of circulated tools, practices and knowledge. Up: 
Abu Dhabi 2030 vision-model. Down:  Singapore New Downtown- model. The comparison 
shows a striking similarity in the scale and the way the plans are promoted and displayed. 
In Dubai (and more generally in the GCC) the ICFUP play a fundamental role. The city, 
enrolled in a development process and strategies that are creating iconic spaces and 
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megaprojects that would contribute in creating a world city image, has relied 
significantly on foreign knowledge (Ewers, 2013). In Ren (2011) many of the GCC 
cities (such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha) are listed among the top cities where 
international consultancy firms in the construction domain have branch offices. These 
rankings reflect the significant role of the international firms who are implementing 
these iconic landscapes and megaprojects.  
Despite the significant reduction of construction activities during the 2008 global 
financial crisis, most of international firms have adapted in order to cater to the new 
post-crisis optimistic mood. Their role seems to have been crucial in the rebounding of 
the GCC cities from the effects of the crisis. 
These ICFUP, object of this essay, will be examined in the beginning as an actor that is 
very evocative of a mode of urban production relying heavily on a new mode of urban 
planning that is shaped by knowledge mobility, and characterized by megaprojects as a 
key output. By relying on literature on urban planning history in the wider Arab and 
Middle Eastern contexts, the introductory part will stress the particularity of the situation 
of Dubai, marked by a relatively recent and brief urban planning history, and of the 
ICFUP, as main urban planning knowledge mobility channel and main urban planning 
producer.  
Next, these firms will serve as an analytical framework in helping to understand the 
market and the politico-economic context. Interactions between the context and the 
firms will be underlined. More particularly the market conditions and challenges that 
contribute to the adaptation process undertook by ICFUP will be unveiled.  
Finally we examine the diversity of ICFUP and divide them into two main categories, 
based on their operational modalities, strategies and structures: the architectural firms 
and the engineering-architectural firms. Despite their similar role in contributing to the 
building of urban space, the study will demonstrate interesting divergence and 
convergence in the way they adapt their knowledge and operational mode to the context 
of urban planning in Dubai, and in the way they contribute to knowledge transfer in the 
urban domain. 
Starting from the identification of 100 masterplans in the GCC countries, based on 
online resources such as blogs, website, journals, and based as well on the two site visits 
to the UAE, the consultants who were involved in two or more master plans were 
 67 
selected for study. The results have identified a total of 13 international firms. Three of 
these did not reply to our request for interview, leaving a total of ten firms constituting 
the focus of this research. The 13 firms were responsible for 61 out of the 100 master 
plans (see table 1.1), while the remaining 39 master plans were done by 39 smaller 
international and regional firms. Two persons were interviewed in each firm: the 
targeted profiles were those of urban planners, mainly seniors or heads of departments, 
depending on their availability. The interviews were semi-direct, questioning the firm’s 
presence, strategy in accessing and maintaining position in the GCC, the types of 
cooperation undertaken with other firms, the theoretical frameworks they use, and 
finally the communication and self-evaluation tools mobilized in the context of urban 
megaprojects in the GCC. The firms are Aecom, HOK, Halcrow, Perkins and Will 
(P&W), Arup, KEO, Benoy Architects, Fosters and Partners, Dar al Handassa and 
Khatib & Alami. In the paper, all the stated information is taken from these listed 
sources – unless designated otherwise. Referring the information to an interview will be 
done through mentioning between brackets the name of the firm, as for example (HOK). 
Architecture Firms EA Firms 
HOK (7) Aecom (12) 
Benoy Architects (3) Arup (2) 
Foster & Partners (2) Halcrow (8) 
Perkins & Will (2) KEO (7) 
 Dar al Handasa (5) 
 Khatib & Alami (2) 
Table 1.1: Surveyed firms, divided into Architecture and Engineering-architecture firms. 
The numbers represent the surveyed projects done by each. 
 
3.1 ICFUP, actors of a new model of urban production  
As mentioned previously, Dubai and GCC cities have heavily relied on an external 
professional expertise in the urban domain, in their mission of building the image of 
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modern states. The case of John Harris16 in implementing the first Dubai’s master plans, 
and later on the presence of western firms, mainly in the domain of engineering, in order 
to build large infrastructures are examples showing the extents to which Dubai 
governments, same as many of GCC governments, have relied on external expertise. 
In the last two decades, and in a context marked by economy diversification’s policies, a 
search for a global city’s image, megaprojects that demonstrate fascination and records 
as well as the emergence of for-profit parastatal real-estate developers with mobile 
capitals and worldwide various investments, ICFUPS constitute a main actor who is 
contributing, through transferring ‘globalized’ knowledge to the implementation of new 
urban landscapes.  
3.2 Interactions between contextual elements and operational mode; the 
international consultancy firms as analytical framework 
In this section we are going to examine how the ICFUP are adapting to Dubai context 
through several modalities of access to the market and how they are contributing to 
produce the city image that typifies the expectations of the city governor. It will be 
shown as well how these firms manage to cope with the difficulties and challenges that 
emerge from this context, be it related to the specificities of the command, to the lean 
regulatory framework or to the complexity of the urban megaprojects to which they are 
contributing to.  
 
                                                
16 ‘In 1960, British architect John Harris drew the first Masterplan for Dubai; He was introduced to Dubai’s 
ruler, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, in 1959 by the British Political Agent, Sir Donald Hawley. Harris 
rapidly won the rulers’s trust and became the state’s expert adviser on the new masterplan. According to The 
Times, ‘he developed a means of working that wedded Sheikh Rashid with an architecture both respected and 
respectful’. The choice of Harris is an interesting one  given that he was relatively unknown and had no large 
practice’. (Elsheshtawy, 2013). 
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3.2.1 Dubai market’s challenges 
3.2.1.1 Access)to)market))
Several aspects of globalization, such as the opening of international markets and the 
development of communication technology, have facilitated these firms’ access to 
international markets. However, competition among firms and the need to sustain their 
international position and global image constitute major challenges (Korkmaz and 
Messner 2008). ‘Going global’ is part of a strategy, a brand and a vision, and to a large 
extent the office networks of international firms mirror the network of global cities 
(Knox and Taylor 2005). 
In order to access Dubai market, international (and all non-local) firms have to be issued 
a permit from the administration of the country concerned, and these impose several 
conditions. One of these conditions is having a local partner; another is a specified 
number of local employees. The interviewees agreed that these conditions are not always 
easy to fulfill. However, they recognized that having a local partner is useful since the 
latter knows the local cultural context better, and also to a certain extent the local 
network of professionals in the construction market. 
We have identified several methods by which the surveyed firms have accessed the GCC 
market: 
- By invitations, sent by client to a restricted number of firms 
- Through competitions, following the classical competition procedure 
- Through partnerships with local or foreign consultants who are locally established: 
partnerships are temporary in this case, lasting only the project duration 
- Through processes of merger, a process through which large firms acquire smaller 
firms. Sometimes the latters substitute as sub-entities and most often they merge 
completely 
AECOM is the most telling example of the last case, since it is in a continuous state of 
‘acquisition’. Smaller offices and companies are merged within the larger structure of 
AECOM, like IDAW, Cansult & Maunsell and others. Mergers allow new markets to be 
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accessed through already established structures that can contribute both expertise and 
clients.  
It is to be noted that the law that requires from foreign firms to employ locals according 
to a certain quota – that is called emiratization - contributes at creating a milieu of 
interaction between local and foreign experts. However, most of our interviewees have 
noticed the relative un-efficiency and lack of competencies of local employees, making 




Main GCC cities are enrolled in a policy that searches for records and fascination, 
needing hence international expertise. 
Recent to Dubai and the GCC region, urban megaprojects mobilize a technical prowess 
that needs special expertise. Even if few local engineering offices do exist, the tasks 
entrusted to them are only secondary ones.  
In this context, ICFUP are aware of the role that they are expected to fulfill as transfer 
professionals of the most innovative ideas and models. In their discourse there is a focus 
on their fundamental role in bringing knowledge and technologies to a context that they 
consider as ‘immature’ and lacking expertise in the urban domain. These arguments are 
consolidated by a specific reality in GCC, related to the professionals in the domain of 
architecture and urban planning. In Dubai, for instance, there is a clear absence of 
professionals, training and experience.  
Moreover, architecture and design related specialties are not privileged in Dubai’s 
universities. Most of the urban related fields do not constitute a major domain within the 
academic milieu. Very few local universities include such specialties in their programs, 
and it seems to be a major lack in terms of professionals, training and experience.  
In an interview with architecture department heads in an Abu Dhabi university, they 
expressed determination to found an urban planning department, but admitted feeling 
discouraged by the difficulties their future graduates are likely to face when seeking 
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opportunities in the market; ‘the market, including public and private sector, prefers to 
have international experts’. Elsheshtawy (2008) considers that GCC officials are turning 
towards Western architects and planners to plan, design, form and shape their cities. He 
also suggests that academics and scholars are absent from any discussion pertaining to 
urban theory.  
Although it can be concluded that, given the absence of local experts and expertise, the 
situation could be described as a one-way transfer of knowledge, however, it should be 
noticed that experts in ICFUP are as well from other Arab and Mediterranean countries, 
such as Lebanese, Palestinians, Egyptians and others. These ‘local agents’ are the ones 
who contribute to a local-international interaction, mainly because they constitute the 
part of ICFUP that knows the local language and the local culture and manners. We 
underline that many ICFUPs have emphasised the role of these ‘local’ experts in 
bringing more context knowledge to the rest of the teams.  
 
3.2.1.3 Market)instability)
GCC is considered by the majority of the interviewees as an unstable market. It is 
frequently compared to the building market in the Far East cities where the ICFUP  have 
larger offices’ networks and more solid presence. In Dubai, projects may undergo an ‘on 
hold’ phase, or alternatively an accelerated production phase. This has a direct impact on 
the structure of firms that shrink and expand according to the market. The selection of 
disciplines and professionals, as well as the functioning mode, is adapted to the current 
market situation.  
In Dubai, the majority of international firms have shrunk their office size, some to half 
and some to a quarter of what it was before the 2008 crisis.  
At the end of 2012, the time when the interviews were conducted, the market was 
previewing a ‘stressful optimism’, and many firms were slowly restructuring and 
recruiting again. Facing this instability, ICFUP try to insure a continuous presence even 
with small teams. This flexibility leads as well to a certain logic of mobility in which 
key experts travel a lot and are only present on site when needed.  
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Since not all the expertise can be present in the same regional office, several types of 
communication are mobilized: some experts may work at a distance while 
communicating with regional offices through phone meetings, emails, or other 
technological tools.  
‘Mobility is important but given the facts of what electronics can do now, the necessity 
of mobility is becoming less and less; I can sit here and have a teleconference with a 
colleague in Washington or in London. We invested heavily in terms of our IT... It has 
paid off, because previously we had to go to the airport, wait and fly from country to 
another, while usually your biggest enemy while doing a project is time. Nothing is like 
face to face meetings, but you still can do a lot of coordination, and this has been very 
important for our company, and how it develops at a global level’ (HOK 1). ‘We share a 
lot of resources online; we have the skill network online within the company, so we 
always share things. We have a lot of experts who go to conferences and work on 
interesting projects. So when they come back, they share everything with the rest of the 
company’. (Arup1) 
Key experts may be relatively more mobile than the other professionals. They may 
travel to establish new units, to train junior professionals, to meet with site working 
teams, or even to meet with the clients. They are often based in principal offices or the 
firm’s headquarters.  
 
3.2.2 Coping with a particular regulatory context 
3.2.2.1 Absence)of)solid)regulatory)bodies)and)framework)
In Dubai, the municipality and other public authorities (Such as Dubai electricity and 
water authority, Dubai land department, Dubai civil aviation authority, etc. (See fig 
1.20), have only recently undertaken an upgrading process. The authorities were facing a 
rapid urban growth in which they were the weakest actors. The municipality was 
marginalized as a controlling authority due to the personal relationships between the 
private developers and the governing sheikh, the first actor driving the development.  
The ICFUP play an important role in the regulation of the planning system in Dubai. 
They have a fundamental role in supporting the governmental agencies through their 
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consultancy services. This ‘support’ is provided at two complementary levels:  the 
planning regulations formulation and/or updating, and making of cities’ strategic and 
structure plans.  
Planning regulations are updated, evaluated or even completely set by international 
firms. In many cases, due to ineffective regulations or the absence of them, consultants 
in the international firms are asked to propose new standards and norms, especially in 
the case of megaprojects considered to be special developments requiring specific 
regulations that go beyond the competencies of the existing local regulatory bodies. 
Dubai Marina for example, a 300 ha megaproject with more than 200 built and planned 
towers, went ahead against a glaring absence of existing regulation. The regulatory 
framework was put in place in parallel with the project’s construction. 
‘In Dubai Marina, when we did the first six buildings, the adequate legislation didn’t 
exist. The legal framework had to change and we support them in that’. (HOK 1)  
Even where an existing regulatory framework does exist, the megaprojects, considered 
as special developments, do not necessarily adhere to it. Therefore, new regulations are 
often proposed by the international firms in parallel with the conception of the master 
plan.  
A telling example is the Dubai 2020 strategic plan, prepared by AECOM. After the 
booming market generated various fragmented developments in Dubai that reflected the 
different agendas of developers, the sheikh and his circle of decision-makers have 
realized the importance of establishing a unified vision of the city, with a main objective 
of a harmonizing the agendas of the actors and the different administrative and semi-
governmental authorities. AECOM was selected to prepare this strategic plan, playing as 
well, beyond the expert role, a role of coordination between the different players.  
In all cases, the factor that has been reinforcing the role of international expertise is the 
need among GCC cities for new standards to address the pressing constraints arising 
from environmental, social and urban issues and the need of having a global city image 
in a context of competition between cities worldwide. 
In the case of knowledge transfer in setting regulations, we have noticed, based on our 
interviews, that a clear interaction could be perceived between ICFUP experts and the 
Municipalities’ professionals who are in majority locals. This interaction seems to be 
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efficient and potentially leading to mutual learning. This can be noticed in the way these 
local employees are capable of evaluating, assessing and orienting the ICFUP 
contribution in terms of setting new plans and regulations. This can be explained as well 
by the fact that local municipalities’ employees knows better the various aspects of their 
context comparing to foreign experts. 
 
3.2.2.2 Limited)circle)of)actors)
As explained earlier, the economical, political and cultural contexts in Dubai are highly 
influenced by the monarchical system. The city’s leader, along with major real-estate 
developers, investors or free zones authorities, are part of the restricted circle of power 
that surrounds the governors and are often members of the royal families.  
The megaprojects are interrelated hence to a complex network of companies and 
holdings with considerable resources that are close to or controlled by the governors. 
The common goal of all these investments is to promote the city and to attract 
investment and visitors, a translation of the governors’ vision of their cities.  
Despite the number of megaprojects that are taking place, the Dubai construction market 
is a relatively small market. ‘It is a very small community here, and they all know each 
other. Relationships are very important, and if one consultant does good work for a 
developer, another developer will know about it, and so on’ (Keo 2). It was clear 
through our interviews that the professionals know a lot about other companies, how 
they work, what their strengths are, how to compete with them; and the most important 
aspect is that the same professionals may have worked in many companies.  
Even with the limited size of the market and competition between firms, partnerships 
and coordination between them is a recurring feature. As per the interviewees, in some 
projects two firms may bid as competitors and in others they may work in close 
coordination. ‘Sometimes you compete, sometimes you coordinate, you know it is not 
emotional… So among the firms that work here, people may move around, so you work 
with KEO, then with AECOM, then you spend two years with Cansult, here and there. So 
the community of professionals is pretty well known. People just change the dance 
partners, no?’ (KEO 1).  
 75 
For ICFUP to access GCC market, they have to be present within or close to major 
networks of power and decision. In their search for new projects, ICFUP need to have 
local partners who are ‘well connected’ in order to sustain their presence in this market.  
Moreover, during the evaluation and review processes, the client or a client 
representative have often a key opinion through the master plans implementation. 
ICFUP consider themselves as in need to be flexible in dealing with this kind of 
governance that is specific to GCC. They also consider that during different stages of the 
urban projects, ranging from the concept definition, to the projects’ contents and the 
review of the master plans, the client has a prevailing role that they have to cope with. 
 
3.2.3 Operating in the context of a specific urban product: the megaprojects 
As per the results of our survey, the ratio of 61 megaprojects done by large international 
firms out of 100 megaprojects shows their profound involvement in the GCC urban 
production and the weight of the decision-makers’ reliance over them. Moreover, being 
involved in a number of megaprojects reflects a more consolidated status within the 
market. As one interviewee considers: ‘It is not the first project that is important to 
have, but the next and the third, etc.’ However, being enrolled in this kind of 
development encounter a plethora of challenges and difficulties for the ICFUP to adapt 
to. 
3.2.3.1 Limited)production)time)and)absence)of)feasibility)studies)
The lack of feasibility studies constitutes a major challenge for the ICFUP: the 
interviewees consider that developers do not understand the need of them; they believe 
that a ‘beautiful project’ will not fail, so they place the responsibility for a projects’ 
success on design. Furthermore, they consider that developers usually want to start 
building quickly, especially in a boom context, where profit is the main goal of an 
investment project; thus their attitude towards preliminary studies is that they are simply 
time consuming.  
As a result, the consultants we interviewed agreed that the client’s brief usually needs to 
be reassessed and analyzed. Most of the time, feasibility studies will be replaced by 
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production of a series of concepts, through which the client and the consultant will ‘test’ 
the design. For instance, the Yas Island master plan went through 22 versions, through 
which the client and the consultant were ‘testing’ the market (Benoy 1). Another 
example is Dubailand which went through a series of versions, transforming the 
megaproject from a huge theme park three times the size of Disneyland to a series of 
themed residential areas (Halcrow 1). 
Regardless of the firms’ various reactions to this situation, they all agreed that they need 
the feasibility studies in order to be able to produce good quality plans. ‘If you want to 
receive a good result from a consultant, you have to give him information; without that, 
you will not have a good project’ (HOK 1). ‘We absolutely want this level of study; 
that’s protection for us. The more we understand a project, the more we can address it 
at all levels’. (Keo 1) 
Another characteristic challenge in the GCC is speculation and limited production time: 
In a boom period when development is driven by speculation, and not related to a real 
need of a future population, time seems to be the most precious factor. As a result, the 
developers impose a short time limit on conceiving the plans. Many interviewees have 
said that the available time is an average of 25% of what it is normally supposed to take.  
AECOM (2) told us that sometimes they have only one week to design a master plan for 
a UMP. Some interviewees expressed confidence in their ability to cope –with some 
challenging difficulties-  with similar conditions, while others didn’t hide their concern 
that this time limitation may compromise the design quality. 
 
3.2.4 Between global and local: searching for references 
Another challenge that faces IFCUP is the particular cultural and geographical context 
of the GCC. In the literature, scholars agree that local contexts have an influence on 
architectural and design practice, and consequently contextualizing the design within 
local environments is not an easy task (Imrie 2007; Faulconbridge 2009).  
In the GCC context, we have noticed that the interviewees invoke general references, 
such as international norms and best practices. Frequently mentioning context 
constraints, the proposed solutions and ideas are limited to broad and general matters, 
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such as ‘respecting the local culture’, ‘being aware of climate specifics’, etc. Healey and 
Upton (2011: 15–18) consider that international mobile experts have insufficient time to 
examine local conditions and related constraints.  
In the GCC, it was clear that the firms’ main challenge is to deliver what the client 
wants, and deliver it on time, leaving no space for preliminary studies related to socio-
cultural or even feasibility aspects. This was evident from the response of one 
interviewee who considered that, in a boom period, there is no time to evaluate: 
 ‘In my position, it is difficult to take a step back, to see the overall picture. For an 
academic, or a researcher sitting on his desk, it is easier to criticize, to see that things 
may not work, to say that it is not sustainable, there are problems in those master plans, 
they are not well connected, etc. Because you are too busy thinking about your next 
project. You don’t have time to sit on your computer reading about new urbanism. In the 
good time, when you do have lots of work to do, you can’t do this step back. But I think 
that I would prefer to have this distance again, that enable me to see the bigger picture’. 
(KEO 2) 
Lacking norms, references and experience, the GCC is considered by scholars as a 
laboratory for urban planning (Barthel, 2010). Using the words of Ren (2011, p.38), 
‘Star architects17 rush there to build the dream projects that probably would not be built 
anywhere else, and young architects rush here as well to be in the action’. It can be 
concluded that, the particularity of Dubai resides in the fact that it is acting like a magnet 
for ICFUPs and international experts in general. Being a part of the world, where things 
–that would not happen elsewhere – happen, ICFUP come to Dubai as part of their 
strategic growth and international image. One interviewee in KEO told us that it is very 
important for him, as an international expert- to show on his CV that he has worked on 
large megaprojects in Dubai and other GCC countries. 
In the next section, we will focus on the diversity of the ICFUP in the GCC. Regional 
and international, architecture oriented or engineering oriented, they have differences 
                                                
17 As for example the UMP Dubai Waterfront by Rem Koolhaas, considered by New York Times as a 
‘Grand urban experiment’ that would not have been built elswhere (Ouroussoff, 2008) 
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and similarities in adapting their knowledge, operational modes and structure into the 
GCC context and Dubai in particular. 
3.3 Between Architectural and Engineering-architecture firms: Toward a 
typology 
In the domain of buildings and construction, firms may have different typologies. 
Engineering News-Record (ENR)1 distinguishes numerous firm categories, such as 
architecture and design firms, architecture and engineering firms, architecture, 
engineering and construction firms, etc.  
However, overlapping is not uncommon, leading to the same firm being listed as 
architecture and design as well as architecture and engineering, for example. This can 
especially be noticed in the cases of firms that are primarily focused on architecture and 
have acquired through time engineering competencies (HOK being one example), while 
architecture and design have still the main base practices.  
In the literature many references suggest typologies for architectural firms (Gutman 
1988; Winch and Schneider 1993; Olds 2001; Ren 2011) based on the level of 
experience, the ability to deliver, and design excellence.  
More generally in the case of international architectural firms, and based on the firms’ 
size, it is possible to distinguish two main types: large corporate firms, also called the 
supermarket-style by Ren (2011: 34), given the broad range of design-related service 
that they offer; and small offices, or the ‘starchitects’. Overlapping may be found even 
in this size-based typology, as in the case of Foster & Partners, which is considered a 
‘starchitect’ firm while at the same time having a corporate size (Ren 2011; McNeill 
2005). 
As for the majority of international engineering firms, they have added architecture 
departments to their structure, followed by planning departments. However, these newly 
added practices cannot be considered part of the core of these firms’ activities. In 
promoting themselves, the engineering firms focus in the first place on their engineering 
expertise, while architectural services constitute a secondary practice. The term 
engineering and architectural firms (EA) refers to this type of firm.  
 79 
Proposing a typology is not an easy task. Given the variety of related factors that may 
result in overlapping in classification, we suggest, in our context, a simplified 
classification, contrasting architectural firms considered as focusing mainly on 
architecture, and EA firms with engineering practices as their main focus (see Table 
1.1). 
Architecture firms and EA firms have numerous differences that can be related to their 
strategies, assets and targeted market. Morris & Empson (1998) consider that an 
architecture firm’s main asset is its creativity, while engineering firms have distinctive 
competence in technology.  
In our survey the architecture firms can be all considered as ‘strong idea’ firms, 
following Gutman’s classification. One may argue that based on this classification, 
Foster & Partners should be consider as strong idea firm while the rest are more ‘strong 
experience’ firms.  
In our context, since the targeted comparison is not between architectural firms, it is the 
interface architecture / engineering that is targeted. This is why we prefer to adopt the 
simplified classification by Olds (2001) who divides architecture firms through two 
categories: the one that seek design excellence and the ones that have more experience 
in what she calls mundane services. In our context, the selected architecture firms 
promote themselves as in the first categories, equivalent thus to the ‘strong idea’ 
appellation. 
From other part, our survey has covered three international firms that are relatively 
regional: Dar al Handasa, Khatib & Alami and KEO. Despite many representative 
offices that these ‘international/regional firms’ have through the world, it remains 
obvious that their major market is the Middle East. However, their structure and strategy 
are, to a large extent, similar to the EA international firms. Some nuances differentiating 
international from regional EA firms are mainly related to the interrelations with the 
local context. 
3.3.1 On communication and mobility 
Within the structure of both architectural and EA firms, mobility and complementarity 
are the main characteristics. However these aspects are more significant and crucial in 
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the matrix structure of EA firms, due to the numerous specialties and sub-specialties. 
Within these structures, not all specialties are present at a country level or even at a sub-
region level (for example, for most of the studied firms, the GCC is considered as a sub-
region in the Middle East, and the UAE as a country in the GCC sub-region).  
The presence of a certain specialty in an office depends on many factors, including 
market demand, the size of the office and the availability of specialized professionals. 
As a result, resources mobility seems to be a crucial aspect in the way the matrix 
operates. ‘There are so many disciplines and it doesn’t make sense to have every 
discipline in every office, so we share a lot of resources across the offices’ (Arup 1). 
‘Sharing resources’ may mean sharing knowledge, sharing projects or even sharing 
professionals. Projects may ‘travel’ from one country to another, depending on the team 
and office selected to work on them, and people may also travel depending on various 
factors, especially the project’s location.  
Many other factors can also limit professional mobility, such as financial aspects, 
climatic constraints and cultural aspects of a country. We have noticed for example that 
occasional instability in the case of Bahrain and the particular cultural context in Saudi 
Arabia seem not to encourage foreign professionals to live there. 
 
3.3.2 On the differences in structure 
As Morris & Empson (1998, p.621) argue, the nature of the knowledge base influences 
the organizational structure of the firm. Consequently, architectural and EA firms have 
different structures, reflecting their strategies and types of targeted market. In the 
literature, it is considered that a main distinction of architectural firms is the ability to 
design at a distance (Faulconbridge, 2009), and even to design projects worldwide from 
a single design-studio, in the case of starchitects (McNeill, 2005).  
Interestingly, EA firms appear to have a more solid and confident presence in GCC than 
architectural firms, in terms of access to local networks and projects. Three main aspects 
may help to explain this: 
Firstly, engineering related tasks and projects require on-site presence, leading EA firms 
to have offices next to their projects. 
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Secondly, as EA firms offer a variety of services, ranging from transportation to 
infrastructure, environment and management, it is more likely they will have projects on 
a continuous basis, while it is unlikely that an architecture firm will have more than one 
project in the same city.  
Thirdly, with a majority of engineering firms present since the middle of the XX century 
when the oil-based economy required western expertise for major modernization 
infrastructure projects, engineering firms seem to have a longer experience and presence 
in the GCC. 
Thus, we have noticed through our interviews that architectural firms have a non-
continuous presence in the region. Following the end of each project, they go through a 
major restructuring of their offices, while EA firms, with their multidisciplinary 
departments, are able to preserve a more continuous presence.  
The EA firms’ departments are organized following a matrix structure built upon 
‘business lines’ and ‘geographies’. Designated as well by divisions, practices or business 
groups, the ‘business lines’ include a number of departments and each department 
houses a number of specialties.  
From the other side, the business lines are distributed through a series of ‘geographies’ 
or regions. Regions are divided as well into sub-regions and sub-regions are divided into 
countries. For example Halcrow’s offices are distributed through four regions: UK and 
Europe, Middle East and Africa, Asia, and the Americas.  
The regional EA firms adopt a similar matrix structure, but with a timid presence in 
Europe and the Americas, having the majority of their offices in the Middle East. In this 
matrix structure, the EA firms seem to have a certain level of autonomy vis-à-vis their 
headquarters.  
Unlike the EA firms, the architectural firms have a pyramidal structure. This is based on 
the architecture practice, and the other practices (engineering, management, etc.), if 
present, act as support to architecture, and to design in general. While the total number 
of employees of an EA firm in the GCC ranges from a few hundred to thousands, (in the 
case of Aecom for example), architecture offices there are small ones, with a staff of 20 
or less.  
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With a majority of architects, and despite being totally design focused, these offices are 
considered as secondary or branch offices, and do not provide the full design of projects.  
There are often senior designers or team design at the headquarters level (UK for Benoy 
and Foster, and USA for HOK and P&W), who may initiate ideas or concepts, leaving 
the task of developing schemes and plans, and coordinating with the clients, to the 
country level offices. 
Differences exist between architectural and EA firms not only at the general structure 
level, but at the team level structure as well. The profiles of the professionals working on 
urban planning tasks vary considerably between firms, and an urban planning 
department may or may not exist within a firm composition. In some cases it is an 
independent department, while in other cases it is a sub-division in a department, 
typically the architectural one.  
Sometimes, and particularly in the architectural firms, there is no clear separation 
between planning and architecture, both falling under the ‘design’ practice. In Foster & 
Partners for example, the designer profile seems to be the dominant one: 
‘We may have urban planners in our teams but not so many; everybody is an architect, 
and we have a way to design things: an architect may work this month on a table design 
and the next month on a master plan. [This is] because we believe that if an architect 
keeps working on the same things, we will lose his creativity, and the same architect 
who designs a chair can design an airport, helped by a support staff’ (Foster & Partners 
1).  
While in the architectural firms, the main profiles are architect, landscape architect and 
urban designer, the planning-related profiles in the EA firms are more various and 
specialized. We note for example, beside the classical practices present in the 
architectural firms noted above, specialists in land development, economic planners, 
strategic planners, transport planners, environmental planners and GIS experts. 
In both cases, the presence of a larger palette of profiles in the EA firms does not seem 
to constitute a competition factor with the architecture firms, nor an element that may 
limit their important contribution to the GCC developments, since the latter would 
search for external complementary skills when needed for megaprojects.  
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3.3.3 Different methods of self-evaluation and review 
Firms have different ways of evaluating their work before delivering it to the client. 
Design board, internal and external peer reviews and ‘Project delivery manual’ are all 
tools for self-evaluation that have been identified through our surveys.  
In the case of centralized firms, like Foster and Partners, the quality control takes place 
via a central board that reviews and controls the design quality, while in the firms that 
lack a centralized structure many tools are used to ensure that the final products have the 
same quality and labels. This can be done implicitly through manuals and documents, or 
can be done explicitly through communication and experience sharing between the 
different offices of the firm.  
Internal self-evaluation requires usually the presence of key experts within the firm. It 
can be considered that EA firms have more decentralized common review tools that can 
be applied through offices worldwide, while Architecture firms have (different level of) 
centralized design control, around key persons as per senior architects and designers (or 
Norman Foster, in the case of Foster & Partners). 
 
 
Transfer and adaptation through ICFUPs 
This section’s objectives were to examine the knowledge transfer process, undertook by 
International Consultancy Firms in the context of UMPs in Dubai. In this context, we 
suggest that ICFUPs constitute a major powerful actor in shaping the city. Dubai, 
witnessing a massive urban transformation that is different from previous types of urban 
development, has relatively short urban history and therefore there is evidence of lack of 
expertise, professionals and norms in the real-estate market. 
The adaptation of these firms, facing the market instability and the clients’ demands 
were examined. Through the complexity of urban megaprojects and within the particular 
politico-economical context of Dubai, ICFUP had to undergo a plethora of adaptation 
procedures, related to their internal organization, their modalities in accessing the 
market, their role in offering the expected expertise for a demanding client and to 
perform in an unstable construction market, where existing knowledge and urban laws 
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would not cope with the on-going spectacular developments. In terms of adapting their 
theoretical framework, we have examined how powerful clients can impact the design 
and the final urban form of megaprojects. The reasons of this input are two fold: firstly, 
key actors are searching for a global city’s image, through looking into international 
models and urban references. From the other side they are looking for an urban form that 
consolidates their cities’ identity, regardless the ICFUP expertise and contribution.  
We have also differentiated architectural and engineering firms. Several aspects that 
characterize each were highlighted such as structure, access to market, and methods of 
self-evaluation. In each case, transfer process of the procedural framework and 
adaptation to local context are different. It could be argued that – since the engineering 
firms are related to technologies while architecture firms to creativity- engineering firms 
are actors of a complete transfer, since technologies are needed per se, and no 
modification from clients is likely to take place. In some cases, this technology-related 
knowledge is challenged in the context of spectacular megaprojects such as artificial 
island, and artificial canals, etc. In the case of architectural firms’, the ‘creative’ 
contribution is frequently subject to modification and discussion, since it could be easily 
linked to aspects related to market trends, the desired image by the client or aspects 
related to the context such as cultural, environmental or identity-related aspects.  
Moreover, in terms of structure, the centralized review system in the architectural firms 
contribute to a direct transfer, while in the case of EA firms, the capacity of local offices 
to make their own review process is likely to lead to an adaptation process, influenced 
by local factors. 
Going back to Ewers’ question about the extents to which the imported expertise can be 
a lever to local capacity development, and therefore contribute to learning, we have 
differentiated several aspects.  Learning occurs in the case of ICFUP setting new plans 
and regulations for municipalities. In that case, interaction with local professionals is 
leading to a learning-resulted transfer. As a result of local laws that require from foreign 
firms to employ locals, the presence of the latters within the ICFUP do not seem to be 
totally efficient, as they are often considered as lacking experience and not benefiting 
from the interaction with foreign experts, therefore truncating the learning process.  
UMPs in this context are highly influenced by this transferred knowledge, through 
ICFUPs. However this knowledge is adapted to the local context given the particularity 
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of political and regulatory system. This adaptation takes the form of procedural aspects 
such as the firms’ structure, the teams’ composition, the methods and the duration in 
designing megaprojects, and the form of substantial aspects where the mobilised 
references are influenced by international currents and images of global cities. It can be 
argued also that UMPs designed by engineering firms portrays aspects of high 
technology and prowess, while those designed by architectural firms focus more on the 
design quality.   
 
4 Conclusion)
Dubai is seen as a particular manifestation of the Arab world, where the ruling dynasty 
mobilizes historical and cultural authenticity, desert tribal democracy and a specific 
neoliberalism as the base of their legitimacy. Seen through a socio-political dimension, 
Dubai is – especially from a Western point of view – a modern successful enclave of 
‘good Muslims’ (Friedman, 2006) within the world of backwardness and extremism of 
the remaining Arab countries (Ibid). For urban experts, Dubai is a city of 
experimentation, adventures and new possibilities. Koolhaas, in an interview in 1996, 
considered that cities like Dubai felt much newer than the west, that they are 
representative of the future and that ‘building there is a daily pleasure’ (Kanna, 2011). 
These three discourses are expressive of the social, political and economic system in 
Dubai: from a political perspective, the ruling dynasty bases its legitimacy over a co-
opted new Arab identity. This identity is disconnected from the multiculturalism and 
nationalism that characterized the pre-oil Dubai. The new identity fashioned by the Al 
Maktoums is based on an ethnic citizenship that embraces a mixing of international 
values and local culture. In this identity, the values of the market and of openness to 
globalization and consumerism are prevailing.  
The ‘contract’ between rulers and citizens in Dubai specifies that the former are the 
protectors of a paternalist system of governance and the latter are passive objects. The 
Al Maktoums have fashioned a ‘ruling bargain’ (Kanna, 2009), where largesse 
distributed by the state is exchanged for political quiescence and where ideology was 
replaced by market and consumerism values. In this system, the ruling family presents 
itself as protectors of the citizenry from the multitude of nationalities of foreigners in 
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their midst. This ruling family makes Dubai into an ethnocracy where worrying about 
authenticity in the face of the imbalance between citizens and foreigners is the basis of 
the ruling legitimacy.  
This identity building is also based on a logic of modernization. This logic can be seen, 
since the 1970s, through large infrastructure projects such bridges, ports and highways 
and since the end of the 1990s through spectacular urban megaprojects, high tech metro 
and tram projects and ultra modern airports, that are taking place only with the role of a 
large number of Western experts and the mobilization of a professional non-local 
expertise.  
These large developments and investments, fashioned to project a globalized and 
modern image of the city, are dependent on the input of a large number of Western firms 
and consultants. The presence of this Western expertise is further encouraged by the 
open policies adopted by the emirate, and the overall facilitating of foreign business and 
companies. Moreover, the generally tolerant atmosphere in Dubai, dominated by the 
presence of foreigners and characterized by openness (compared to other Arab 
countries) towards other identities and customs, is also a factor that encouraged the 
settlement of foreign companies.  
In addition to the Western experts, and more particularly the ICFUPs, there is a group of 
powerful actors who plan, command and manage these spectacular developments. 
Sheikh Mohammad Al Maktoum, following the ambitious policies of his father, is the 
main actor in Dubai. Surrounded by his circle of allies and consultants, he fashions and 
draws the vision that he wants for Dubai and implements the necessary strategies and 
tools to translate it into reality.  
With the starting of the Mohammad era, the understanding of real estate development 
gained a new definition and logic. Long-term investment has been seen as inconsistent 
with Dubai’s vision, and megaprojects have become a quick means to translate the 
investors’ plans. The role of urban planners and other experts in this context is no longer 
to design and conceive projects from scratch. It has become restricted to implementing 
visions and ideas already fashioned by key investors and parastatal real estate 
companies.   
In fact, ICFUPs in Dubai, even with broad backgrounds and seemingly solid theories, 
are in practice adapting their knowledge to the vision drafted by the city through a 
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particular politico-economic system. They are adapting their knowledge to serve existing 
various cultural representation of Dubai. These representations however, even if they 
include aspects of ‘local identity’, are dominated by references that are more 
internationalised, and by architectural currents that can be described as part of mobile 
international knowledge, in the context of mobile planning.  
Therefore, UMPs in recent years have constituted the main tool in drawing a city image 
that aims to compete with the world global cities. They are the mean through which an 
economy based on spectacle and fascination is being deployed. They also constitute a 
lever that fuels several sectors, such as tourism, aviation, finance and others. Finally, 
they are at the core of a complex system of governance that encompass family ties, 
business logic and individualist visions, and that seeks legitimacy through deploying a 






































Dubai’s Megaprojects from isolated objects to shaping 








































This chapter focuses on Megaprojects in order to understand, based on a corpus of cases, 
their characteristics in terms of governance, morphology and contents. On another level, 
it aims at examining their role as development engines contributing to Dubai’s 
extension, and at understanding their role within the wider dynamics of the city. At a 
closer scale, the chapter presents an urban morphological analysis, where four selected 
megaprojects are analysed in terms of their morphological characteristics and their 
interrelation with their closer surroundings.  
In the first part of this chapter, we start by drawing a representation of Dubai’s UMPs 
based on literature. We suggest dividing the elements of this representation into two sets.  
The first is related to governance aspects and the second is related to morphological 
aspects. For this exercise we have used several types of sources. First we have reviewed 
a large number of articles and books that examine UMPs in general. These sources either 
describe features of UMPs through case studies or through generalized aspects that are 
related to morphology, content, governance, risks and others. Another type of source is 
the one that focus on GCC or on Dubai in particular. These latter do not address UMPs 
directly but do touch on aspects that relate to them in terms of the emirate’s economy, 
governance, architecture and the particular urban growth.  
These references range from scholarly articles, books and book chapters to websites and 
blogs that are focused on either real estate in the GCC or one or more of Dubai’s various 
sectors, such as urban planning or real estate. This literature-based representation 
valuably highlights the myriad of factors that generate, impact and shape Dubai’s UMPs, 
but the analysis of it remains at the descriptive level at this stage. This will afford us 
further insights in understanding the status and role of Dubai’s UMPs within the city’s 
extension logic and dynamics, through an analytical grid that will be mobilized in the 
second part of this chapter. 
In the second part of this chapter, we base the comparative analysis on our empirical 
corpus of UMPs. In order to draw an analytical grid for this comparison, we focus on 
three axes of reflection: the UMPs as governance tools, the UMPs as tools for the city’s 
expansion, and the UMPs as elements of a ‘patchwork urban planning’.  
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For each of these axes, several aspects are examined, based on data extracted from the 
empirical corpus of 36 megaprojects. These aspects will be further explained and 
analysed below. A discussion questioning aspects of fragmentation and of ‘assemblage’ 
will conclude this part. 
In the third part of the chapter, we focus on four case studies of Urban Megaprojects in 
Dubai, in order to analyse morphological aspects in detail. These aspects include the 
urban design of the master plan as well as the relation modalities of the project to both 




Megaprojects’ design, location and general morphology are directly related to a 
corporate-driven governance that reduces the role of the traditional public authorities 
and is deeply dependent on international expertise.  
 
Fig. 2.1 Representation of Dubai UMPs in the litterature 
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Based on the literature on Dubai, and with the aim of reconstructing a representation for 
Dubai UMPs, we propose two sets of factors that appear closely intertwined (see fig. 
2.1): governance through the main stakeholders in urban development; and the 
morphological characteristics of megaprojects. The aspects included under the 
governance set are: the corporate leaderships, international consultancy, weak public 
authorities, distant end users, and international finance. Items properly considered under 
the morphological set include, we suggest: exceptional size, location (particularly on 
waterfronts), mixed-use content, greenery and water, and the architectural records. As 
we have explained in the introduction, these aspects are accorded varying degrees of 
importance in the literature. For example the role of international consultants is less 
examined than that of the governor and the major holdings. On the morphological side, 
records and size are frequently addressed, whereas more detailed aspects such as the 
presence of greenery and water, or the location within the city, are discussed less often.  
For the purpose of the suggested literature-based model, we have accorded all these 
aspects an equal importance. However, in the empirical based second part, some aspects 
receive more focus than others, according to the level of their contribution to the 
suggested analytical grid.  
 
1.1 Characterizing megaprojects by their government-related 
characteristics 
Understanding who the actors in an urban megaproject are normally requires a minima 
an identification of the clients (and their representatives) who are initiating and 
financing it, the main consultants who are designing the project, and the end users who 
will nominally live and/or work in the project. Most of the elements of the governance-
related aspects that are identified in the diagram in figure 2.1 based on the literature have 
been examined in the previous chapter. Below is a brief presentation detailing each of 
them.  
Corporate leadership: Identifying the main actors goes in parallel with understanding the 
governance mode in the system. As highlighted in the previous chapter, Dubai is directly 
ruled by a dominant elite close to the Sheikh (Sampler & Eigner, 2003; Kanna, 2011; 
Lavergne, 2007; Acuto, 2010; Crot, 2013; Malty & Dillon, 2007). The lack of 
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democratic institutions is particularly expressed through a “corporate governance” style 
adopted by the Sheikh. Accordingly, development is most often organized under the 
direct authority of the State, trusted to so-called “parastatal organizations”. 
International Consultancy: In the literature on Dubai, some references have mentioned 
the particular expertise-related aspect of Dubai’s UMPs where there is a great need for 
international consultants (such as Elsheshtawy, 2013). Some researchers highlight the 
preeminent role of international consultants in the city’s development (Davis, 2007). ‘In 
Dubai, the emirs think and the occidental enterprises implement’ (Lavergne, 2007). This 
role goes even beyond the traditional advisory role of a parliament, since in Dubai, 
‘when advice is solicited, it generally comes, not from the powerless parliament but from 
western consulting firms’ (Brook, 2013, p. 372). 
Weak public authorities: The weakness of public bodies involved in the regulation of 
these megaprojects is another key dimension of Dubai. ‘While Dubai Municipality is 
nominally in charge of coordination, developments are many times given the go-ahead, 
and approval is obtained after the fact, and then incorporated into the structural plan’ 
(Elsheshtawy, 2013, p. 122). In fact this weakness at the level of public authorities 
broadly reflects a loose regulatory framework, especially with regard to the widespread 
presence of free zones that constitute places with their own special laws and regulations 
outside administrative control (Dumortier, 2007).  
Distant end-users: Concerning the end users, researchers usually consider that neither 
the autochthonous population of the city nor its international immigrants play a role in 
the development process (Lavergne, 2007). The projects are indeed designed for a 
virtual potential population whose notional needs and way of life are defined by the 
developer (Bagaeen, 2007). Dubai’s megaprojects tend to promote and sell new ways of 
living: ‘Dubai relies, for its growth, on its ability, not so much to respond to real needs, 
but to arouse constantly new demands and new needs in an emerging market that comes 
from regional economies’ (Lavergne, 2007).  
International finance: As shown in the previous chapter, the literature highlights the 
significant relationship between real estate in Dubai and the financial sector (Malty & 
Dillon, 2007; Hertog, 2007; Ramos, 2010). The capital that is mobilized in real estate is 
also invested in other economic activities in various sectors, including finance, 
communication, ports and aviation. Moreover, these various large investments, that 
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encompass UMPs and other sectors, exceed Dubai’s boundaries leading to what Roy 
(2011) calls an important ‘circulatory capacity’ of Dubai that exists beyond the city’s 
landscape, reaching several countries in the surrounding region, also involving 
partnerships with neighbouring governments.  
1.2 Characterizing megaprojects by their morphological aspects 
Beyond the governance dimensions, charting these representations of Dubai’s UMPs 
leads to an examination of the main characteristics of projects in terms of size, content, 
elements of urban design and location, as these are described in the literature. 
Exceptional size: Even if complexity – in terms of the number of actors or the level of 
technology – is a distinguishing feature of most megaprojects, their overall size 
obviously remains a criterion that is commonly referred to in order to characterize them 
(Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003). However, the scientific literature offers no threshold 
definition to distinguish “usual” urban projects from megaprojects. Cusset (2007) 
describes Dubai’s UMPs as ‘pharaonic’, while other authors reach for comparison with 
other worldwide cities and projects, describing Dubailand as twice the size of 
Disneyland (Davis, 2007), or Dubai World Center as exceeding the area of Atlanta by 
50% (Samarai & Qudah, 2007).  
Furthermore, there are a number of ways to formalize the size of a project: it may be 
expressed in terms of gross land area, floor square area, number of inhabitants/jobs or, 
more basically, in terms of project cost. In Dubai, the size of some spectacular 
megaprojects has been defined by the number of workers (40,000 in the case of 
Jumeirah Island), or the volume of moved sand (one billion cubic feet for the island The 
World). In the case of Jumeirah Palm, the size of the megaproject has even been 
advertised through the fact that the island would be ‘visible from outer space’ 
(Elsheshtawy, 2004, p.170).  
Mixed-use content: As regard to their program, most contemporary UMPs are defined as 
‘mixed-use’ developments (Lehrer & Laidley, 2008). In Dubai, the UMPs include 
hotels, malls, tourism and leisure functions (Acuto, 2010), a response to ‘demand-
oriented planning’ (Bagaeen, 2007, p.175) that seeks to provide comfort zones for all 
(Acuto, 2010). A further characteristic of Dubai projects is their quest for theming, or 
‘narrative’ as per Andraos & Wood (2013), who consider that theming is the ‘substitute 
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for public space and programming’, the element that generates an immediate, global, 
mass-consumable meaning. Elshewtawy (2013) proposes a classification of Dubai 
megaprojects according to four themes: Information Technology and media, Mixed-use 
real estate communities, Financial centers and Office/Hotel Complex.  
Apart from their mixed-use, Dubai UMPs are considered as disconnected from their 
context since all necessary amenities are provided within each project. This has led, as 
per some authors (Ramos & Raw, 2013; Andraos & Wood, 2013; Cusset, 2011), to a 
mosaic where the desert is divided into pieces of land connected by infrastructure. 
Architectural Records: Besides these aspects, the architecture of records is considered as 
one of the main characteristics of Dubai megaprojects. “The different projects in Dubai 
compete for superlatives, and thus for attention – the unifying principle seems to be 
‘Bigger! Faster! Higher!’” (Schmid, 2009). This directly concerns architecture and 
especially the presence of high-rise buildings like the Burj Kalifa Tower (the tallest 
building in the world with its 827 meters), but also the size of artificial islands or water 
bodies included in some megaprojects. This architecture of records denotes the 
determination of local authorities and developers to shine in a worldwide race to 
gigantism (Davis, 2007; Roy, 2011). From another perspective, Acuto (2010) considers 
that these ‘firsts’ are not a caprice; they denote dynamism and a commitment to 
progress, where symbolism is crucial. Many authors consider that records are not ends in 
themselves, but a sign of power, a tool in creating a symbolic image of the city in order 
to reach its uniqueness (Davis, 2007; Elsheshtawy, 2004).  
Location on waterfront: Location is a significant aspect in understanding Dubai’s 
megaprojects. Sager (2011) considers that waterfront developments are one of the 
typical elements of the products of neo-liberal urban planning politics. Elsheshtawy 
(2013) points out that Dubai has a short coastline, a significant limitation to attracting 
tourists. Dubai’s natural coastline is mainly occupied by industrial ports and residential 
areas, and this is what has led a push to create coastlines and waterfronts through 
artificial islands.  
Greenery and water: The nature of open spaces constitutes another key characteristic of 
Dubai’s UMPs. In a desert context, green and water elements are a form of ostentation, 
denoting a combination of political endeavor and economic power. These elements 
basically reflect the quest for that which is lacking in an arid climate. Green and water 
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are also symbolic elements of a luxurious way of life. The water theme is equivalent to 
‘becoming modern and advanced’ (Elshewtawy, 2013, p.166). Jensen (2013) has noted 
the “green enclave” quality of some golf course themed UMPs in Dubai. Picon-Lefevre 
(2013) has examined the presence of water in Dubai. She considers that the 
passion/obsession to relate water to architecture may be seen in most port and seaside 
cities, but Dubai is taking that to the extreme, where water becomes a synonym for 
pleasure, beauty and endless summer.  Moreover, she proposes a typology of four 
categories of ‘water presence’ in Dubai, two of which apply to UMPs: the picturesque, 
as per the fantasy islands and canals, and the urban port type of relation.  
 
 
As concluding remarks that can be drawn regarding the Dubai literature-based model, 
we can note that most of the references on Dubai focus on governance as a main 
characteristic, and on the political and economic angles. Rare are the authors who offer 
an architect- or urban planning-related profile. Aspects related to international finance 
are mainly examined from a financial angle.  
Morphological aspects are examined by authors from different disciplines, though 
among them architecture-related profiles are dominant. It can be noted that addressing 
Dubai’s UMP-related aspects remains at a descriptive level (excluding the comparative 
analysis between Dubai and Las Vegas based on the theoretical framework of 
‘Fascination Economy’, or Elsheshtawy’s socio-political approach). This is why we 
argue that understanding Dubai’s UMPs requires an integrated approach that compares 
and relates the various aspects that contribute to the implementation of UMPs.  
This leads us, in the coming section, to adopt an empirical approach, based on 
examining the 36 cases of megaprojects in Dubai. The analytical grid will rotate around 
three interrelated axes that help in understanding the overall image of UMPs: the city’s 
expansion through UMPs, the city’s governance through UMPs, and the UMPs’ 







As mentioned earlier in the introduction, we consider that the existing literature on 
Dubai megaprojects does not sufficiently account for this phenomenon, since it 
mobilizes only isolated approaches that are not adequate or sufficient to uncover the 
complexity that lies behind. In this part – and after we have drawn a model of Dubai’s 
UMPs that is based on the literature, and that has shown the limitation of a descriptive 
approach, and the absence of a holistic understanding of the latter – we propose an 
empirical approach that is based on a set of investigated and analysed UMPs in Dubai, 
and an analytical grid. This analytical grid aims at including and structuring the 
interrelations between the most representative aspects of UMPs in Dubai and their 
status within the city from a structural (in relation to the city), morphological and 
political point of view, while offering a base to analyse the relevant characteristics of 
the Dubai UMPs that were assembled in our corpus.  
Figure 2.2 shows the footprints and names of the 36 megaprojects. This map is 
produced through a combination of project masterplans and aerial views. The selection 
of these 36 UMPs is a reflection of several factors: 
Availability of complete data concerning the master developer and his status (private 
or public), the contents, start and completion dates, the consultant’s name, cost and 
built area. As mentioned before, this data was extracted from several sources including 
specialised journals, websites and blogs, interviews with urban professionals and site 
visits. 
The status of the project: several of the UMPs in Dubai that have attracted media 
attention are still at the planning stage. A large number have been found to be non-
feasible, while others were cancelled after the 2008 economic crisis. The selection of 
36 megaprojects took this aspect into consideration, and we opted for completely built 
projects or on-going ones. 
An important aspect in the selection of the 36 megaprojects is the size: indeed, even 
the size in defining megaprojects is a major aspect, we could not refer to it as a criteria. 
The UMPs’ sizes vary enormously. For example Dubai Lifestyle City, one of the 
smallest of the megaprojects selected, covers a surface area of 60 ha, and includes  
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Fig 2.2: The locations and names of the 36 surveyed megaprojects in Dubai 
hotels, residences, a golf course, sports facilities, restaurants and various recreational 
facilities (see fig. 2.3). However, compared to the largest UMP selected, Deira Palm, 
with its 1500 ha (25 times the size of Lifestyle City), the status of Dubai Lifestyle City 
as a megaproject could be questioned. Therefore, we do not consider a certain 
threshold or a minimum in selecting our database.  
It is to be noted that we could not obtain plans or maps from either the consultants or 
Dubai Municipality. The consultants were reluctant to provide plans, considering this 
to be problematic because of the status of plans and other project documents as the 
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master developer’s property. In Dubai Municipality, a complicated administrative 
procedure needs to be followed in order to obtain any kind of document or plan. But in  
 
Fig 2.3: Dubai Lifestyle City’s Masterplan (60 ha), showing residences, hotels, a golf 
course, sports equipment and various entertainment functions (Source: 
www.2daydubai.com) 
 any event, few documents are published by Dubai Municipality, such as the complete 
document of Dubai Vision 2020.  
Drawing the boundaries of the selected 36 megaprojects was easily done through 
examining the aerial view on Google Earth, since each project presents a clear and 
isolated pattern. Master plans each constitute an independent composition that is 
different from its surroundings, thus facilitating the identification of projects (see fig. 
2.4). Identifying the masterplans was basically done through following the projects’ 
websites, since all these projects have their websites that provide maps, figures and 
other information.  
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During the site visits that took place in October 2012 and October 2013, for a duration 
of one month each, we were able to visit the majority of these megaprojects. Some 
could not be visited as they are not easily accessible, such as The World Islands 
(accessible by boat, but not to the public), Jebel Ali Palm and Deira Palm (under 
construction), Emirates Hills and Jumeirah Islands (private communities). For the 
remaining projects, visits to some were undertaken by car, mainly those located in the 
inland. The scale of the project and the high temperature made walking in these 
projects a difficult task. As for the megaprojects that are located along the main axis of 
Sheikh Zayed Road, and served by the metro line, these were easily accessible. The 
ones that offer commercial and public spaces, such as Dubai Marina, Jumeirah Lake 
Towers and Jumeirah Beach Residence, and at the same time connected directly to a 
metro line through metro stations, provided easy access for us to walk, take photos and 
examine and explore the various parts at leisure. Another opportunity came with the 
visit to an upper floor of Burj Khalifa, providing a view over large parts of Dubai, and 
in particular of the Business Bay projects located under that tower.  
 
Fig 2.4: The megaprojects in Dubai, each with its specific urban composition, making 






The first axis that we address is the role of UMPs within the political structure of the city 
(see fig. 2.5). We consider that UMPs play an important role in the centralised 
governance around the Sheikh.  
 
Fig 2.5: The three axes addressed in section 2 and their respective relevant analysed 
aspects 
Indeed, UMPs in Dubai constitute a tool through which the city is governed and the 
shares among major stakeholders are allocated. Since the political dimension is a main 
dimension in understanding Urban Megaprojects, the two proposed elements within this 
axis are the Master developers of the UMPs and the identification of the free zones 
where a number of UMPs are built. We aim through these aspects to examine the 
respective roles of the governmental institutions, the parastatal developers and the 
private sector. Analysing the status of free zones aims at highlighting and understanding 
the co-presence on the same territory of different stakeholders and differentiated 
regulatory frameworks. 
The second axis that addresses the status of UMPs within the city’s urban expansion will 
be examined and analysed through two aspects: the location of UMPs within the city 
structure, and the role of UMPs as engines for urban expansion. Through analysing these 
two characteristics, we aim to examine to what extent the role of these UMPs are 
primordial in the city development, expansion and dynamics. 
The third axis examines UMPs as isolated objects within an integrated network of 













the isolation/connection aspects that disconnect or connect the projects from or to the 
city, we highlight fragmentation-related characteristics relative to other aspects that 
show attempts to connect to the city through various networks. The elements of theming 
and records are proposed for use in examining the commodification logic that 
predominates in this type of development that is based on UMPs. Through this part of 
the analysis, the potential of urban spaces through sectorization18 of functions and 
themes (Mangin, 2004) will be examined. 
 
2.1 The master developers 
Our survey highlights the crucial role of parastatal holdings in Dubai UMPs, as a total 
of 27 out of 36 projects are developed by holdings like Emaar, Nakheel and Dubai 
Properties (See table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1. The developers of Dubai UMPs 
                                                
18 This is a concept that considers that, in a fragmented context, various urban spaces search for status and 
meaning through differentiation and competition in function, themes and records. It will be detailed in the 
third part of this chapter. 
Developers) Nb)of)projects)
Parastatal)
Nakheel' 12'Emaar' 5'Dubai'Properties' 3'Tecom' 2'Union'Properties' 1'Meeras' 1'Dubai'Holding' 1'Dubai'Investment'Group' 2'
Institutional) Dubai'Government' 4'
Private)




Fig 2.6: Nakheel islands projects: The three Palms (built or on-going), the Universe and 
the Waterfront (Still at the plan level). (Source: www.2daydubai.com) 
Quite significantly, 12 projects are developed by Nakheel alone (see fig. 2.6). This 
company specializes in megaprojects like the Palms artificial islands and the ‘World 
Islands’. Founded in 2000 as a subsidiary of Dubai World, Nakheel is known for its 
spectacular land reclamation projects: the three Palms, the World Islands, the Universe 
Islands and the waterfront (the last two projects are in the planning phase and were not 
included in our corpus). Nakheel in Arabic means ‘palms’, and the name was chosen 
because it was founded at the first place where the palm tree islands were built. 
Nakheel is also known through other residential projects such as the International City, 
the Gardens and Jumeirah Islands. After the 2008 crisis, Nakheel went through a debt 
crisis, and after significant restructuring it changed from parastatal to government 
owned in 2011. In 2014, Nakheel was still repaying its debts to banks. There have been 
many controversies about the negative impact of these reclaimed land islands. The 
costs of these islands are also a subject of controversy. Several blogs and online 
forums claim that Nakheel, in order to rebalance its under-estimated costs of the 
islands’ construction, has increased the buildings’ density.  
Also under Dubai World, DMC (Dubai Maritime City) is another artificial island 
dedicated to maritime activities and ports. Limitless is a real estate company that is 
developing Down Town Jebel Ali megaproject, also a member of Dubai World. The 
total number of UMPs under the umbrella of Dubai World is 14 of the 36. 
Dubai World is a giant holding that was created in 2006 by decree of Sheikh Ahmad 
Al Maktoum, ruler of Dubai, who is reputed to hold the majority stake (based on 
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interviews). Headed by Sheikh Ahmad bin Saeed Al Maktoum, the uncle of Sheikh 
Mohamad, Dubai World invests in different sectors, including areas of transport and 
logistics, dry docks and maritime, urban development, investment and financial 
services (www.dubaiworld.ae). It has investments in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and in South Africa. In addition to Nakheel and the other above-mentioned 
companies that invest in real estate, Dubai World contains a number of international 
companies such as DP World (Dubai Ports World) and Drydocks World. DP World 
has more than 65 marine terminals in the six continents (in 2015) (www.dpworld.com).  
The other giant holding, Dubai Holding, that is responsible (through Dubailand, Dubai 
Investment, TECOM and Dubai Properties) for 6 megaprojects of the 36, is also a 
global investment company. It has investments in financial services, real estate, 
specialised business parks, telecommunications and hospitality. Sheikh Mohamad 
holds the majority of Dubai Holding (based on interviews).  
Emaar is also a major developer in Dubai (see table 2.1). While Nakheel only operates 
in Dubai, Emaar has developed projects worldwide, focusing exclusively on real estate. 
A public joint-stock company, Emaar has developed mainly downtown Dubai projects 
– with Burj Khalia as landmark, Emirates Hills, and Dubai Marina, one of the largest 
megaprojects in Dubai containing more than 200 towers. 
Private developers are developing 5 out of the 36 megaprojects. This is an indication 
that “pure” private developers are active in Dubai development, even though it is far 








































































































































































































































These numbers unveil that in Dubai, it’s not about a neo-liberal market where the 
government encourages the private sector, or plays a role of a main partner. In Dubai, 
the governor who is the major investor and partner is incontestably the first player in 
shaping the city. He implements his policy and vision indirectly through a large number 
of key developers. Being able to trace back the real owners of the companies, we have 
identified a limited number of large holdings that invest in several sectors including real 
estate. It can be argued, that these holdings are not only shaping the urban form of the 
city but more than that they are shaping its economy as well.  
2.2 The Free zones 
Based on the survey, seven megaprojects are located in free zones. Two of these projects 
are considered as government-owned. Dubai International Financial Center is a financial 
zone, with a specific regulation, conceived as a platform for business and financial 
institutions at a regional level. Silicon Oasis is a free trade zone with residential and 
commercial activities.  
Even when government owned, specific authorities usually regulate most developments 
in Dubai, which thereby fall outside the scope of administrative agencies. Free zone 
authorities play an important role that goes beyond their institutional limits. Developers 
that are subsidiaries of a main holding can refer to an authority of a free zone within the 
same holding. Business Bay constitutes a good example of this situation. The project is 
developed by Dubai Properties, a subsidiary of Dubai Holding; and it is controlled by 
TECOM, another subsidiary of the same holding. Dubai Municipality appears to be the 
weakest actor in this system. It can, at best, try to put in place a holistic vision for the 
city through a seemingly ‘after the fact’ master plan, which does nothing more than 
compile the various agendas of developers.   
The 2008 crisis had an important impact on this system by forcing the cancellation, 
downscaling and modifying of many projects. Some developers no longer exist  
(Tatweer, Sama Dubai); major holdings were restructured, while a majority of 
international consultancy firms have downsized their Dubai offices. This helped to boost 
the role of the municipality in the regulation of urban projects. Dubai Municipality 
upgraded its procedures for more efficiency and simplicity. ‘Our aim is to encourage 
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developers, not block their projects’ said an urban planner in Dubai Municipality. Since 
2008 all developments are again controlled and reviewed by the municipality, even 
though free zones still have their own planning rules. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Business Bay is a megaproject under construction in Dubai. Above: model 
(Source: www.2daydubai.ae, accessed on 10 February 2015). Below: View of Business bay 
from Burj Khalifa (2013). (Source: Oula Aoun) 
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Figure 2.9: Silicon Oasis is a megaproject of a free zone that is still under construction. 
(Source: www.globalgate.ae) 
 
Figure 2.10: Dubai Financial District is a federal free zone. (www.2daydubai.ae) 
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As concluding observations for this part, we consider that analysing the political 
dimension that runs through Dubai’s UMPs, and more particularly the way the power 
and the land are distributed between main developers closely related to the government 
and to the Sheikh, helps in understanding the status of UMPs within this political 
structure.  
Distribution of land to main developers by the Sheikh in order to implement UMPs is a 
way by which the Sheikh confers power on the master urban actors and exercises control 
over various city parts. We can notice for example the symbolic power accorded to 
Nakheel through the multitude of impressive artificial islands. Emaar, while not 
associated with development of artificial islands, has its name related to the Burj 
Khalifa, the world’s highest tower, and to Dubai Marina, considered as one of the 
landmarks of Dubai.  
The conclusion here is not that master developers each have their own place in the city 
to invest in. On the contrary, we can notice another logic in the way the megaprojects 
are distributed through developers, one that consists of distributing shares of lands 
within the same area, particularly in sites with high potential. In the case of Jumeirah 
sector, we notice that all the above-mentioned developers have developed megaprojects 
there, within one agglomeration of projects. The same situation is apparent around the 
creek, where at least three developers are developing megaprojects next to each other. 
The multitude of free zones, and more particularly of UMPs developed as free zones, 
characterized by their own legal regulatory framework, is also expressive of the 
existence of fragmented areas of power. However, through these differentiated urban 
logics, UMPs seem to play the role of tool by which the city is managed, the means by 
which the Sheikh is establishing the territory of the different players in a context where 
the overlapping of prerogatives and authorities may frequently occur.  
 
2.3 The location of Megaprojects 
Location is a significant aspect in understanding Dubai’s megaprojects. Sager (2011) 
considers that waterfront developments, for example, are one of the typical products of 
neo-liberal urban planning politics. Dubai has a limited coastline, a significant challenge 
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in attracting tourists. In fact, Dubai’s natural coastline is mainly occupied by industrial 
ports and residential areas. This is what drove the creation of new coastlines and 
waterfronts through artificial islands.  
Indeed, Dubai now has urbanized areas on both land and sea. Of the 397800 ha 
constituting the total area of the emirate, existing urban fabric and projects under 
construction constitute only 20%. Another 20% comprises land committed for 
urbanization by 2008. The sea territory located within 12 nautical miles covers 145000 
ha. From this area, 23% was reclaimed and dredged for offshore artificial islands (Dubai 
Municipality, 2012). As of 2014, these islands were partially developed. 
Dubai is divided into three territorial areas; the offshore islands, the urban area and the 
desert area (see fig. 2.11). As for the existing land use structure, the desert area includes 
a few ‘non-urban settlements’ and a conservation zone, while the majority of the area is 
not built. The urban area includes residential, mixed, commercial and various uses. The 
industries and the surfaces allocated to airports and seaports constitute a significant part 
of this area. Free zones are also located here19. The offshore built area comprises (as of 
2015) the artificial islands. 
In terms of locality, the artificial palm islands and the world islands are undoubtedly the 
most visible and mediatized megaprojects. Palm Jebel Ali and Palm Jumeirah are 
already built. The third and biggest Palm, Palm Deira, has been put on hold with only 
minor parts as yet reclaimed, even after being largely downscaled after 2008. Two other 
megaprojects, Dubai Maritime City and Jumeirah Pearl, are also artificial islands, 
though on a less spectacular scale than the Palms; together with the three Palms and the 
World Islands they constitute a total of six artificial islands out of the 36 megaprojects. 
This still leaves 30 megaprojects in relatively less spectacular locations. 
 
                                                
19 There are more than 20 Free Zones operating in Dubai (Dubai Municipality, 2012). The main free 
zones are: Dubai Airport Free Zone, Dubai Cars and Automotive Zone (DUCAMZ) also known as Dubai 
Auto Zone, Dubai Healthcare City, Dubai International Academic City, Dubai Internet City, Dubai 
International Financial Centre, Dubai Knowledge Village, Dubai Media City, Dubai Gold and Diamond 
Park, Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC), Dubai Silicon Oasis (DSO), International Media 
Production Zone, Jebel Ali Free Zone, JLT Free Zone and Dubai World Central (DWC) Business Park. 
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Fig 2.11: Dubai emirate as divided in Dubai Municipality report Dubai 2020: the desert 







Location of Megaprojects Nb 
Inland 15 
Along Sheikh Zayed Road 11 
Artificial Islands 6 
Natural waterfronts nearby the creek 4 
Total 36 
Table 2.2: Location of megaprojects’ in Dubai 
 
Some 15 megaprojects from our survey are located nearby the creek and along Sheikh 
Zayed Road. This location benefits from access to major services, axis and metro line, 
and it is related to a symbolic dimension. Being closer to the coast and/or the creek, 
these megaprojects often have important areas of greenery and water bodies, an aspect 
that is lacking in the remaining inland megaprojects, located along secondary road axes 
inside the desert.   
 
2.4 The role of UMPs as expansion engine 
‘Dubai Emirate has committed vast areas for developing mega urban projects (or cities 
within a city). Some megaprojects are planned to house over one million inhabitants. 
The carrying capacity of these megaprojects (as committed before the global economic 
downturn in 2008) if completed and fully occupied may reach over 9 million inhabitants.  
The anticipated implementation and completion periods of such projects are not 
definable at present. Some projects were achieved, but after 2008 the development of 
several megaprojects was already placed on hold, or deferred (Dubai Municipality, 
2012).  
It is unlikely that many of these projects will proceed in the form in which they were 
designed, given that they have been prepared within a different market context to the one 
prevailing post-2010 (ibid). In 2012, the on-going megaprojects that were not modified 
or put on hold have a population capacity of 1.4 million residents.  
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The artificial islands, more than simply contributing to the Emirate’s urban extension, 
are at the core of building the new identity of the city. Megaprojects around the creek 
have a symbolic dimension, and from a morphological point of view they fulfill a 
densification role within the existing concentric old urban fabric around Dubai’s creek. 
The megaprojects along Sheikh Zayed Road contribute to the ‘modern’ and high tech 
image of the city, linking in a linear way, from a morphological point of view, the old 
Dubai to the Jebel Ali zone along the route to Abu Dhabi. The megaprojects that are 
built inland are less integrated within the existing fabric, and contribute to the scattered 
and uncontrolled aspect that the city has.  
Comparing the UMP location map with the map of city extension phases reveals much 
about the primordial role of the UMPs in the logic of city extension. Indeed, figure 2.12 
shows an overlapping between Dubai’s different extension phases and the location of 
UMPs. It shows that the UMPs are at the core of these extensions. They are to develop 
through agglomerations of megaprojects each constituting a significant area in the 
context of the total city area. 
The aspects related to the location and status of the UMPs within the city, and their role 
within the broader extension logic have shown, especially through the map overlapping 
the locations and the extension phases, that UMPs are not particular and unique 
extravagant projects. They constitute the catalyst and the engine around which the city is 
growing and extending. Indeed, the strategic governmental plans have always planned 
and established future development and extension zones in which UMPs are 














Fig 2.12: Dubai expansion phases, compared to megaprojects location: the overlapping 
shows the status of UMPs as levers in the city’s expansion. (Source: Oula Aoun. 







Fig 2.13: In red: The reclaimed land islands, The world Islands, Palm Jebel Ali, Palm 
Jumeirah and the under construction Palm Deira. In Green: the Jebel Ali port and free 
zone. In blue: the old center. The orange line shows the main axis of the city’s 
expansion, linking the old center to Jebel Ali free zone. 
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2.5 Theming and Symbolism 
Dubai megaprojects can be classified into six main categories (Table 2.3). Obviously 
there are important overlaps between these categories. While sports equipment and/ or 
golf courses are classified in the sport themed category, residential functions are equally 
present in these projects. 
Through detailing the components of each UMP, table 2.3 reveals two main findings: 
The mixed-use category – where projects include a variety of functions ranging from 
residential to offices, leisure and commercial – covers 13 of the 36 megaprojects. It 
constitutes the largest category of the six. However, while the literature proposes a 
generalized definition of Dubai’s UMPs as integrated cities–within-a-city where all 
amenities are provided, our detailed examination of components shows that this 
definition cannot be generalized. 
The literature often describes Dubai’s projects as gated communities; while our survey 
confirms this aspect only for the purely residential category and, to a lesser degree, the 
sports themed category, together constituting a total of 16 out of the 36 megaprojects. 
This leaves a majority of megaprojects, that include the commercial, offices and leisure 
activities, which cannot be considered as gated communities. 
As for the symbolism, we focus on analysing the emphasis on water and greenery 
presence within the majority of megaprojects, as a symbol of modernity and luxury 
context, especially in a desert climate where these elements are scarce. The analysis of 
the treatment of open spaces has shown that 29 of the 36 megaprojects have water 
elements, while all the projects have green elements. These elements vary in terms of 
role and area within each project. Water bodies are classified as waterfront, canals or 
ponds, while green elements range from golf courses to linear plantations (see table 2.4).  
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    Table 2.4 Water and green bodies in Dubai’s UMPs 
Our findings confirm an aspect, only vaguely mentioned in the literature, that is present 
in the integration of water and green in a systematic way within almost all Dubai’s 
UMPs. Water and greenery are also present symbolically in the projects’ name. 
Symbolism related to water is reflected in project names like ‘Bay’, ‘Marina’, ‘Lagoons’ 
and ‘Islands’, while the greenery symbolism is reflected in titles like ‘Palms’, ‘Gardens’ 
and ‘The Green’. Such symbolic features can even determine the overall shape of 























Culture'Village X X X X
Jumeirah'Pearl' X X X X
Jumeirah'lake'towers'FZ X X X
Dubai'Gardens X
Downtown'Jebel'Ali X








Dubai'Festival'City X X X X X
Tiger'woods'Dubai'Dev. X X X
Meydan'City X X X
Jumeirah'Park X X




Palm'Jumeirah X X X
Arabian'Ranches X X X
Business'Bay X X
Dubai'Lagoons' X X X
Silicon'Oasis'FZ X X
International'City X X X








Fourteen of the 36 megaprojects have water elements as major component: lakes, bays, 
lagoons, marinas etc. This may reflect a desire for luxury in a desert context, but the 
relative easy digging process, due to soil nature and a water table close to the surface, 
can also explain this tendency. Many of the consultants we interviewed during our site 
work consider that people are naturally attracted by water. It would hence constitute an 
‘added-value’ to these projects, even though it can be argued that designing with water is 
not suitable in a hot and desert context for a series of reasons (costs, humidity, thermal 
comfort etc.). Most projects include greenery in their open spaces. These can consist of 
gardens and golf courses. While more adapted to the climate than water bodies, greenery 
is considered as less luxurious and only related to residential and sports projects.  
We consider that in the context of competition among megaprojects with relatively 
similar content, theming is a major element that provides megaprojects with specialised 
aspects, in line with the commodification logic which forces each project to strive for 
visibility. 
Therefore, through the commodification logic that was examined through symbolism 
and theming, the analysis of the corpus has shown that Dubai’s UMPs represent what 
Mangin (2004) described as the sectorization of urban spaces that aims at maximizing 
the potential of land commodification through a multitude of functions and theming. We 
consider, as per Mangin, that this sectorization in Dubai, beyond the chaotic image, is 
what helps the city in holding its different parts together.   
2.6 Records  
Dubai megaprojects are known for international records. This ‘race to gigantism’ can 
clearly be observed in the Palm artificial islands, the biggest artificial islands in the 
world. Dubai Marina claims to host the largest man-made marina in the world and the 
tallest residential tower (the Princess tower). The Downtown Dubai project is associated 
with Burj Khalifa, the tallest building worldwide (827 meters high). Dubai is also known 
for its ‘biggest commercial mall’ worldwide, the ‘biggest indoor ski track’ etc.  
Almost all UMPs are characterized by ambitious features like artificial lagoons, canals 
and oases or by being ‘first of its kind’, as Media City and Maritime City were. 
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2.7 Connection/Disconnection to or from the city 
What we have analysed in sections 2.5 and 2.6 shows that Dubai UMPs are meant to act 
as self-sufficient entities, each with its symbolic power and its image, competing with – 
without complementing – other neighboring projects. Dubai 2020 vision considers that 
UMP-based urban expansion is contributing to a fragmentation of the city. 
While recognizing that ‘[a] large metropolis may generate vibrant and diverse life and 
activities, but also could generate complex environments and put greater adverse 
pressure on infrastructure, social order, pollution, heat islands, etc…’, the Dubai 2020 
Urban Masterplan considers that its major urgent prioritie is to facilitate flexible, 
compatible, sustainable and smart urban planning. The main challenges that it highlights 
are related to fragmented development arising from the proliferation of UMPs. 
‘A fragmented development, with numerous stalled and ongoing megaprojects being 
poorly integrated with the city urban structure’. The plan considers that the fragmented 
development pattern of urban megaprojects is a key threat to Dubai’s economic 
competitiveness, since the existing lack of integration between individual projects and 
Dubai’s larger urban structure entails unnecessary infrastructure costs and requires an 
inefficient allocation of resources. 
Other challenges related to this fragmented development, as mentioned in Dubai Vision 
2020 are as follow: 
Conflicting land uses, including incompatible uses and locations within these planned or 
ongoing development projects 
Delayed project completions, resulting in gaps in service and inefficient outlay of 
infrastructure 
Oversupply and duplication of land uses, created by inadequate coordination between 
competing development projects and insufficient regard for regional supply–and-
demand dynamics  
The housing capacity of committed projects is greater than the projected residential and 
workforce populations for 2020, requiring a review of current project phasing. 
Moreover, their housing provision targets the middle and upper classes, and thus it needs 
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to meet an increasingly diverse range of housing and social demands in order for the 
residential sector to be sustainable. The plan suggests a demand-led provision rather than 
supply-led one. 
In the Dubai 2020 Master Plan, it is considered that several of the stalled megaprojects 
are located too far outside Dubai’s existing urban limits. To respond to this challenge, it 
is proposed to support priority development areas by transferring ownership and 
development rights to more appropriate and convenient locations. 
The Dubai 2020 Master Plan (Figure 2.14) considers that in order to deal with 
urbanization-related problems, and particularly those that have arisen due to 
megaprojects, it is important to find means to activate the ‘on hold’ urban projects that 
have a potential to contribute to city growth. It underlines the necessity to provide a 
‘strongly defined’ program to phase and monitor these developments. Moreover, given 
the sporadic implantation of these developments, the plan suggests concentrating on 
compact growth centred on existing uses and infrastructure and promotes the use of 













A fragmented city is not able to function as a one entity. Yet the spectacular growth and 
the increasing investments that have marked Dubai in the last twenty years strongly 
suggest it is not perceived as a fragmented city. How is this dilemma to be resolved? We 
argue that three factors contribute to the understanding of Dubai as a unified entity. 
First, despite the seemingly disparate master developers each with its own agenda, our 
analysis shows that all these actors are grouped under the umbrella of a few giant 
holdings that are controlled by the Sheikh. The city thus grows in response to one vision 
and one centralised authority that provides a flexible system of governance.  
Second, even with a multiplicity of commodified spaces, each presenting its own realm, 
image and symbol, we argue, following Mangin (2004), that Dubai holds its parts 
together because of this multiplicity of spaces that contribute to producing an image of a 
modern, capable and experimental city. It can be also analysed through the notion of 
urban assemblage, where ‘there is no city as whole, but a multiplicity of processes 
assembling the city in different ways’ (Farias, 2011, p. 369).  
The third factor is the physical one that connects these different entities: the network of 
infrastructure. Indeed, in Dubai there is a political will that recognizes the role of 
infrastructure in connecting the city and providing an asset for development. The road 
network, metro and tramlines, as well as water routes served by ferries and water taxis, 
all contribute to connect the different parts of the city. By connecting to these networks, 
UMPs become parts of an overall ‘assemblage’ system where the city can be understood 
through ‘both the individual elements and the agency of the interactive whole’ (Mc 









Fig 2.14: Dubai 2020 land uses 
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3 Understanding)megaprojects)through)their)morphology)
The morphology is a main characteristic of urban megaprojects. Despite the fact that 
scholars focus on form when examining the role of these projects in influencing their 
context, performance and objective, very few studies analyse the morphology and urban 
design of UMPs in detail (but see, for example, Carmona’s (2002) analysis of the urban 
design of a megaproject in Tokyo Bay).  
Descriptions typically remain at the general level, and sometimes the urban form of 
UMPs is very broadly described, highlighting for example their size or their iconicity. 
Sklair considers that iconicity in architecture has two defining characteristics: 
First, it clearly means famous, at least for some constituencies; and second, a judgment 
of iconicity is also a symbolic/ aesthetic judgment. By this I mean that an architectural 
icon is imbued with a special meaning that is symbolic for a culture and/or a time, and 
that this special meaning has an aesthetic component. It is this unique combination of 
fame with symbolism and aesthetic quality that creates the icon. Iconicity persists, but 
not necessarily forever. (Sklair, 2006, p. 25) 
 
UMPs are analysed against different backgrounds – economic, political, social and 
managerial – and yet design and architecture focused studies on UMPs are rare. For 
example, Fanstein (2008) asserts that ‘there is a striking physical similarity among the 
schemes in European and American urban megaprojects’, without explaining the nature 
of those similarities. Priemus et al. (2008) consider that megaprojects are colossal, 
captivating because of their size and aesthetic design, having an innovative and 
experimental character.  
Scholars also focus on the quality and the iconicity of design as the means by which 
UMPs fulfill their role as tools to attract media and business attention. ‘This form of 
intervention (urban megaprojects) goes hand in hand with an eclectic planning style 
where attention to design, detail, morphology, and aesthetics is paramount’ 
(Swyngedouw et al., 2002). ‘Well-designed landmark developments bring lasting value 
to cities’ (Worpole, 2000).  
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Architectural symbolism and iconicity strongly contribute to the role of spectacular 
design as a tool for marketing cities in the era of capitalist globalization. ‘They act as a 
permanent advertisement for the city, attracting media, cultural activities, tourists and 
business alike (Carmona, 2002).  
 
3.1 Urban Analysis Approach and Methodology   
In this research, we aim to closely analyse the morphology of UMPs in Dubai. We 
suggest doing this through a number of case studies. The objective of analysing a 
selection of Dubai UMPs is to understand the characteristics of the components of the 
master plans, the elements that govern the relation with the immediate context and the 
city in general, and the aspects of iconicity that are specific to this kind of development.  
A morphology analysis can have different aspects and mobilize different approaches. 
Merlin (1988) considers that there is an absence of consensus on the terminology of 
urban analysis, and an epistemological weakness as well as a lack of scientific rigor in 
the approaches taken by researchers in this domain. Attempting to devise a typology of 
approaches in morphological analysis, Lévy (2005) considers that there are five types of 
analysis in approaching the urban form: 
- Urban form as a form of the urban landscape (in the sense of urban ‘paysage’ in 
French), in the meaning of the urban space understood in its three dimensions and its 
plastic materiality (texture, color, materials, styles, volumes, gabarits, etc.), as analyzed 
by G. Cullen (1961), E. Bacon(1965), C. Sitte (1889), K. Lynch (1960), etc. 
- The urban form as ‘social morphology’, in which urban space is studied as a space 
occupied by social, demographic and ethnic groups and family types, as well as the 
functions’ distribution in the city (such studies to be found in the work of Durkheim 
(1960), Halbwachs (1828), Roncayolo (1996), etc.). 
- The urban form as a bioclimatic form, which is thus studied through its environmental 
dimension, as an urban microclimate in relation to which many aspects can be 
mobilized: site location, urban fabric shape, orientation, pollution agents, etc. (see e.g. 
Escourrou (1980) and Hall (1971)). 
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- The urban form as the form of urban fabrics (Panerai, Langé, 2001), that consists in 
studying the interrelations between the constitutive elements of an urban fabric: the lots, 
the road network, the open space, the built space on the one hand and their relation with 
the site on the other. 
- The urban form as the form of urban layouts (tracés urbains in French), which means 
the analysis of the geometric form of the city (organic plan/ geometric plan; orthogonal 
plan, radio-concentric plan). Lavedan (1926, 1941, 1952) has proposed a categorization 
of these layouts, while Pinon (1994) and Lévy (1996b) have analysed the notion of 
‘urban composition’. 
In our context, the approach that has been adopted is for the most part close to the fifth 
type above, the urban form considered as a form of urban layouts, since our interest 
concerns the general layout of the projects’ plans in their relation with the city, and as an 
urban composition through which iconicity features, symbolism, and aspects related to 
the partition or the divisibility of a plan are analysed. Sometimes, the built areas are 
analysed in their relation to the parcels and the road system, mobilizing hence the 
approach of urban form as a form of urban fabrics (the fourth type).  
Analysis grid and indicators’ definition 
Based on our analysis, we consider that analysing the urban morphology of Dubai UMPs 
is equivalent to understanding three aspects (See fig. 2.15):  
- The physical image of UMPs in contributing to the city’s promotion and the adopted 
economy of fascination (Iconicity) 
- The role of each project within the city’s dynamics and the type of relation with its 
context (Accessibility) 





Fig 2.15: A diagram of the three aspects that are addressed in the urban morphology 
analysis 
 
The first aspect that the analysis aims at understanding through morphology is the 
iconicity of the project and the fascination dimension, or the ‘technological sublime’. 
While the literature highlights this as a characteristic aspect of Dubai UMPs, we aim for a 
detailed understanding of the elements and types of composition that contribute to this 
image. We propose the following characteristics: 
- Type of composition: concentric, organic, others. 
- Presence of central bodies of water or greenery. 
- Presence of artificial islands.  
- Presence of iconic buildings or other records. 
 
The second aspect is accessibility in terms of relation to the city and the connectivity of 
the project with its immediate and broader contexts. The proposed characteristics to be 
analysed are: 
- Location of the project: along main roads, at the intersection of roads, etc. 
- Servicing by various forms of transport: metro, water taxis, tramway, etc. 
- Relation to the context at the plan level: introverted, connected 







+ The third aspect is the project’s implementation and management through urban 
design and in particular what is called in the literature plan divisibility. Divisibility 
consists of different functional elements or subprojects that may work independently of 
one another. Bruijin & Leijten (2007) consider that divisibility ensures more certainty 
and manageability during the implementation of the project. Divisible projects usually 
have more simultaneous processes (activities that can be carried out at the same time), 
which can reduce the consequences of time and cost overruns in the course of the 
project. In divisible projects, any problems in one part of the project can more easily be 
isolated, or a part of the project can even be cancelled, without consequences for the rest 
of the project.  
On the other hand, a divisible project is vulnerable to downsizing. If circumstances make 
it attractive, the owner of a project can opt to scrap part of the project, thereby enhancing 
the manageability of the rest (De Bruijn & Leijten, 2007). For these reasons divisibility 
ensures more certainty and manageability during the implementation of the project.  
The proposed characteristics to be analysed are: 
Aspects of divisibility and elements contributing to: Plan partition, roads, etc. 
Sectorization through land use 
Unifying units of the layout: road network, water or green body, project envelope, etc. 
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3.2 Selection of case studies 
 
Fig 2.16: Location map showing the location of the four selected case studies within 
Dubai’s urban structure 
 
The four case studies, Dubai Marina project, Jumeirah Lake Towers project, Green 
Community project and City of Arabia project, were selected based on the following 
criteria: 
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Availability of data, in terms of plans, photos and information. As with most of the other 
projects of the corpus, the sources are online websites and blogs, interviews and site visits. 
However it can be considered that for these four case studies we were able to collect 
sufficient information to allow us to proceed with the morphological analysis. 
The selection is restricted given the limitation of a thesis exercise in terms of time and 
budget. Therefore we consider that four detailed case studies in this research are sufficient 
to support the overall morphological analysis that combines different scale of analysis. 
The four projects are selected to be representative of the total corpus, in terms of aspects 
that are relevant to urban morphological analysis:  
 In terms of location in the city (See fig. 2.16), we have selected different locations for 
each project: The first location is in the inland desert side, and represented by the project 
City of Arabia. The second location is between the main axis of Sheikh Zayed Road and the 
desert inland, and is represented by Green Community. The third and fourth locations are 
along Sheikh Zayed Road, which offers two possibilities: on its north-western side, along 
the littoral, benefiting from a direct relation with the sea; and on its south-eastern side, 
where there is no relation with water. The first is represented by Dubai Marina, while the 
second is represented by JLT (Jumeirah Lake Towers) 
 In terms of connection to the city, the four projects enjoy different levels of 
connectivity. Dubai Marina is the most connected, with a metro line, a tramway line, a bus 
station, and maritime transport such as yachts, boats and water taxis. JLT is connected 
through a metro line. City of Arabia is also planned to be connected to a metro line, albeit a 
secondary one. Green Community does not benefit from any public transport. 
 In terms of major elements of the plan, such as water and green, Dubai Marina does 
not have green spaces but has a large artificial canal directly connected to the sea, a feature 
that constitutes the core of the project. JLT does not have green and is designed around four 
separate artificial lakes. City of Arabia has green bodies, and small canals around which the 
buildings are located. Finally, Green Community project basically has large green spaces. 
 In terms of building height and density, Dubai Marina is a towers project, which has 
earned some records such as the highest residential tower in the world. JLT also has a large 
number of towers, although less than Dubai Marina. City of Arabia has a mix between 
villas, low buildings and towers, while Green Community has only low residential villas.  
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3.2.1 Descriptive analysis 
3.2.1.1 Dubai)Marina)
 
Fig 2.17: A master plan for Dubai Marina (Source: www.Skyscrapercity.com) 
Size, location and function 
Dubai Marina is one of the first urban megaprojects in Dubai. It covers 300 ha and includes 
more than 300 towers. It is designed to accommodate more than 120,000 people. The 
artificial 3.5 km canal with a 7 km pedestrian promenade is at the core of the plan design. 
The project includes residential towers, the Marina Mall, a Yacht Club, and ‘Jumeirah 
Beach Residence’, a sub-project built in only one phase. ‘The Walk’ – a cornice promenade 
within the project – is deemed to be one of the best public spaces in Dubai. The project 
boasts several world records and spectacle elements such as the highest residential tower, 
the largest man-made marina, and the ‘Tallest Block’, consisting of a block of high towers 








Development argument:  
 
Fig 2.18: Plan showing the connection points linking the project to the city 
Dubai Marina is considered to be ‘one of the first and largest waterfront developments in 
the region’. It was planned to be the core and the catalyst for the development of the 
Jumeirah region at the end of the 20th century, when the major development of the city was 
occurring around the old center and along Sheikh Zayed Road. With its towers, luxurious 
residences and retail facilities, mixed use spaces and ‘public’ promenade, Dubai Marina is 
now considered the new center of Dubai. 
 





Fig 2.20: A master plan for City of Arabia project. (Source: www.2daydubai.com) 
 
 
Size, location and functions: 
City of Arabia consists of luxury residential, retail, office and entertainment functions. It is 
located on the gateway to Dubailand, an impressive planned agglomeration of megaprojects 
in the inland at the periphery of the urbanized zones of Dubai. Covering an area of 185 ha, 
it is planned to accommodate 33,000 people and is to serve a catchment area of 1.8 million 
people. The project includes three zones: the towers zone with up to 50 floors, the Mall of 
Arabia, ‘one of the largest malls of the world’, with more than 1000 diverse retail outlets, 
and an entertainment destination designed to draw more than 20,000 visitors per day. The 
third part is the Wadi Walk, a waterfront community with luxurious apartments, outdoor 
cafes and retail spaces. 
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Fig 2.21: A plan showing the connection points that link City of Arabia to its surrounds 
Development argument:  
The project’s website describes the atmosphere as similar to London’s Covent Garden or a 
Parisian street scene. An 8 km canal is the main feature of this zone, with water taxis 
electronically powered. A monorail serves the project and will connect its parts to a future 
metro station. These elements contribute to the creation of a luxurious image of a self-
sufficient and introverted project, in the inland desert, far from the densely urbanised cores.  
 





Fig 2.23: A master plan for JLT. (Source: www.Skyscrapercity.com) 
Size, location and functions: 
JLT is located along Sheikh Zayed Road, opposite Dubai Marina. It covers 200 ha and 
consists of a mixed-use development with high towers containing residential, office, retail 
and other functions. It is designed for a population of 60,000. Situated in the heart of new 
Dubai, JLT, as a free zone, hosts more than 5500 registered companies. JLT has more than 
80 towers with height up to 150m and one 250m high centerpiece, ‘Almas Tower’. The 
project features a pedestrian promenade along the shores of the lakes. 
 
Fig 2.24: A plan showing the connection points that links JLT to its surrounds. 
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Development argument:  
JLT is promoted as the ‘ideal place to live, work, and play’ and a place that is designed ‘for 
a dynamic lakefront community’ living in a luxurious atmosphere. It is a megaproject that is 
planned to complement – or compete with – Dubai Marina as a core for a metropolitan area, 
albeit with more flexible laws, being a free zone.  
 












Fig 2.26: A Master Plan for the project Green Community (West). (Source: 
www.skyscrapercity.com) 
Size, location and functions: 
Green Community (West)20 is located near Jebel Ali free zone, to the south west of Dubai. 
It comprises 67 ha of residential properties and functions such as leisure, retail and 
commercial. It is constituted from low-rise buildings and private villas. It encompasses 
landscaped gardens for the residents, and internal stone streets. The project is for a 
population of 5000 people.  
                                                
20 This is to differentiate it from Green Community East, another phase of the same project 
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Fig 2.27: A plan showing the connection points that links Green Community west to its 
surrounds. 
Development argument:  
The development prides itself on its modern and landscaped surroundings with natural 
greenery being the ‘key to peace and tranquility’ and a unique way of living outside the 
city, within a working and living secure community. Constituting a relatively traffic free 
environment, Green Community West aims at providing a secure green and pleasant 
atmosphere.  
 




As it was explained in the introductive paragraph, the case studies were selected to cover a 
variety of aspects related to location, connectivity and contents. Table 2.4 shows main 
information about these projects. We note mainly the difference in scale and population. 
However, the content for all projects is constituted of mixed-use functions. Dubai Marina 
and City of Arabia may have similar elements that contribute to the creation of a mixed-use 
luxurious content. From the other side, Jumeirah Lake Towers’s image is a Free Zone one 
that is mainly centered on business activities. Green Community is a residential project with 
a gated community aspect, offering the image of a car free and green private environment. 
 
 
Table 2.5: Projects’ information brief 
 
3.3 Interpretive analysis 
Based on the three aspects of the morphological analysis explained and argued in the 
section 3.1, the results are interpreted as follows: 
3.3.1 Iconicity, through elements of urban design 
3.3.1.1 Boundaries’)shape)and)geometric)features)as)iconicity)aspect?)
In the four plans, the plan boundaries do not seem to follow a common logic. For Dubai 
Marina and JLT, the plan boundaries are the result of many factors such as properties’ limit 
Dubai&Marina City&of&Arabia JLT Green&Community
Project&area 300#ha 185#ha 200#ha 67#ha
































and intervention by powerful actors to modify the land limits (this aspect is developed 
further in the last section of chapter three).  
 
Table 2.6: Table briefing the iconicity aspects in the four case studies 
In the earliest version of the Dubai Marina master plan, JLT formed one part of it, with 
Sheikh Zayed Road separating the two parts. City of Arabia’s semi-circular boundaries are 
most likely part of the concept, while the curvilinear boundaries of Green Community West 
are the result of the larger project’s phasing and divisibility strategy. It is clear that the 
design and shaping of boundaries constitute an iconicity aspect only in the case of the 
artificial islands, where the projects’ envelopes shaped to resemble palms, a map of the 
world map shape, or other, are at the core of the concept. However, within each 
configuration, organic or geometric features are designed as iconicity elements, such as the 
curvilinear borders of the canal that impact the whole project grid in Dubai Marina, the 
concentric grid of City or Arabia that denotes centrality and power, the wavy borders of 
JLT’s four lakes, and the organic lines that shapes Green Community clusters around a 
longitudinal central green space. 
3.3.1.2 Water)and)Green)elements)as)iconicity)aspects)
For the four analysed megaprojects, the main spectacular element is either an artificial canal 
(in the case of Dubai Marina), a series of artificial lakes (in the case of JLT), a network of 
water channels that irrigate the project’s parts (in the case of City of Arabia), or a central 
green park (in the case of Green Community). As it was mentioned in chapter two, water 
elements and green elements, and particularly in a hot desert climate, denote an economic 
power and symbolic dimension of beauty, modernity and lux. Integrating water bodies in a 
project is more expansive than greenery. We note for example, that Green Community is 


























































promoted as private environment, however it is not a luxurious project, and its location 
nearby Jebel Ali industrial zone contribute to that. For the remaining three projects, City of 
Arabia is the most challenging, given the cost of a water canal in the middle of the desert. 
Dubai Marina is a relatively an easy case of a project that has a large water body since it is 
located on a waterfront. In all cases, be it through water or green bodies, this symbolism 
and search for luxury are at the core of iconicity. 
3.3.1.3 Iconicity)in)Buildings)
Beside these central green or blue elements designed to be spectacular components of the 
plans, the search for iconicity is mainly seen with the quest to set records in buildings 
especially in the case of Dubai Marina, JLT and City of Arabia, where a large number of 
impressive skyscrapers, reaching more than 500 meters in the case of Dubai Marina, are 
designed. Other than the exclusively residential low to medium-density projects, all mixed-
use megaprojects in Dubai have towers. Dubai marina has more than 300 towers, JLT has 
more than 80 towers and City of Arabia has more than 20 towers.  
Iconicity can be also interpreted at the architectural style level, where it is not only 
associated with a search for records. The rotating tower and the Twisted Tower in Dubai 
Marina are examples of the search for a spectacular architecture.  
3.3.2 Accessibility, analysed through connectivity aspects 
The four megaprojects do not connect with their immediate context. They are introverted 
projects that are designed to operate as autonomous entities. The majority of them are 
conceived as cities within the city.  
 
Table 2.7: Table briefing the accessibility aspects in the four case studies 























































In terms of accessibility, the four projects are connected to major road network, each 
through a number of access points (See fig. 2.24, 27, 30, 33). However traffic problem rise 
with the project’s density, such as the case of Dubai Marina that suffers from critical traffic 
congestion. None of the projects seeks a direct connectivity with its neighboring projects; 
however it is the connectivity to further city parts and to the wider network that they seek 
for, mainly through highways, metro line or tramway line. Dubai Marina, JLT and City of 
Arabia are connected to the metro line through a metro station located at the project’s edge.  
The complex road network, while connecting the projects to the city, prevents any 
interrelation between the projects and their direct surroundings. Indeed, the megaprojects 
are most of the time located on main roads and highways. Dubai Marina and JLT are 
located on the Sheikh Zayed Road. City of Arabia, even if in the inland zone, is located 
along the major Sheikh Mohammad Bin Zayed Road. Along this road are located a number 
of other themed and introverted megaprojects, parts of the downsized Dubailand.  
At the morphological level, there is no continuity, neither with the neighboring urban fabric 
nor with the secondary road networks. For each project, a surrounding road that is part of 
the project’s boundary acts as main access, from which entrances allow ingress to the 
different parts of the projects. At the same time these roads contribute to isolating the 
projects from their surroundings. For instance, Dubai Marina and JLT are surrounded by 
highways and two main interchanges.  
Green Community West, part of a larger megaproject (Dubai Investment Park), divided into 
Park 1 and Park 2, is located on the intersection of two main roads, adjacent to Jebel Ali 
industrial zone.  
Infrastructure plays a crucial role in connecting these megaprojects to the city: first, they are 
located on major roads. Second, some of them such as Dubai Marina and JLT are served 
with metro stations. City of Arabia is designed to be connected to a future metro station as 
well. Third, tram lines and monorails play a similar role in connecting the projects to the 
city, such as the built tram line in Dubai Marina, connecting the project to the surrounding 
context, and the planned monorail project in City of Arabia connecting the project to the 
future metro station. Fourth, bus lines and water taxis are present in some projects, as in the 
case of Dubai Marina. It is to be noted that the connectivity of a megaproject increases with 
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its importance, such as the case of Dubai Marina, planned to be a new metropolitan center 
of Dubai, and hence mobilizing a multimodal transportation network.  
Large catchment areas are characteristic of Dubai megaprojects. The projects are not 
designed to serve a defined context or zone. In the case of Dubai Marina, JLT and City of 
Arabia, the majority of the targeted population is middle and upper-class foreign and 
international employees and experts, working in various zones of the city. Green 
Community West may have a more restricted catchment area with targeted population being 
mainly employees and workers in Dubai Investment Park and the larger Jebel Ali zone.  
3.3.3 Divisibility, analysed through phasing and management aspects 
Divisibility and phasing are common aspects of the four megaprojects analysed. Dubai 
Marina, for instance, was implemented in several phases. Moreover, Jumeirah Beach 
Residence, or JBR, is part of Dubai Marina project while constituting an independent phase 
and project in its own right. In JLT, the project, even if built through one phase, is in 
general divided into four main parts, and the infrastructure and diverse networks operate 
separately in each part. The plan of City of Arabia is divided into five parts. Only two, 
hosting the commercial mall, are currently under construction, while the rest of the 
residential waterfronts are still on hold. It is to be noted, that commercial buildings are built 
in a first place, before the residential component, as a strategy that ensures providing a first 
image of a project that is ‘working’, with a low level of risks compared to residential and 
offices buildings. 
 
Table 2.8: Table briefing the divisibility aspects in the four case studies 
 



















































Green Community West is itself a phase of a larger residential project, the latter being in 
turn a part of a larger investment park. As said previously, the divisibility of plans is a 
strategy in managing the complexity and uncertainty of projects. Proceeding by phases is 
clearly a feature of building in all four projects analysed. Moreover, the availability of 




Fig 2.29: Above: The four lakes in JLT project in 2012. Middle: One lake backfilled and 
transformed to children playground in 2014. Below: Landscaped playground (2015). (Source: 
Google Earth) 
 
For instance, it is clear that in Dubai Marina there are parts that are more ‘successful’ than 
others, as for example the eastern part of the project that hosts the tallest block and the 
majority of cafes, restaurants and activities. Compared to the rest of the project where the 
residential functions dominate, the viability of the different parts of the project varies 
significantly.  
 146 
Another telling example of flexible plan design is the case of JLT, divided into four parts 
surrounding four artificial lakes. One of the lakes has been a topic for debate, because the 
residents have claimed more practical common spaces. The lake was backfilled and 
transformed into a green park serving as promenade and playground space for children (Fig. 
2.29).  
Through these constant modifications of the plans, we can notice elements that provide 
unity and stability for the project, such as the podiums that ensure continuity at the ground 
floor level, even with a variety of forms at the tower level. 
The backfilled lake is an example of both flexibility of design and stability, where the lake 
borders have remained the same with no impact on the surrounding lots, however it is the 
filling of this shape that has modified its function. Thus, even if for each master plan there 
are various versions, we can note that the main elements remain common and stable from 





















We have focused in this chapter on the morphological characteristics of Urban 
Megaprojects in Dubai. We aimed, through analysing the morphology-related aspects, to 
understand UMPs, first as objects, and second as constitutive parts of the city.  
At a general level, we have drawn a comparison between Dubai UMPs as perceived in 
literature and our corpus’s analysis. We have, for the literature representation, set two 
categories of characteristics; the ones that are related to the governance and the ones that 
are related to the morphology. From the other side, our analysis of 36 surveyed UMPs 
aimed at adding an advanced layer to the literature representation that can be described as 
general and sometimes superficial.  
The second part of the chapter has focused on a close urban morphology analysis, where 
four case studies have been analysed. Megaprojects are becoming a worldwide phenomena, 
however, there are no studies that focus exclusively on the urban morphology of these 
developments, even if morphology-related aspects are at the core of their iconicity and 
search for spectacle. We have gone through a quick overview of the different types of 
approaches in urban morphology, and we have explained that the objectives of our analysis 
will be met through an approach that analyses the urban form as the form of urban layouts.  
Aspects such as iconicity, relation to the city and managing complexity can be best 
understood through this approach. It was shown that UMPs in Dubai are clearly designed to 
offer images of iconicity, through the specific detail of plans and their forms, water and 
green elements and records.  
Analysing the connectivity to the city has shown that UMPs are closed to their immediate 
context but well connected to the city through sophisticated and diversified infrastructure, 
consolidating the idea that these UMPs are addressed to a globalized population and not to 
local specific needs.  
It was shown also that urban form is a tool by which these complex UMPs are managed. 
The divisibility of a project is a prime strategy used to control the evolution of its 
development phase. It is a means through which projects can be evaluated, assessed and 
modified as they are being implemented.  
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From another side, it can be argued that morphological aspects of megaprojects constitute 
elements of specific governance in Dubai, in the context of UMPs implementation. First, 
through aspects of iconicity, actors –who are most often within the Sheikh’s limited circle 
of partners and family members - seek legitimacy, by presenting themselves as protectors of 
a modern and competitive image of the city.  
Second, through divisibility and flexibility, both developers and regulatory authorities find 
means to manage and control the complexity of megaprojects and to integrate recurrent 
modifications, divisions and adjustments to buildings, roads and open spaces, without 
compromising the image of a project. These aspects related to governance and management 



















































In this chapter we analyse the UMP-based approach in urban planning. We try to 
understand this approach through defining its aspects and characteristics. We also identify 
the place and role UMPs play in this approach. 
UMPs have been commonly seen, worldwide, as exceptional and spectacular urban 
developments epitomizing globalization dynamics. As opportunistic large-scale 
developments, UMPs disrupt established urban planning and governance regimes. They 
bring in a large number of actors, require particular – often ad hoc – complex operational 
arrangements and hold their own temporality. With UMPs increasingly becoming a feature 
of contemporary large globalizing metropolises, bringing them to articulate with existing 
urban planning and development instruments and governance arenas is a growing concern 
for urban policymakers and managers. The latter, eager to integrate and profit from global 
markets and fluxes, cannot but accept – even encourage – these urban developments but at 
the same time worry of and try to mitigate their disruptive effects. In some cases, as this 
thesis argues for Dubai, UMPs are more than just an opportunity and challenge to urban 
planning and development. They represent the backbone of what is called here “UMPs-
based approach” to urban planning and development.  
In this approach, UMPs’ development is intentionally sought and orchestrated. Through a 
constellation of UMPs, policymakers aim to bring out the physical landscape and urban 
dynamics that will firmly link the city’s economy to globalization and benefit from it. 
UMPs play the role of fixes attracting and articulating local and global fluxes and 
dynamics. This track of urban development brings its own challenges. It calls for adaptive 
institutional and operational structures, arrangements and devices that would be capable of 
dealing with the rising complex and fluctuating opportunities, markets and actors. 
As a physical structure and an operational process, the UMP is the central instrument on 
which this UMPs-based approach stands. Instrument should be understood here in two 
ways. First, UMPs are considered as a particular type of urban planning instrument, as 
would masterplans, land subdivision or streetscape regulations for example. They 
contribute to operationalizing a defined approach of urban planning and development and 
framing the future urban form and dynamics in the city.  
Second, UMPs could be understood as an instrument in the way scholars working on public 
policy instruments, in the steps of Lascoumes & Legalès (2004) and Halpern, Lascoumes & 
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Legalès (2014), give to this word. For these authors “a public policy instrument constitutes 
a device that is both technical and social, that organizes specific social relations between 
the state and those it is addressed to, according to the representations and the meanings it 
carries. It is a particular type of institution, a technical device with the generic purpose of 
carrying a concrete concept of politics/society relationship and sustained by a concept of 
regulation” (Lascoumes and Legalès, 2007). This public policy instruments literature 
distances itself from dominant urban governance literature that focuses mainly on 
actors/interests/institutions’ relations and draws a fuzzy, fragmented and constantly moving 
political landscape of contemporary cities. It stresses the considerable weight of instruments 
as institutions by themselves, capable of bringing inertia around their cognitive and 
technical components. This “inertia effect” enables resistance to outside pressures such as 
global political changes and actors’ interests. At the same time, it consolidates the 
ascendant position of actors and institutions that are behind its development and steering its 
implementation. Instruments are not value-neutral and hold embedded in them the values of 
their creators. It is in this regard that UMPs in Dubai could be seen as an instrument bearing 
the values of the Sheikh’s vision for the city and providing through its technical (material 
and operational) components the needed stability for holding together a whole UMPs-based 
approach for urban planning and development. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, we locate the UMPs-based approach 
in the wider landscape of dominant and mainstream urban planning approaches, we identify 
the role the UMPs as urban planning instruments play in this approach and we look into the 
challenges that face the articulation of UMPs to other planning instruments. In order to do 
so, first we base our discussion on a literature review that studies the boundaries between 
urban planning and urban design, and helps us place the UMPs-based approach in regard to 
this large disciplinary divide. We illustrate this discussion with elements from our empirical 
data detailed in the previous chapters. Then, we suggest a comparison between UMPs and 
other approaches that are basically categorised as physical planning – given the importance 
emphasized in the UMPs-based approach on the physical dimension. Similarities and 
divergence are underlined. Finally, we go through the role of the UMPs as planning 
instruments and challenges, successes and failures of articulating them with other planning 
instruments, mainly urban networks planning and strategic planning, within the Dubai’s 
UMPs-based approach.  
In the second part of this chapter, we focus on the UMP as a public policy instrument. The 
procedural aspect is hence examined. As it is not feasible to study the whole spectrum of 
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UMPs in Dubai, given the large number of projects and the intrinsic complexity that lies 
within, we suggest examining in detail one case study that is representative of the general 
situation in the city.  
The case study of Dubai Marina project is selected for several reasons: first, it is a telling 
example of divisibility, the processes of grouping and ungrouping of sub-projects, and of 
the allocation of land shares that is a recurrent feature in Dubai. These features represent a 
central technical attribute of the UMP instrument in Dubai. Second, it provides a rich 
display of the complexity of actors’ relations. In a limited space, we find a wide palette of 
actors competing/working together, with a strong and direct involvement of the city’s ruler 
in according power to key developers and in withdrawing it. Third, the case study displays 
aspects of complementarity, competition and synchronization of actions that are 
characteristic through particular modes of project management articulating what is known 
in literature as ‘pilotage’ and ‘project engineering’ traditions. Fourth, this project is 
basically marked by the speed of implementation and the displaying of spectacle and 
records, aspects that are at the core of urban development in Dubai.  
We argue that understanding the various procedural aspects in Dubai Marina help us 
decipher the complexity of the UMP as a public policy instrument. We underline also the 
limits of this generalisation, and we highlight what differentiates and articulate city-scale 




1.1 UMPs-based approach a hybrid of urban planning and urban design 
The two fields of urban planning and urban design are considered as essentially the same, 
or more correctly, urban design is seen as a subfield of urban planning, particularly 
concerned with urban form and aesthetics (Gunder, 2011; Gleye, 2014). They constitute 
two parts of a bifurcated heritage in which urban design was more oriented towards 
physical planning and urban planning more oriented towards socio-economic policy (Gleye, 
2014). The concept of place is absent in the theory of urban planning. Friedman, in his book 
Planning in the Public Domain (1987), traced what he considered as the four major 
traditions of urban thought, without any link to a visual and physical environment: the 
realms of social reforms, policy analysis, social learning and social mobilization.  
It is argued in the literature (Gunder, 2011; Cuthbert, 2001; Madanipour, 2006) that there is, 
particularly in recent years, a dominance of urban design over urban planning, given the 
former’s greater visibility. Urban design is considered as a facet of a globalised and 
neoliberal market, that mirrors ‘the commodification of the built environment for the 
achievement of capital accumulation under competitive globalization’ (Gunder, 2011, p. 
185). Urban design initiatives go together with the enhancement of city image, and the 
‘increased public sector focus on the promotion of local distinctiveness’ (Punter, 2007, p. 
169). Moreover, the rise of urban design is linked to the deployment of large mega-projects, 
increasingly adopted to create an image for competitive cities, and led by the private sector 
(Madanipour, 2006; Carmona, 2009). 
It is often assumed that urban planners have failed in bringing about more just, sustainable, 
efficient and beautiful cities (Campanella, 2011). Gleye (2014) considers that urban 
planners – at least in the USA – are often judged by the resulting physical character of a 
city that people can experience and see.  
A general dissatisfaction with urban planning, compared to urban design, can be noticed, 
mainly because of the restrictive regulatory land use planning codes, and the failure of 
urban planners in addressing the pressing challenges of cities under neoliberalism. Planners 
are considered constrained by a rigid system of codes, while urban design displays a 
flexibility that generates design options at every step of the process (Van Assche et al., 
2012). Gleye (2014) contends that planners have sidestepped a vision of the city as a place, 
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without replacing it with convincing arguments for the essential role of socio-economic 
concern for the urban future. Madanipour (2006) considers that architects and planners lost 
interest in imagining the future shape of the urban environment, and that urban design has 
filled this gap by imagining the future of the city in new ways at a more concrete level than 
that of urban planning.  
Under neoliberalism and the prevalence of urban design, good government has come to be 
perceived as assisting the market by weakening traditional regulation (Hackworth, 2007; 
Gunder, 2011). Increasingly, it is argued that market forces are more efficient in managing 
the built environment than the classical prescriptions of urban planning and the related 
regulatory process. 
However, it is assumed that urban planning – through governments – still has a crucial role 
in providing environmental regulatory frameworks, ensuring acceptable thresholds of 
environmental impact and also an ‘engagement with spatial political economy and its 
adverse societal effects as they pertain to social equity, environmental justice, 
multiculturalism, and the like’ (Gunder, 2011, p. 190). Gunder argues as well that, if urban 
design is often perceived as a mirror of capitalism, urban planning is traditionally perceived 
as mirroring a ‘caring’ state, through fairness and a respect for diversity, difference and 
ecological sustainability.  
Besides the economic, social and environmental concerns, planning is considered – in 
contrast to urban design – as committed to a long-term vision. Moreover, planning has the 
ability to draw on its close ties with social sciences in evaluation methods, as for example 
for evaluating programs, which is a well-established discipline (Gleye, 2014). 
Cuthbert (2007) argues that urban design has failed as an independent discipline because 
there has been no concerted attempt to link the material creation of urban space to 
fundamental societal processes beyond that of the market, and because it lacks critical 
reflection. ‘Under neoliberalism, the question remains: does the private sector and the 
entrepreneurial state want reflective planners concerned with the public good, who also 
happen to have good urban design skills?’ (Gunder, 2011, p. 190). 
The literature contends that these two domains of planning need to be combined, that urban 
design should not only be considered as ‘final frosting on the cake’ (Gleye, 2014, p.5), and 
that the city must be considered from the physical as well as the economic and social point 
of view. McMahon (2012) concludes that planners spend most of their time focusing on 
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numbers and that in the future they will need to spend more time instead thinking about the 
values, customs and characteristics that make a place worth caring about. 
Based on the above discussion, we locate here the UMP-based approach within the urban 
planning-urban design debate. The approach adopted in Dubai can be considered as 
including aspects from both urban planning and urban design. In that sense it can be 
considered as a hybrid standing on the fence between the two disciplinary approaches. 
Table 3.1 outlines the characteristics under urban planning and urban design as discussed in 
the previous section. The coloured cells in the table can be related to and illustrated by the 
UMP-based approach. Hence, Table 3.1 reflects this hybrid nature of the UMP-based 















Table 3.1: Limits between urban planning and urban design: the coloured cells can be 
related to the UMPs-based approach 
As for the dominant political and economic systems, we consider that the governance 
system in Dubai can be analysed under two coexistent logics: the logic of a caring state, and 
the logic of a neoliberal approach aiming at competing with world cities. The first can be 
illustrated by the land and housing policy by which the government allocates real-estate to 
nationals. It can be also illustrated by the provision of infrastructure such as roads, public 
transport, etc., as well as hospitals and museums. However, the neoliberal approach is 
clearly more dominant in many areas. In Dubai, deliberate deregulation can be seen 
everywhere, as for example in free zones where laws are adapted and simplified, and at the 
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megaprojects level, where regulations are tailored to each project. It is also seen in the 
absence or reduction of taxes and the generally lean regulatory framework that facilitates 
the establishment of foreign companies. 
 
Fig 3.1: The land committed to UMPs before 2008, in red (Dubai Municipality 2012) 
 
As for the aim of UMPs, we have shown in the previous chapters that they are implemented 
in a search for high visibility. Megaprojects do not constitute an answer for local needs, nor 
do they contribute to the implementation of a long-term strategic plan. They are built for an 
international virtual population. In many cases the projects are not populated, and the 
capacity of planned megaprojects exceeds population forecasts by a wide margin (see fig. 
3.1). The quest for spectacle, records and images is at the core of urban megaprojects in 
Dubai. The power of imagery is used to project an image of a daring, smart and successful 
city. Moreover, if we examine published images of projects and aerial views of Dubai, it 
becomes apparent that a large number of the projects depicted are not built and are only 
potential ideas. A widely circulated map of Dubai that is frequently seen on real estate 
blogs and websites shows a series of artificial islands that take the shape of the universe, a 
broad waterfront in a crescent shape, a huge ‘U’ shaped artificial canal that penetrates the 
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desert, and many others (see fig. 3.2). These spectacular images contribute increasingly to a 
perception of Dubai as the city where any extravagant project can be built.  
 
Fig 3.2: A circulated map that includes both existing and non-existing megaprojects. 
(Source: purchased from a private office for mapping in Dubai) 
 
The limitation of a unified vision for the city can be seen in the circulated discourse within 
each project, promoting a self-sufficient project without any concern for complementarity 
with surrounding projects. A quick overview of UMP self-promotion discourses reveals that 
these large investments aim at creating independent ‘cities’ within the city, isolating 
themselves from the city’s real needs or constraints.  
‘Business Bay is an incredible project in the heart of Dubai, an entire city with an 
infrastructure well equipped to promote businesses, trade and luxury living. This 
cornerstone of the new economic impetus is to be a capital hub for Dubai and the Middle 
East, it has established a new modern Central Business District (CBD) on the scale of 
Manhattan and is not only a very desirable place to live but also a major business and 
trading hub for local as well as international corporations’. 
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‘Situated in the heart of New Dubai on Sheikh Zayed Road and between two metro stations, 
Jumeirah Lakes Towers, or JLT, is the ideal address to live, work and play. 
JLT’s dynamic lakefront community spread over 200 hectares encompasses 64 attractive 
residential and commercial towers alongside hotels, leisure and 160 retail outlets with over 
50,000 people living and working here’. 
‘Dubai Festival City is a 1300 acre, premier waterfront urban community that has been 
designed to capture the ground breaking 21st Century spirit of Dubai. It offers a rich and 
vibrant living experience that interconnects the finest, easily accessible shopping, dining, 
entertainment and leisure, residential community, schools, Hospitality, commercial and 
24/7 management. An established creekside mixed-use destination, Dubai Festival City 
offers an unrivalled community lifestyle with modern luxury, comfort and convenience’. 
However, as discussed in previous chapters, the will for a unified vision is strong. The 
construction of a large number of UMPs, especially between 2000 and 2008, could not take 
place without a will and a vision imagined by the Sheikh and the elite circle of power 
steering this UMPs-based approach. The Dubai 2020 and other plans and strategies reflect 
clearly this will. Though clearly this suggests the presence of clear values and political 
choices behind urban development and planning in Dubai, public political debate around 
strategic planning choices or UMP design is inexistent.   
All this and many other aspects discussed in previous chapters bring out the hybrid and 
bipolar nature of Dubai’s UMPs-based approach: government-led strategic planning 
addressing the whole of Dubai’s territory and building on systemic assessments and 
projections on one hand, and multiple sites of localized placemaking, led by private sector 
and parastatals seeking attractiveness, impact and fast profit on the other. One might be led 
to believe that this is a two-scales orchestrated enterprise where urban planning at large 
scale orients and encompasses the multiple urban design initiatives at UMP level.  
However, in Dubai’s UMPs-based approach, as in other urban planning approaches that 






1.2 Comparing UMPs-based approach to similar physical approaches 
In this section, we examine UMPs as a physical approach through a comparison with other 
similar approaches. In selecting these approaches, our aim is to de-emphasise ideological or 
operative differences in favour of the social, political and economic contexts that produce 
the physical form. This is generally consistent with typologies that give a deal of 
importance to urban form from a historical perspective, as exemplified in Benevolo (2004) 
and Riboulet (1998) where the focus is on understanding urban planning through the 
interrelations between urban physical form and the socio-political and economical contexts. 
This perspective is interesting since it allows urban forms to be seen as the product of a 
governance, an epoch, in their interaction with technologies in producing cities – something 
the “UMP-based planning” approach seems to do.  
As we have shown in the previous chapters, urban megaprojects can be understood as a 
product of a particular system of governance and a specific urban evolution that had led to 
adoption of a series of economic policies aiming at orienting the city’s development. They 
are also a spatial matrix linking various scales of actors, temporalities and spaces.  
We consider that there are similar approaches in urban planning that have privileged – or 
that were reflected through – urban form as lever to planning and that developed in a 
specific political and socio-economic context. Riboulet (1998) distinguishes four types of 
physical urban planning21. They are: traditional planning, royal planning (l’urbanisme 
princier), the liberal mode of planning, and the regulatory mode of planning. (The first of 
these is a spontaneous type of planning that does not reflect a will or a vision.) In the next 
section we will draw a comparison between the urban megaproject-based approach and the 
urban planning approaches suggested by Riboulet.  
                                                
21 In French, Riboulet exhibits four types of ‘mode de composition’, a term we consider the rough equivalent 
of the English ‘urban design’. However the expression ‘urban design’ as often used in the Anglo-Saxon 
literature does not include the set of elements that impact the final physical procedure. This dimension is 
included somehow in the word ‘mode’ in French that encompasses, beyond the ‘composition’, all the 
context’s aspects that have led to this final design. This is why in the context of this chapter we did not 
suggest an equivalent to ‘mode de composition’ in order to avoid inadequate translations and designations. 
However the expression ‘urban planning’ as we are using it refers, in our sense, to the physical form as 
intrinsically related to various contexts that lead to it being political, social, cultural or economic.  
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We do so in order to identify convergences and divergences between these approaches and 
the UMP-based approach. In fact, those approaches developed in particular socio-political 
and economic contexts, but tend to have a claim of universality – or at least to 
generalization. We do not claim this selection of approaches as exhaustive; nevertheless, we 
consider they are fairly representative. 
In this section we outline the urban planning approaches presented by Riboulet. As noted 
above, these are royal urban planning, liberal urban planning and regulatory urban planning. 
The main similarities between these and the UMP-based approach are the physical material 
aspect and the presence of a will or a vision. This is what led us not to include in this 
comparison the ‘traditional mode’ of Riboulet’s typology, since it does not encompass this 
dimension of intentionality and is more spontaneous.  
Royal urban planning: This is an urban planning that depends upon the existence of an 
absolute authority. The process of this urban planning is particular and can easily be 
distinguished from ordinary processes since it is marked by the rule of exception – be it in 
the urban form it produces or in the elaboration process. Most often it bypasses existing 
laws and rules. It aims at showing the absolute power of a prince vis-à-vis his people to 
concretize, in physical form, the dependence of the latter. Similarly, the UMP-based 
approach in Dubai reflects the presence of a centralized authority, as has been seen in 
previous sections. However, those who are addressed in Dubai are global actors and 
international investors rather than local subjects. Nevertheless, following Kanna, citizens 
are addressed in the meaning that the Al-Maktoums try, through mobilizing the modernity 
and the excellence discourse on UMPs and the city as a whole, to create and maintain a base 
for their legitimacy.  
At the form level, the difference is normally clear between the ‘royal project’ and its 
‘ordinary’ surroundings. The former shows a particular order and a different scale 
compared to the existing surrounding urban fabric. Its main objective is to reflect an 
absolute power through spectacular physical forms. Beyond the project’s physical space, 
the influence of this royal intervention exceeds the initial project’s boundaries and defines, 
somehow, the surroundings areas. The case of Versailles and of other royal squares in Paris 
illustrates the ability of the Palace to influence the planning of the city. This is what 
Riboulet calls the ‘Capacity of subordination’. The UMPs in Dubai do not pretend to 
change their surroundings. Their impact on the city is different from that of royal planning. 
This impact, at the morphological level, can be seen most of all at the overall network of 
infrastructure in the city. From a general view of the city plan, the road and metro networks 
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for example are clearly designed and articulated to serve urban megaprojects, while there is 
no direct impact exerted by a megaproject on its nearest urban fabric.  
Also, it is important to note that royal planning is representative of a particular monarchical 
society where laws, power, knowledge and urban relations are shaped by the Prince 
(Riboulet, 1998). That means that this type of planning can be reproduced in different areas 
of a kingdom or a nation so long as certain representatives of authority or the aristocracy, 
linked to the Prince, are present. This aspect can be considered also to apply in Dubai, given 
that many powerful actors close to the Sheikh produce a certain form of royal urban 
planning, through iconicity and through bypassing the law. However, a main nuance exists 
in the fact that all lands in the emirate are in one way or the other property of the Sheikh or 
subordinated to his direct or indirect control, and hence all these powerful actors are in the 
end translating the Sheikh’s will by developing these lands.  
Another characteristic of royal planning is the exceptional financing capacity that comes 
from taxes or rent rather than ordinary commercial exchanges. This is the case also in Dubai 
where the financing of UMPs cannot be provided from “normal” economic activities.  
Liberal urban planning: Liberal urban planning is historically a product of a series of 
transformations, mainly in Western societies. It is a reflection of the beginning of a 
capitalist mode of production, of a cultural revolution and technical innovations. It is the 
result of the transition from a traditional artisanal society towards an industrial one. 
Liberalism in this sense is about a certain individualism that is more beneficial to powerful 
persons. For Riboulet, the city of liberalism is a fragmented city, where each powerful actor 
is free to develop his land in a logic of competition.  
The result is the appearance of dispersed and autonomous parts in the city, marked by 
functional and physical disorganization. It is fully capable of producing particular and 
spectacular architectural projects; however, these different parts cannot create a ‘unified’ 
composition for a city, which must remain a set of individual parts. This aspect of 
fragmented parts is a main characteristic of Dubai’s development through UMPs. It was 
shown in chapter two that the UMPs are creating isolated parts in the city, marked by 
mutual competition and overlapping of functions, without being able to create a cohesive 
urban fabric. The point of difference, however, with the liberal mode is that this 
competition is not real in Dubai, given that all the funds and capital of major development 
companies are centralized around the Sheikh’s circle.  
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Regulatory urban planning: while differentiating between liberal and regulatory urban 
planning, Riboulet considers that neither exists in a purely separate form, and that normally 
they coexist. He highlights that this distinction is for representation-related purposes, 
aiming at more clarity in explaining each.  
The main objective of regulatory urban planning is to impose order in the city’s urban form. 
This is done through regulation that encompasses laws for the lands, regulating plot size 
and shape, and laws governing buildings, regulating the location within the plot, the 
footprint, the volume and contents. The intended results of this planning are order, 
alignment and regularity.  
However, Riboulet admits that the limits of this planning can be seen in the dissimilarity 
between what is planned and what exists in reality – even in developed societies. He 
considers the reason behind this to be the absence of absolute power capable of enforcing 
such regulations. The ultimate authority for him is not the State but the economy and, more 
particularly, private capital. This aspect is exacerbated by the fact that contemporary 
governments need the private sector more than ever to develop the city.  
In the context of Dubai, there are two aspects to highlight in this regard. The first is that the 
city, in response to the very rapid urbanization, has developed a series of strategic plans in 
order to orient and regulate urban development – as was shown in chapter 2. However, 
building and land regulations that are under the responsibility of the municipality concern 
only the center of Dubai and do not extend to the urban megaprojects. Urban megaprojects 
in Dubai are considered as specific development within the city’s strategic plans. These 
plans impose a broad regulation for the content, such as industries, residential functions, 
airports, etc. The second is that regulatory planning can be seen inside each urban 
megaproject. Being developed by a parastatal or a private developer, buildings within a 
UMP follow a set of regulations that are elaborated in parallel to the master plan’s 
implementation. The degree of respect accorded to the municipal city regulations varies 
between one project and the next. In the context of the great complexity generated by 
UMPs, it frequently happens that the preset regulations are modified, sometimes repeatedly, 
in order to meet with reality or the market demand.  
Many similarities and divergences have emerged from this comparison: the UMP-based 
approach is similar to royal urban planning in the sense that both have a central powerful 
authority, a physical form marked by iconicity that can impact the immediate surroundings 
(in the first case) or the broader context of the city (in the second case). They also have the 
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similarity of mobilizing particular sources of funding, and of extending this mode to a wider 
circle surrounding the central holder of power. The UMP-based approach is similar to 
liberal urban planning at the level of results that is translated in a fragmented city reflecting 
individualism (in the case of the absolute liberal mode) and the absence of a unified vision 
for the city (in the case of Dubai). UMPs are not reflective of a regulatory planning, 
however; within each project, detailed regulations exist in order to provide a physical unity 
at the master plan level.  
1.3 UMPs as planning instruments: role and challenges 
In Dubai, and within the UMPs-based planning approach, UMPs could be considered as one 
particular form of planning instruments among the large arsenal of instruments deployed by 
its planning regime in order to produce the adequate urban form, dynamics and facilities 
that allow the city to embrace globalization while maintaining a strict control of its 
development and (re)distribution of its resources. As we have seen in previous chapters, this 
arsenal includes, among others, strategic planning, regulatory, fiscal, facility and 
infrastructure creation, networking and communication instruments. However, the UMPs as 
planning instruments seem to hold a central role in this approach.    
 This role is quite complex and ensures many of the assets behind this approach. Mainly, it 
can be said that: 
• UMPs are considered as the ultimate tool for significantly and rapidly extending the 
city’s boundaries. UMPs constitute a way to develop, through a single project, hundreds 
of hectares.  
• UMPs are the essential instrument that marks the ‘globalized’ image of the city, 
through spectacle and fascination architecture and urban design. 
• UMPs provide the main facilities and necessary functions for the implementation of 
international and regional headquarters of large firms in Dubai.  
• UMPs are also a form of development that could serve as vehicles for diverse 
investments in different sectors, representing a considerable vector of economic 
development.  
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The assets of this instrument are however undermined by challenges to its capacity to 
articulate with other planning instruments. UMPs are in fact to a large extent self-standing 
autonomous: socio-spatial fragments with their own stakeholders, financial processes, 
spatial forms and temporalities. They are also first and foremost financial investments for 
large parastatal and private actors implicated/integrated in global financial markets. Hence, 
UMPs might relate/be exposed more to global processes and fluxes than to local ones. But 
at the same time, UMPs depend for their success – at least as financial investments – on 
local conditions: e.g. good city infrastructure, the sustainability of Dubai as an attractive 
destination for work and leisure, a minimum stability of real-estate markets, etc. By using 
UMPs as an instrument in Dubai’s planning and development, policymakers are constantly 
challenged to strike the right balance between regulation and laissez-faire and articulate this 
instrument to other instruments. In the following we look into these challenges by focusing 
on the cases of two instruments: infrastructure development and strategic planning.         
The tension between UMPs and infrastructure development could be illustrated through the 
case of the RTA, the authority for roads and transport, and the way it develops new roads 
and highways to service potential developments. Two opposite situations could be 
identified. One arises when a highway becomes unused or its construction is stalled because 
developers were not capable of bringing their projects to completion, a situation that was 
especially common following the 2008 crisis. The other is when projects develop with a 
need for road infrastructure that RTA fails to provide. 
Indeed, in an interview with professionals in RTA, they explained how they adopt a ‘wait 
and see’ stance regarding the development of UMPs. Building infrastructure in Dubai is 
very costly. During and after the 2008 financial crisis many projects were stalled, 
downsized or re-phased. This had a significant impact on road construction. In Dubai’s 
system, the RTA is responsible for building national and secondary roads, while local roads 
within developments are part of the developer’s responsibility. With many of the stalled 
megaprojects, the RTA had already completed the construction of roads intended to serve 





Fig 3.3:Roads put on hold around cancelled or stalled UMPs 
 
Such outcomes are deemed abortive investments for RTA. This is what had led it to 
proceed by stages as the RTA waits to be sure that the developer is capable of delivering his 
projects, and the road network expands only following the completion of individual 
construction phases. Many of the stalled or not-yet-commenced megaprojects are located 
well outside Dubai’s existing urban limits, and it is this that explains why there are so many 
roads that have still not got beyond the drawing board (see fig 3.3). 
Tension between strategic planning in Dubai and UMPs’ development is also significant.  
The general dissatisfaction among those who favour a strategic planning based approach to 
developing the city relates, among other things, to the minor roles that these strategic and 
city master plans are having in reality. For years now, strategic plans have been 
continuously and rapidly changing with each plan replaced by a new one. In that UMPs 
play a major role (see fig 3.4). 
The planning tools existing before the real estate boom in Dubai have proven inadequate to 
keep up with the quick urban transformation of the city, and the complexity of procedures 
adopted by UMPs. Two contradictory logics mark the attitude of Dubai Municipality facing 
the uncontrolled UMP-based development.  
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Fig 3.4:Palm Jebel Ali, Palm Jumeirah and The World Islands, built starting in 2005. 
However they were not planned in Dubai Structure plan 2003. They were included in Dubai 
2020, prepared in 2012 (Source:Google Earth) 
At the strategic plan level, the Municipality’s position has changed and evolved over time. 
It has adopted two different positions. First, it tried to include the already built UMPs in the 
city’s adopted strategic plans ex post facto. Then it adopted a ‘go with the flow’ attitude, 
committing certain lands for special development, or in other words, for UMPs. Even this 
second approach is more reactive than proactive. In fact dozens of planned UMPs are 
promoted before their construction, in locations across almost the entire area of the emirate. 
The developers of these planned UMPs are usually well known and are most often the same 
parastatals that are developing other UMPs. This aspect forces the Municipality not only to 
include built UMPs in its plans but also many planned ones. This reveals flexibility towards 
developers and a will to facilitate and encourage new developments. 
The second logic, opposite to the first one, is rejection by the Municipality of the idea of 
UMPs as a development tool. This came after the 2008 crisis and can be noticed mainly in 
the Dubai 2020 document that suggests that the uncontrolled trend toward the spread of 
UMPs across the Emirate has generated fragmented development, unexpected infrastructure 
costs and trivial competition and duplication of uses between various megaprojects. Its 
main recommendation, however, is to proceed by in-fill development on the un-built lands 
scattered between megaprojects. In other words, UMP-based expansion has not been 
prohibited, but a serious review of the way they are done is recommended. Even with such 
a recommendation, now considered the main basis of urban planning principles, a new 
artificial island emerged facing Dubai Marina just after the document was issued. This new 
UMP was not included in the 2020 Dubai Urban Masterplan (see fig 3.5). It is clear that the 
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balance between official municipal planning and an urban development through UMPs 




Fig 3.5:A new artificial islands (Bluewaters Island) hosting ‘Dubai Eye’ opposite Dubai 
Marina. It was not planned in Dubai 2020 Masterplan. (Source: respectively, 
www.meeras.com and Google Earth) 
 
In both cases – infrastructure planning and strategic planning – tension with UMPs as 
planning instruments comes from the fact that they stem from a different rationality 
regarding what urban planning and development are and how they should operate. 
Infrastructure planning and strategic planning are long term processes closely tied to 
 169 
government’s political choices and budget. They rely on thorough data, regarding existing 
physical, social and economic conditions, coming from a large variety of institutions and 
compiled by the bureaucracy. They interact closely with other existing planning instruments 
(fiscal, real-estate market organization, etc.) and are usually conceived in articulation with 
them. To the opposite, UMPs are short or mid-term investments, linked to financial markets 
and opportunities and led by parastatals and private actors. It is these discrepancies in 
temporality, nature of actors and operational modes that bring this tension. In order to deal 
with these tensions and discrepancies, UMPs as instruments have developed what could be 
called mitigation capacities. The latter are of substantive and procedural nature and are 
explored closely in the next part through the case of Dubai Marina UMP. 
 
2 UMPs)as)an)instrument)to)mitigate)complexity)
This section examines the management and implementation aspects of UMPs in Dubai. It 
aims to unveil aspects of competition, complementarity, centrality of decision, diversity of 
actors, and synchronisation of actions, at the UMP and city levels.  
Urban megaprojects often require significant funding and are based most frequently on 
particular forms of public-private cooperation. Far from being inscribed in controllable 
schemes, UMPs often go through a series of unpredictable and brutal on-hold or 
acceleration phases. As discussed above, this constitutes a challenge to classical 
institutional assemblages previewed for the project implementation. However, in many 
aspects, UMPs hold the characteristics of policy instruments (see chapter introduction) that 
allow them to become the backbone of a different type of assemblage through what we have 
called in this thesis the UMPs-based approach to urban planning and development in Dubai.   
These characteristics are mainly the capacity to provide frames for the stabilization of 
actors, institutional and spatial relations through the provision of accepted and shared 
values (stemming from the Sheikh’s vision for the city), flexible technical procedures and 
ad hoc negotiation spaces. The articulation of these procedures and negotiation spaces is 
orchestrated through particular forms of project management. 
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2.1 Facing the complexity: pilotage or project engineering 
In this part, we focus on literature statements in the domain of ‘urban engineering’ and 
‘strategic pilotage22’, in order to bring a better understanding of challenges present in 
managing this type of project, aiming at minimizing risks.  
There is a growing literature on the management and production modes of megaprojects, 
where they are analysed as objects and processes as well. This literature tries to suggest 
management tools and normative grids. It reflects the political and economic issues that are 
implied in these processes, and the necessity for planning as a discipline to understand one 
of its main emerging operational levers (UMPs). This literature can be divided into two 
main categories: that of urban engineering (Dupont et al., 2012) and that of strategic 
‘pilotage’.  
2.2 Urban Engineering 
Engineering includes all functions ranging from conception and construction to the control 
of a technical or industrial installation. The project is at the very core of engineering since it 
represents one of the main rationalization tools.  
Urban engineering aims to develop tools, methodologies and environment to better consider 
urban issues. In fact, the main objective is to ensure their effectiveness within complex 
systems (Dupont et al., 2012). It brings to the urban production process a rationality that 
helps deal with the complexity of projects and minimize risks by reducing uncertainty.  
In fact, as Middler (1993) explains, the more we go forward in a production process, the 
more we acquire an important level of knowledge concerning elements of this process, but 
we lose the ability to act, since changes and adaptation possibilities decrease. In the context 
of urban engineering, different methodologies have emerged in the last decades23  to 
                                                
22 Pilotage is a French term meaning ‘steering’ in English. Few Anglo-Saxon references use the equivalent term 
steering (see Idt et al., 2012). However, the francophone literature is far more developed than the Anglo-Saxon 
literature in dealing with the notion of pilotage. Therefore the French term pilotage will be used in this research. 
23 Modelling of actors and their interactions is thus proposed, in a perspective of systemic analysis that would 
allow simulation of solutions aiming to optimize these interactions (Priemus, 2008). Similarly, in line with risk 
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transcend this paradox and allow optimum process organization in terms of widening 
adaptation margins and minimizing uncertainties.  
Urban engineering approaches are specifically designed to control this complexity; 
however, complexity is still difficult to stabilize. Urban projects, particularly megaprojects, 
depend in their implementation on a large number of factors and actors that the projects’ 
promoters are not necessarily capable of controlling. 
In fact, the implementation of these projects often heavily relies on the project developer 
outsourcing activities to other public organizations, private companies, consultants, 
facilitators and mediators. The frames of cooperation of these actors come under informal 
agreements and mutual trust since legal frameworks do not always follow the need for 
regulation at this level. 
Furthermore, the management of these projects entails a need over time to adapt to changes 
of various kinds: economic, political, cultural and urban. Real estate market fluctuations, 
changing priorities of politicians, the emergence of new social and cultural trends and 
themes (such as concern for the environment, heritage, local social and landscape 
representations, or industrial renewal), the transformation of the urban structure due to 
urbanization, can all compel deep rethinking of the project or its abandonment. 
In this perspective, and in order to understand and explain the ability of many urban 
projects to adapt and cope with this unpredictability, other researchers prefer a different 
frame of analysis, that of ‘pilotage’. 
                                                                                                                                        
management methods, the so-called ‘real options’ analytical approach, that can identify the ‘best’ possible 
choices at any given stage of the process (Miller and Lessard 2008), has emerged. The distributed collaborative 
design approach is inspired by design theories and practices to underline the need, in the different stages of the 
process, for collaboration modes and decision-making that are segmented and hierarchical or common and 
collegial (Dupont et al., 2012). Other approaches highlight the need for performing systems of information 
management that can bring strategic information to involved actors at the various stages. It can play a crucial 
role in these approaches (Kim et al., 2009). The application of the so-called concurrent engineering approach, 
emphasizing the need to move forward simultaneously on the various aspects of the project, could also have 
benefits when applied in the urban project (Ben Mahmoud-Jouini, 2003).  
 172 
2.3 Strategic ‘Pilotage’ 
The notion of ‘pilotage’ is not new in the urban field. However, the expansion of its recent 
use reflects a growing need for decision-making bodies to provide guidance and 
coordination of action in an increasingly complex institutional and operational context. The 
pilotage, as a management flexible practice marked by ad hoc decision making, is often 
opposed to heavy bureaucratic practices (Lavergne, 2014; Zerah, 2011). Pilotage would 
bypass these practices and provide capacity to act and take decisions in an unstable 
operating environment, which requires a good reactivity from the actors. 
Concerning the urban project, pilotage has been defined as the activity of organizing actions 
and directing their development, implementation and outcome (Arab, 2004; Arab & 
Lefeuvre, 2011). It is defined through the articulation practices of the various components 
of the project(s) and not from a prior methodology – as is the case in various urban 
engineering approaches. Pilotage varies deeply from one situation to another; this poses a 
significant challenge to scholarly analysis of this crucial activity for understanding the 
management and control of the urban project today.  
However, we can identify analytical keys that emerge and allow the making of certain 
generalizations about this phenomenon: the arsenal of strategies and tools mobilized and the 
figure of the pilot(s). 
In fact, the pilot(s) of a project play a central role by ensuring the unity of projects. This 
unity is built through the efforts to coordinate action in defining, maintaining and evolving 
global orientations, issues, (cognitive) meaning of action, strategies, means and timing, and 
all this over the entire duration of a project (Idt, 2009).  
The interest of this definition lies mainly in the fact that it can help to overcome the 
separation of the phases of the project, specific to ‘urban project management’ (Frébault, 
2006). This separation structures the reflections coming from the fields of urban 
engineering (Prost, 2003; Henrot, 2003; Ben-Mahmoud Jaoui, 2003), but is seen in the 
pilotage perspective as a fictional division that only rarely corresponds to reality and 
distorts the analysis. For promoters of an analysis in terms of pilotage, the urban project is 
far from being a linear process. On the contrary, different parts of a project evolve at very 
different rates, or even in total independence of each other. Moreover, often, the action may 
be initiated while the reflection on the overall project can long continue to evolve (Arab, 
2004; 2007). 
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In this complex process, authors identify a number of advantages and strategic and practical 
tools for success in the ongoing adaptation of the project over the long term. At the strategic 
level, it is the ability to act on, and develop the program and the cognitive dimension of the 
project that allows the pilot to ensure the stability and unity of the project. By allowing 
these two dimensions to evolve, pilots manage to integrate or accommodate the interests of 
various stakeholders and to maintain the unity of the project while opening to new themes 
that are supported at political or popular level.  
At the practical level, creating and articulating ad hoc and informal spaces at different 
scales (at project level, at the level of its subparts, and at the metropolitan level) is a 
common practice. It is in these spaces that exchanges allow the negotiation of interests, or 
the monitoring of the positions of the different actors, but also the building of trust between 
these actors. Developing new operations also goes in this direction. Entering events, and 
even creating them, is a common practice to enroll actors or redefine the image of the 
project. 
The pilot24 is described in the literature as a person who is well connected to political and 
technical milieus. It is a person who has good technical knowledge within the urban project, 
or who at least shares the technical culture with the project’s main actors. He is also close to 
the center of the political decision-making system, while retaining a degree of personal 
autonomy that often derives from relationships built with actors in the context of the 
project. Finally, he has an important position within the institution in charge of the overall 
pilotage of the project. 
In this sense, the following sections examine the context of the project’s command, and the 
aspects that have required strategic and operational modifications. Then we identify, 
through the case study of Dubai Marina, the pilotage practices, and more particularly the 
program changes and the project’s image. We designate these aspects as falling under the 
substantive level of the project. Another pilotage practice that will be analysed falls under 
                                                
24 The pilots come from politics as well as the technical world. They are often locally elected. It is frequently 
the case that there is a link between some mayors and major projects they develop in their city, for example. 
However, they can also be technical actors, including directors and managers within public institutions who 
are faced with the task of coordinating large urban projects. In some projects, we can encounter several pilots 
who must find ways to act together. 
 
 174 
the procedural level and is related to the creation of informal negotiation and coordination 
spaces. 
2.4 Analysing Dubai Marina as case study 
Dubai’s context is specific, and Dubai Marina is emblematic of this context. As was 
explained in the previous chapters, Dubai is urbanizing through a succession of urban 
megaprojects, under particular entrepreneurial governance. In a specific context that is 
characterized by strong partnerships between economic and public stakeholders, the central 
place of the Sheikh, and parastatals that are set in competition with each other in a logic of 
profitability, the Dubai Marina project is emblematic of this complex context that requires a 
continuous pilotage by the strategic actors and an articulation between their various pilotage 
actions.  
2.4.1 Historical description of the project 
The project was designed to create a new centrality west of Dubai, in a site that was still, 
until the end of the 1990s, not urbanized (as per an interview with HOK, the first urban 
consultants of this project). The project's general orientations have largely changed. From a 
medium-density residential project, Dubai Marina has turned into an area where hundreds 
of skyscrapers compete for world height records. 
The idea of the Marina, or in other words the artificial canal in the center of the project, 
goes back to when the CEO of Emaar25, the company developing the project, visited the 
city of Vancouver. He was impressed by the artificial channel Concord Pacific project and 
later asked architects involved in this project to develop a similar plan in Dubai (Hurley, 
2012). 
The first project’s master plan dates back to 1999, and the early work with the canal digging 
started in 2000 (as per an interview with HOK). The project was supposed to develop 
according to different phases over a span of twenty years. In 2010, almost ten years after 
                                                
25 This story is well known and frequently told in Dubai. We were given the relevant details in our interviews 
with professionals in Dubai Municipality as well as with HOK. 
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the project’s launching, and despite the dwindling number projects that were still under 
construction, the general appearance of the marina was that of a completed project. In the 
space of ten years, the total area of the project was already built.  
 
Fig 3.6: Dubai Marina in 2012 (Source: Oula Aoun) 
Interestingly, the project was characterized by a gradual shift from a traditional approach to 
development of a global project by a single actor to a series of divisions of the project into a 
number of independent projects that are supported by different stakeholders in competition 
(Based on our interview with Emaar, and TECOM) 
The 500 ha that made up the original area of the project was divided into four different 
projects developed by various real estate companies, all semi-public: Jumeirah Lake 
Towers (JLT) developed by Nakheel (and separated from the rest of the project area by 
Sheikh Zayed highway), Jumeirah Beach Residence (JBR), developed by Dubai Properties 
on a large site amputated from Emaar following a decision of the Sheikh (as per interviews 
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with Dubai Municipality), and finally The Beach project, developed by Meraas, on a plot 
belonging to the land granted to JBR (see fig. 3.8) 
What remains of Emaar’s initial project consists of the majority of the land surrounding the 
marina, barely exceeding half the surface area of the original project – and which will be 
called in this text the Marina Project to differentiate it from the overall project called here 
Dubai Marina. 
In addition to these four projects, a new project known as ‘Bluewaters Island’ emerged in 
the form of an artificial island in the sea. Construction works have already begun during our 
visit to Dubai in 2013 (see fig 3.13). This project adds further complexity to these urban 
megaprojects, thus modifying again the scope of the original project and complicating the 
actors’ relations. 
 






Fig 3.8: Different sub-projects constituting Dubai Marina in 2014 
2.4.2 Project’s actors 
The development of each of these subprojects is affected by the multiplicity of actors within 
each of them and by the presence of actors that are involved at the city level. Within each 
sub-project, there is first the project developer (parastatals) that also plays the role of 
contractor in certain respects. These companies have their own services that support the 
design of new streets, the construction of some facilities and the management of public 
spaces (Based on our interview with Emaar). 
However, they regularly call for consultants on many technical issues, especially for the 
development and adaptation of Master Plans that are the main references in these projects. 
In a highly speculative context, buyers and re-purchasers of many plots, developing their 
own building projects, will seek to increase their profit margin through increasing land 
exploitation rights.  
As for the many private companies and commercial actors, they push for investments and 
events that confer greater attractiveness on the overall project. Finally, we note the presence 
of various public and sectorial authorities in charge of services and infrastructure, the 








To all these actors must be added the central role of Dubai’s governor who does not hesitate 
to intervene in project details, or to dismember a project and create a new one at the stroke 
of a pen.  
The regulation of interrelations among the actors is directly guided by profit logic. In 
Dubai’s context, there is no democratic participation and transparent governance framed by 
rules and charters specifying responsibilities and procedures. This makes the maintenance 
of project stability a difficult task in the face of sudden changes in economic and financial 
markets, especially when they are exposed to global forces (Sampler & Eigner, 2003).  
In that sense, the efficiency of project engineering practices seems very limited. That's why 
we observe the development of pilotage practices at two levels: in each project and between 
different projects. 
2.4.3 Pilotage practices in each project 
In each of these projects, forms of pilotage take place aiming to adapt the project to 
economic, political and cultural factors and to maintain the coherence and unity of the 
project. This is expressed through interventions that have substantial implications affecting 
the form and functions as well as the image of the project. It is further expressed by 
procedural elements related to spaces of negotiations and interactional practices conducted 
by some actors. 
The continuous programming practice 26  is both strategic and tactical. It facilitates 
adjustment and guidance of the project through new constraints that can have a decisive 
impact on its future development; at the same time it opens a space to accommodate the 
interests and requirements of new actors. This is especially the case of the various projects 
in Dubai Marina. 
Continuous change of ‘Affection Plans’, at least in the case of Marina Project, is quite 
expressive of this mode of incremental regulation, which is also used strategically to 
reorient the program and shape the project. 
                                                
26 Meaning the continious redefinition of the project’s content 
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These changes took place quite dramatically in the early phases of the project which 
witnessed a transition from a mainly residential luxurious low-density program to a more 
diversified and complex one combining business functions, tourism and leisure. The change 
is not only at the level of functions, but also in terms of site exploitation, leading to height 
increases. These changes reflected the unexpected rapid boom, urban extension and high 
speculation the city underwent in these years.  
Dubai Marina, as a new centrality that developed to the west in a particular location on the 
axis linking Dubai and Abu Dhabi, in the proximity of the industrial and regional logistics 
centre of Jebel Ali, represented a high potential for the city development. The main actors 
therefore sought to meet the expectations of the many real estate investors who were 
involved in the project and wanted to benefit from this investment. They also wanted to 
confirm the new role expected of Dubai Marina, as a ‘new city centre’, following the vision 
of the city governor. It was to be a new centre around which a large number of investments 
and mega-projects would develop to the west of the city. 
On a much smaller scale, but just as importantly, we saw the intended purpose of the JBR 
project (Jumeirah Beach Residence) deeply redefined. In a late phase of the project’s 
construction, the ‘Walk’ emerged, in the midst of speculation aiming at developing a 
commercial offer mainly focused on hotels, restaurants and cafes. The project was primarily 
residential with local shops intended to serve its population. By annexing a strip of land that 
developed into a large boulevard overlooking the sea and dubbed the ‘Walk’, the project 
was profoundly redefined. This strip of restaurants and retail annexed to the project, 
allowed for the inclusion of new actors in the project that helped make it a success. The 
Walk became in fact the new ‘public’ space of the ‘New Dubai’. 
A third example of adaptation in depth of the spatial organization and functions of projects 
is linked to the resurgence of certain public actors from the mid-2000s, including the RTA. 
Densification was already present and started to constitute a challenge to the proper 
functioning of services and mobility within projects. But it was only with the RTA 
becoming in the 2000s the ‘new transport police’ that various projects made serious efforts 
to comply with its dictates. This led to the design and implementation of new road, 
interchanges, water taxi services and even a special tram on the site of Dubai Marina, in 
order to diversify the locally available transportation. A metro line linking the site to the 
rest of the city is already there, with two stations located at the project’s boundaries. 
Through these transport projects both cooperation and complex arrangements between the 
parastatals and the RTA were established. 
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Another level for acting to adapt the project while maintaining its coherence and unity is its 
form, or rather its projected image based on the form. In these projects where developers 
seek to compete by producing iconic buildings, where ‘Affection Plans’ are the only official 
documents binding the form of buildings, it is easy for a project to lose its coherence and 
unity. However, the guidelines structuring the form of these projects have a major role in 
contributing to project unity.  
An extreme example is the case of the JBR project where sixty towers were built all 
together, in a single phase, with a single architectural style (see fig 3.9). The podium at the 
ground level and the restaurant strip of the ‘Walk’ consolidates its uniform aspect and 
insures its functional continuity.  
 
Fig 3.9: JBR towers, in light brown (2013). They have been built in only one phase and 
following the same architectural design. (Source: Oula Aoun) 
 
For Marina Project and the JLT project, despite the morphological differences of the 
various constructions styles, their articulation around central water bodies (the marina and 
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the ‘lakes’ respectively) provide them with elements of coherence (see fig 3.10). However, 
the need to ‘continually sell the project’ to attract investors and buyers requires periodic 
efforts to recreate a new image of the project while trying to ensure its unity. 
 
Fig 3.10: JLT towers, built around four artificial lakes (2013). (Source: Oula Aoun) 
Thus, the Marina Project in its last phases has faced fierce competition from the 
development of spectacular mega-projects that multiply throughout the city. This will lead 
it to deeply redefine its affection maps, especially in the eastern zone, to allow the 
development of skyscrapers (over 70 floors). This must be understood not only in the sense 
of a change in programming but also, and especially, as a change of image (As per the 
interview with Emaar).  
The message of these changes was that the project is always in the race of the production of 
the spectacular city. The number of skyscrapers setting many records, in what is called the 
tallest block in the world, is evidence of this message (see fig 3.11). The Walk at JBR must 




Fig 3.11: The ‘tallest’ block in the eastern part of Dubai Marina (2013). (Source: Oula 
Aoun) 
It is interesting to see in this project the number of regulatory spaces that have enabled the 
development of localized and ad hoc arrangements between the various players, in order to 
accommodate their interests. 
A characteristic regulatory space is the one that develops within Emaar to discuss with the 
developers the design guidelines for new construction in the vicinity of Marina Project. 
Indeed, Affection maps that represent the only official document do not provide detail in 
the design guidelines.  
However, a tacit agreement between the municipality, as public authority in charge of 
construction and planning permits, and Emaar prompts the former to refer to a control unit 
within Emaar in dealing with these issues. This mechanism allows the different interests of 
developers who are at the same time ‘clients’ and the project partners to be taken into 
account and integrated, as far as it is possible. In fact, it is through their voluntary 
enrolment in Emaar’s directives, at different stages of the project that an overall uniformity 
and possible adaptations to changes can be ensured. 
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Another regulatory space – that may be more veiled – is that concerning the Sheikhs. These 
are a separate caste in the socio-political system of the emirates of the Gulf. In fact, they 
benefit from an exceptional status that does not necessarily have to acknowledge any of the 
regulatory frameworks established by public authorities or parastatals. They only deal 
directly with the Sheikh, Governor of Dubai, who also gives them the ‘royal lands’ or plots 
within projects. However, although concrete information is lacking on this point, it is clear 
from the outcomes that spaces of negotiation between these Sheikhs and parastatals were 
used in order to articulate their private property interests in the whole project. 
The solid relationship between parastatals and the municipality is central to the success of 
their projects. In the early years of Dubai Marina, although the municipality is officially in 
charge of planning issues, in reality it had a peripheral role in the development of the area. 
In practice everything came back, in terms of making decisions, to parastatals, either by 
official recognition accorded to a body that is attached to them, as in the case of DTMFZA 
(Dubai Technology & Media Free Zone), a subsidiary of Dubai Properties, or based on 
informal agreements as in the case of Emaar. Even after the restoration of the 
municipality’s functions after the 2008 crisis and the centralization of all the responsibilities 
in terms of urban planning in municipal services – leading inter alia to the setting aside of 
the DTMFZA – the role of the municipality remained a secondary one in these projects. In 
reality, the regulation of these projects is highly time-consuming and is undertaken as part 
of informal interpersonal networks that are difficult to stabilize within an institution such as 
the municipality. The ‘mutual trust’ between city officials and project managers in 
concerned parastatal companies is the reason why, even today, they continue to operate in 
the same way as before.  
This regulation is also strongly linked to the role played by certain individuals. Apart from 
the Sheikh, with his deep involvement in the strategic vision of the project and its 
relationship to the city, there are also the different CEOs of parastatals. So for the CEOs of 
Emaar, Dubai Properties, Nakheel or Meraas, there is a direct involvement in the various 
aspects of the regulation of projects that goes with their position.  
For Emaar, it was its CEO who was behind the concept of Dubai Marina. As said above, he 
was personally in contact with Canadian architects to invite them to design the first plan of 
the project and discuss it with them. He was also in direct contact with the majority of 
project stakeholders to manage the various stages of the project’s progression, but also all 
the related investments within the project. He also represents the media side of the project 
as well as being the key person to deal with strategic issues related to the project, with the 
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city authorities and with the Sheikh, given his place in the circle of power (As per interview 
with Emaar). 
A powerful and omnipotent person within his organization, he is involved in the selection 
of senior consultants, reviewing plans, and he invests his time heavily in the daily 
monitoring of many technical details, through discussing various issues with the employees. 
2.5 Competition or complementarity 
Despite the competition between the different projects constituting Dubai Marina pushing 
everyone to stand out by highlighting their own specificities compared to the others, we 
stress also the degree to which complementarities, cooperation and even compromises, 
come into play to ensure the collective interest of this new urban centre and its status vis à 
vis the city. 
This link between competition, specificity and complementarity can be observed at 
different levels. This is mainly concerning the different functions that are included in the 
projects. Even if all projects are competing in the market of residential real estate, this is 
less clearly the case for other functions. For example, we see commercial functions taking 
different forms in different projects: a shopping centre in Marina Project, a strip on the 
‘Walk’ of JBR, or a leisure centre at ‘The Beach’. 
A second example is that all projects are seeking to highlight an image of places offering 
public spaces, especially through promenade areas, that are not otherwise so available in 
Dubai (see fig 3.12). However, at the same time it is about different types of promenade, in 
each project. At Marina Project, there is a promenade along the water, reserved for 
pedestrians, while at JBR The Walk offers the opportunity to a car promenade in a close 
proximity to cafes and restaurants. At The Beach, the promenade has a character that is 
more in keeping with the beach and tourists who frequent the seaside projects nearby. 
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Fig 3.12: Pedestrian promenade in Dubai Marina, (2013). (Source: Oula Aoun) 
 
It is also apparent from the way the different projects are approaching the issue of quality 
and luxury image that they all seek to promote, a complex interrelation that articulates 
competition, specificity and complementarity. In Marina Project, this is reflected through 
the yacht clubs and luxurious boats that occupy the banks of the marina. At JBR the Walk 
itself is promoted as a refined public space dedicated to the promenade but also to 
commercial activities targeting upper middle classes. In The Beach, this is reflected through 
a selection of restaurants and upscale cafés, creating a luxurious restaurants pavilion. 
It is about an underlying search for a complementary in providing facilities and 
atmospheres, even if in practice the interactions between different actors remain occasional 
and minimal. Thus, The Beach project has grown through continuity logic with the 
dynamics of the existing Walk (see fig 3.13), in order to benefit from existing dynamics 
while being different. However, in terms of competition logic, there has been no formal and 
official coordination with the actors of neighbouring projects, including JBR, in the 
development of the project and its orientations. 
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Fig 3.13: The Beach Project, being built in parallel to the existing ‘The Walk’ in JBR. (2013) 
(Source: Oula Aoun) 
 
Thus there exists a particular articulation of projects and a search for coherence in 
implementing this complex world of Dubai Marina. It does not take the form of either an 
adopted or a stabilized governance around a common project, but rather a logical 
synchronization and adjustment of temporalities, places and interests of different spaces and 
practice. It is a logic of reactivity where each actor redefines its project in response to 
initiatives, actions and projects of the other actors. It is mainly through this mechanism the 
particular interests of the different actors are connected, as well as their collective interest 
focused on the development of Dubai Marina. 
2.6 Between the project scale and the city scale 
The case study of Dubai Marina allowed understanding procedural dimensions of UMPs 
but also at city scale. In fact, many similarities between the characteristics of strategic 
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pilotage at both scales can be found. More importantly, these strategic pilotage scales are 
also interconnected. Several elements explained in terms of pilotage can be seen 
simultaneously at the UMP and city levels.  
First, at the substantial level, the continuous adaptation of form and content can be seen at 
the city level. More specifically, it can be seen in the number of the city’s master plans and 
strategic plans, that aim each time at readapting the characteristics of the city, and 
reorienting its development (see for example the case of Dubai 2020 explained earlier). 
Second, at the procedural level, the ad hoc regulatory spaces that exist at the project and 
sub-project level also exist at the city level. These are interpersonal spaces that include the 
municipality, the Sheikh, the developers and the regulatory authorities. These spaces are 
also clearly connected to the UMPs’ negotiation and ad hoc regulatory spaces, since many 
actors are present in both chambers. In fact, it is this very asset, beyond all institutional 
frameworks and strategic documents, that serves best the articulation of UMP processes to 
the city-level urban planning and development processes led by the Sheikh’s close circle. 
However, the articulation between the two scales of ad hoc negotiation and regulatory 
spaces is not rigid and operates mainly through synchronization. Although this 
synchronization is more driven by a competitive context than a search for mutual interest, 
as is often the case for sub-projects.    
The complementarity, reactivity, competition and synchronization that we have identified at 
the project scale do exist at the city scale, though at different levels. Rarely there may be 
complementarity between two projects, as for example when the same developer is building 
two different projects, whether or not they lie in close proximity to each other. Reactivity is 
not frequently observed at the program level. In the case of Dubailand for example, which 
was put on hold after the 2008 crisis, the sub-projects did not change or adapt their 
programs, and the majority were cancelled or simply frozen. Instead of adapting the 
program or the image, new projects are implemented in other locations, with a completely 
new program and a new image. Competition exists between megaprojects at city level. This 
can be seen in each project claiming status as a centre for the city, or a new city within the 
city. However, it is difficult to interpret the duplication of functions and programs that do 
occur with great frequency. One interpretation may be found in the absence of market and 
feasibility studies. 
Increasingly, and despite the challenges to the articulation of the infrastructure planning and 
UMPs instruments, the RTA seems to hold a growing role in linking city and UMPs scales. 
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This can be seen at the UMP scale when the RTA has recently imposed more significant 
measures to be followed by the developers in order to ensure some unity and 




In this third chapter, we have analysed the UMPs-based approach in urban planning and 
development in Dubai. The chapter aimed at understanding the characteristics of this 
approach, the place UMPs hold in it and the interconnection between the two scales.  
In the first section, focus was on the location of the UMPs-based approach midst urban 
planning approaches with a focus on those approaches that give emphasis to the 
physical/spatial dimension. It also investigated the role of UMPs as planning instruments 
and the challenges they raise to any city-level planning strategy. UMPs-based approach in 
Dubai seems a hybrid approach drawing on both urban planning and urban design 
traditions. It has many similarities with royal mode of planning, mainly a strong central 
actor with vision and means, the use of iconicity in architecture and urban design as a mean 
of asserting and legitimating political power and the capacity to generate ad hoc resources 
for large investments. It has also similarities with the liberal mode of planning, especially 
the absence of strong regulatory frameworks, a focus on entrepreneurial initiative and the 
seemingly fragmented landscape that this mode of planning produces. Hence, the UMPs-
based approach to planning and development in Dubai emerges as a physically-oriented 
mode of planning where large UMPs play a central role in their competition and 
complementarity.  
In this approach UMPs as planning instruments play a range of roles that are essential for 
the capacity of the city to answer the challenges of catering to the needs of globalization 
economic dynamics and profit from them. This includes mainly: (1) creating housing and 
other facilities to the expected international population and tourists that will allow this 
economy to work, through a considerable expansion of the city and through rapidly 
produced and self-regulated large territorial fragments, (2) the consolidation of the 
fascinating globalized image Dubai is trying to project of itself, (3) the provision of 
facilities needed for emerging sectors linked to globalization economy and, (4) the 
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contribution to a multi-billions dollars investment market that is one of the major wheels of 
economic development in this emirate. But they also bring challenges, not the least the 
difficulty of articulating this ever-changing and opportunistic instrument of urban 
development with other long-term, bureaucracy-led processes.        
In the second part of the chapter, focus is on the way this articulation is done on the 
different scale of the UMP, its sub-parts and the city level. Based on the case study of the 
Dubai Marina, representative of many large UMPs in Dubai, UMPs seems to hold many 
characteristics of what scholars in the footsteps of Lascoumes & Legalès (2004) call public 
policy instruments. UMPs as physical objects and as processes provide technical procedures 
and ad hoc arenas for bringing together and articulating, in a strategic pilotage manner, 
actors, interests, sectorial processes, scales and budgets. The way they get to inscribe in 
each other and interconnect different scales, like Matryoshka Russian dolls, allow 
simplification of the complexity at each scale keeping it manageable. Hence, when a project 
gets to a point where complexity is becoming too difficult for the pilot to lead, it might well 
get divided in several projects. The synchronization of projects at different levels operates 
through a dynamic of competition, complementarity and voluntary adjustment. The 
regulation of this dynamic is in many aspect in informal ad hoc spaces bringing together a 
restricted number of key influential persons, usually holding many responsibilities and 








































Urban megaprojects are considered as a tool for cities’ revitalization, and are pursued in 
search for economic growth and competitiveness. They constitute icons of the managerial 
and technical prowess in the production of the contemporary city. They have different 
designations that vary with time, place and authors. However they have a large set of 
similarities such as the large scale, the complex implementation, the large number of actors 
and partnerships between private and public sectors. 
The old version of megaprojects has existed in different periods and forms, such as the 
mega structures movement of the 60s. However the contemporary ones are very complex, 
with mixed-use content and numbers of signature buildings. In the context of this research, 
we haven’t included large-scale infrastructure projects, large architectural projects nor 
territorial projects. We have defined UMPs as large urban development projects that are 
specific for their size, complexity and duration. While they are considered as expressions of 
neo-liberal urban planning policies, they are as well the product of specific local factors 
such as socio-political and economic contexts and professional milieus. Similar to 
neoliberal policies, UMPs have to undergo an adaptation and transformation process in each 
context. 
This research has focused on UMPs in Dubai, a particular context where these have 
contributed to a massive urban transformation and to drawing the image of a high-tech, 
smart, successful and competitive city that can be considered as a world metropolis. Dubai 
has a specific process of development since it has went in only one century from a fishing 
and pearling village to a city that is ‘present’ on the map of world cities. It is considered 
however as in a hectic search for spectacle and superlatives, and its policies are mainly 
oriented toward the market, combining taxes minimalization and a lean regulatory 
framework. 
The main argument is that UMPs, as a reflection of globalization, are at the same time: (1) a 
territorial processes and forms that are rooted in the local context of Dubai, and (2) the first 
tool of the city’s development through which the city is controlled and oriented. The 
research aimed at questioning many related issues: first the specific context’s factors that 
have contributed to the emergence and the adoption of UMPs as main tool in the city 
production; second, the ways these UMPs have impacted the city’s urban dynamics and 
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urban form; third, the ways UMPs are contributing to forging a particular planning 
approach in the city.  
The first chapter, divided into three parts, examines respectively the specific urban history 
of Dubai, the particular governance and the customized expertise that focus on the 
international consultancy firms. 
We have drawn a chronological description of the major phases in the urban history of the 
city, going from a small fishing village, to the oil discovery that have fuelled the city’s 
development and the building of modern infrastructure. The tradition of open policies 
adopted by the ruling family, the geographic location and a focus on an economy of 
spectacle and fascination, are the main elements that mark and explain the city’s present 
dynamics.  
We have also described the morphological transformation characterized by the extension of 
an old centre, based around a creek and a port, to a linear and polycentric pattern, along the 
main axis of Sheikh Zayed road, and through scattered agglomerations of UMPs. The 
adopted tools by the city such as strategic plans and master plans are numerous and quickly 
replaced, mirroring a lack of efficiency facing the rapid emergence of large number of 
megaprojects built in a short period of time that does not exceed 15 years.  
In this context, UMPs are the dominant tool that contributes to the city development. They 
are the major component of the adopted policy in Dubai that focuses on city marketing and 
an economy of fascination, where semiotics and theming are observed in urban spaces. This 
is contributing to the commodification of the city, and an increased sectorization aiming at 
giving meanings and roles to the various city’s parts. 
The particular governance was examined through three major actors in Dubai: The Sheikh, 
the municipality and other relevant authorities, and the parastatals. Planning and 
development in Dubai is carried out following the vision of the Sheikh. A small elite circle 
surrounds the Sheikh and contributes as well at this centralized form of governance. The 
system is often described as a corporate style in managing the city, where the Sheikh is 
considered as its CEO who runs the emirate as if it was his own company. He is the main 
actor and the most decisive along with his small team. Key persons within this circle are 
chairmen of large parastatals. He often allows exceptional procedures and is involved at any 
time in the process of projects’ conception and implementation, through the ‘Executive 
Council’, be it in the public or the private, to change the course of things. The Executive 
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Council has a structure that is similar to a government with heads of institutions and 
departments playing ministry’s roles. 
Dubai municipality, supposed to be the main authority in governing the urban, is far from 
being a key actor in managing the planning and the organization of the city. Other 
authorities, such as those managing the free zones, are powerful actors in this system. Dubai 
municipality plays therefore a reactive adjustment role, as for example adjusting strategic 
plans to adapt with the quick emergence of megaprojects, or from the other side facilitating 
the administrative procedures for developers. It can be argued that the governance system is 
marked by interpersonal relationships and compromises, privileging leadership and trust 
instead of rules and regulations, and by the unclear limits between public and private, since 
the majority of key developers are controlled by the Sheikh. From another part, being the 
controller and the owner of the great majority of lands in the Emirate, the Sheikh allocates 
lands to key developers in order to built megaprojects; a way through which he exercises 
control over the city’s parts. 
International consultancy firms are also a key actor in this system. We have examined the 
knowledge transfer in the domain of urban planning, in the context of a lack of local 
expertise, professionals and norms in the real estate market in Dubai. We have also 
analysed the adaptation measures undertaken by these firms facing the market instability, 
the clients’ demand and the intrinsic complexity of UMPs. These measures are related to 
their internal organization, their modalities in accessing the market, and their mobilized 
methods. We have also set a typology differentiating engineering firms from architecture 
firms. It was shown that the first are mostly involved in UMPs requiring a high level of 
engineering prowess, while the latter are involved in the context of UMPs requiring a 
spectacular image and design. 
In the second chapter we have focused on the morphological aspects of UMPs, and their 
role in the wider dynamics of the city, as main engine in driving the urban extension and the 
city’s transformation. In the first section we have drawn a model of UMPs in Dubai based 
on the literature in this domain. In a second section we have compared this model’s 
characteristics to the characteristics that emanate from our corpus of 36 surveyed 
megaprojects. The comparison is articulated around three axis: UMPs as governance tool, 
UMPs as tools for the city’s expansion, and UMPs as elements of a ‘fragmented’ urban 
planning. We have structured the literature-based model into two sets of characteristics, the 
ones related to governance and the ones related to morphology. In the first, we have 
identified a corporate leadership, a major role for international consultancy firms, weak 
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public authorities, distant end-users, and the financialisation of the real-estate market in 
Dubai, in the context of UMPs. The morphological aspects are the exceptional size, the 
mixed-use program, the architectural records, the location on waterfronts, and the role of 
greenery and water as major components of the design.  
From the other side, analysing UMPs characteristics from an empirical approach is based 
on the following analytical grid: (1) highlighting the role and status of UMPs through 
identifying two factors:  first: the Key developers and their location within the centralized 
system of governance and second: the number of megaprojects located in free zone, 
mirroring a major role of these flexible spaces within the city’s regulatory framework. (2) 
Understanding the role of UMPs in the city’s expansion through analysing the potentiality 
of the various projects’ locations, and their role as engine of urban expansion that 
contributes to a snowball effect. (3) Understanding UMPs as fragmented and commodified 
parts that are at the same time elements of a potential unified system of the city. This was 
addressed through analysing the role of theming, symbolism, records and the relation to the 
city. We concluded this section by arguing that three factors contribute at understanding 
Dubai as one entity, in a fragmented urban development. First, despite the seemingly 
various master developers that have each his own agenda, we have shown that these latters 
are grouped under the umbrella of few giant holdings that are controlled by the Sheikh who 
has his centralised vision for the city. Second, and following Mangin (2004), commodified 
spaces in are contributing at holding the city’s parts together, through producing an image 
of a modern, capable and experimental city. Third, infrastructure networks constitute a 
physical element that connects the city and provides an asset for development.  
The third part has analysed four case studies at a closer scale: we have focused on the 
morphological aspects, including the urban design of the master plan and the modalities of 
relations between the project and its surrounding from one side, and the city parts from the 
other. In analysing urban morphology, we have suggested three elements: the divisibility of 
the master plan, the accessibility of the project, and aspects of iconicity. These elements 
were analysed and illustrated through, respectively: (1) the project management and 
implementation through the plan’s form, (2) the status of the project within the city’s 
dynamics and the type of relation with its context, and (3) the physical image of UMPs in 
contributing to the city’s promotion and adopted fascination economy.  
Aspects of iconicity were illustrated through the type of composition (concentric, organic, 
linear, others), the role of central green and water bodies, the existence of artificial islands, 
and the records. In terms of accessibility, it has been illustrated through the projects’ 
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location, the availability of various types of transport within their surrounding, the relation 
to the context at the level of urban design (meaning continuity or discontinuity of urban 
fabric), and the catchment area. We have concluded that UMPs are clearly designed to 
contribute to the city’s visibility, through iconicity aspects. We have concluded as well that 
UMPs may be closed to their near context, however they are connected to the city through 
sophisticated infrastructure. Finally we have concluded that urban form is a way by which 
UMPs are managed, through the divisibility that helps implementing the project through 
different separate phases.  
The third chapter’s objective is to analyse the UMPs-based approach of urban planning and 
development in Dubai. It aims to situate it in the larger literature on physically-oriented 
planning approaches, identify the role UMPs play, as planning instruments, in this approach 
and the challenges they bring mainly in terms of articulating them to other planning 
instruments and city scales. The chapter is structured around two sections. 
In the first section, we start by localizing UMPs within the analytical grid that differentiates 
urban planning and urban design, and second, comparing UMPs to similar physical 
approaches in planning. It was shown that the UMPs-based approach is a hybrid standing 
on the fence between urban planning and urban design traditions. It tries to bridge the 
considerable gap between a neoliberal city making approach, building on visibility, the 
focus on the ‘Place’ and the physical form, the flexible governance, the short term of 
implementation, the variety of design options, and the absence of a critical reflection on one 
hand, and a “caring state” approach building strategies to address the socioeconomic 
development of the city as a whole on the other. The UMPs-base approach has strong 
similarities with the historic royal planning approaches giving a central role for the Prince 
in building the city, mainly through iconicity in architecture and urban design. But at the 
same time it relates, at least in the urban landscape it produces, to a radical form of liberal 
planning where regulations are limited and entrepreneurial private initiative brings out a 
spatially very differentiated, sometimes fragmented, city. 
In this UMPs based approach, the presence of different urban planning and design traditions 
cannot be brought to a simple issue of scale where planning operates on the city scale and 
design on the local project scale. The interconnection between scales is more complex and 
cannot be understood but through the role UMPs hold in this approach and the way they get 
to link actors, institutions, sectors, instruments, temporalities, scales and resources. To 
understand this complexity, we have resorted to understand UMPs as instruments, planning 
instruments but also and mainly public policy instruments. In this perspective, UMPs bring 
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a certain “inertia effect” and simplification that can help deal with complexity while 
maintaining the values and will of the Sheikh – the backbone of the “Dubai adventure” – 
embedded in all processes.  
For that we have first identified the role played by the UMPs in Dubai’s UMPs-base 
approach and the challenges it faces in articulating with other instruments. UMPs are in fact 
the planning instrument that allow Dubai to cater, on the urban spatial and development 
levels, for the needs of a globalized economy it is trying to integrate: a huge need for 
housing for incoming population, new state-of-the-art facilities, a fascination image and a 
multi-billions dollars real-estate market that drives its economic development. But at the 
same time, its opportunistic short and mid-term investment nature puts it in tension with 
more traditional government/bureaucracy-led long-term planning instruments like 
infrastructure planning and strategic planning.  
Second, and in another section, and through the case of the UMP of Dubai Marina, we have 
questioned the way UMPs as objects and processes constitute policy instruments holding 
different actors and scales together. For that we have resorted to the literature on project’s 
management, and more particularly the project engineering and the pilotage. First we have 
identified main divergences between these two methods. The rationality and pre-set 
methods characterize the first, while uncertainty, adaptation and flexibility characterize the 
second. We have analysed the presence of both methods in a case study, Dubai Marina. 
Dominated by pilotage methods, the implementation of this megaproject is marked, at the 
substantial level, by continuous adaptation, of the form, the content and the image. It is also 
marked by the subdivision of the project in several sub-projects in order to keep it 
manageable for a leading pilot. This subdivision, in the way of Russian dolls, allows at each 
scale an important simplification of the complexity. As for the way the relation in each 
project, between the different sub-projects in the larger project and between different 
project at city level, the existence of unveiled ad hoc informal regulatory spaces piloted by 
key persons connected to the Sheikh’s inner circle allows a framed negotiation at each level  
between the concerned actors at that level. This regulation between different sub-projects 
and projects takes the form of synchronization, adaptation actions and high reactivity facing 
any changes that may occur, as well as an equilibrium between complementarity and 
competition dynamics.  
 In the light of these three chapters, we bring forward a set of conclusions that summarize 
our understanding of the UMPs-based planning approach and provide material and starting 
questions for launching future research. 
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Large urban projects are not particular to Dubai. In a context of city competition at the 
global level, many cities have supported the development of large urban projects. These 
projects are there to build a new image for cities as much as to answer their pressing needs 
for diversified residential demand and economic activities. However, what we see in Dubai 
with the UMPs-based planning approach is taking the large urban projects’ production 
process to another limit. It is making of this process the building block of city-making in a 
context of very rapid growth and uncertainty, through a complex assemblage of the various 
fragments and actors of the city. 
In fact, the most important asset of the UMPs-based planning approach is its speed. Like 
most large urban projects in Europe and the USA, UMPs seek iconicity and contribute to 
the production of the image of the city. Like their European and American counterparts, 
they are imbricated in multi-scalar governance dynamics involving a large variety of public 
and private actors. However, the tempo in which the UMPs develop in Dubai is 
unprecedented and in that very different. Speed does not mean simple acceleration to 
already well-known and analyzed European and American processes. Speed is here 
essential and provides answers to new and different stakes. For a rising city with no history, 
no image, this UMPs-based planning approach has allowed the creation of a fascinating and 
attractive image. In the absence of clear and stabilized urban strategic plans, this approach 
has helped cope with large demand for growth while allowing key governing actors to 
maintain control of the city’s development. 
It is exactly for their capacity to rapidly change the whole landscape and dynamic of the 
city that UMPs have been recognized, in the now documented process of “dubaisation”, as 
a main “export” of the city. From Morocco to Turkey and beyond, many have seen in these 
UMPs a lever that could help revitalize cities living deep urban crises. The capacity of this 
planning approach to ignore existing urban dynamics – in an amnesiac way – and to 
develop its own dynamics, seems to be a magical solution for governing actors in these 
cities.  
However, to the difference of UMPs built in the periphery of Cairo or Casablanca, in 
Dubai, UMPs are not isolated fragments but part of a large assemblage process. The latter is 
what we have called in this thesis the Dubai’s UMPs-based approach to urban planning and 
development. Of course, many UMPs in Dubai are gated communities, while other are 
conceived to function independently from the rest of the city. But all these UMPs are 
related through a main process. It can be seen as a complex multi-scalar governance process 
allowing the involvement of a large number of private actors and areas all over the city in 
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the urban development process while giving the Sheikh’s circle the needed weight to 
maintain an efficient and effective tight control of this process. Paradoxically, the UMPs 
that are usually seen as symbols of fragmentation are the very backbone instruments that 
allow the process of synchronization to work. 
This assemblage to whom the city owes its success is far from being a top-down 
engineering exercise. In fact, there is has been in the last decade a formidable growth and 
change at the demographic and economic level while there is too few recognized formal 
norms and conventions and too little available and stable data. To provide a stabilized mode 
of urban development in the midst of all this uncertainty, this assemblage through a UMPs-
based planning approach operates less in an engineering mode and more in a pilotage mode. 
It is this very fuzziness of this multi-scalar pilotage that allows its flexibility and capacity of 
adaptation. 
These conclusions lead to reflections and questions that could be developed in future 
research. A first question relates to planning in context of very rapid growth. This rapid 
growth in many cities around the world, especially in the global South, has translated in 
informal development and more slums. It has produced very large metropolises whose very 
governability is put to question. However, as shown by recent research, in some cases - 
especially in China -rapid growth and complexity have not necessarily led to ungovernable 
metropolises. On the contrary, authoritarian rule, infrastructure and urban services 
governance have allowed these cities to stabilize and orient their rapid growth and urban 
development. Questioning elements of convergence and divergence with the Dubai UMPs-
based planning approach, especially in terms of governance, in a comparative approach 
could hence present the starting point of a research project. 
In the continuity of the first question – but with more focus on materiality of infrastructure 
– and building on the analyses of this thesis on the way certain physical characteristics of 
UMP’s design allow for flexible arrangements between different actors and interests, 
another possible future research track would be to focus on elaborating our understanding 
of the role physical characteristics play in allowing or blocking flexibility in multi-scalar 
governance processes.    
 





Abaza) M) (2011)) Critical) commentary,) Cairo’s) downtown) imagined:) Dubaisation) or)
nostalgia?)Urban&Studies)48(6):)1075R1087.)
Acuto) M) (2010)) HighRrise) Dubai) urban) entrepreneurialism) and) the) technology) of)
symbolic)power.)Cities&27(4):)272R284.)
Acuto) M) (2011)) Finding) global) city:) an) analytical) journey) through) the) ‘Invisible)
College’.)Urban&Studies)48(14):)2953R2973.)












Andraos) A) &)Wood) D) (2013)) Peak) urbanism,) microRplanning,) and) other) emergent)
realities) in) Dubai.) In:) Kanna) A) (dir.)) The& Superlative& City,& Dubai& and& The& Urban&
Condition& in& the& Early& TwentyEFirst& Century.) Cambridge:) Harvard) University)
Graduate)School)of)Design.)
Arab) N) (2004)) L’activité& de& projet& dans& l’aménagement& urbain:& processus&
d’élaboration& et& modes& de& pilotage.& Les& cas& de& la& ligne& B& du& tramway&
strasbourgeois&et&d’Odysseum&à&Montpellier.)Thèse)à)l’Ecole)des)Ponts)ParisTech.)
Arab)N)(2007))À)quoi)sert)l’expérience)des)autres?)Espaces&et&societies&131:)33–47.)
Arab) N) &) Lefeuvre) MRP) (2011)) Des& cadres& territoriaux& au& coeur& des& coopérations&
institutionnelles :& les& « entrepreneurs&métropolitains ».)Politiques& et&management&
public)28:)399–415.))
 200 
Ashworth)G) J) (2009)) The) instruments) of) place) branding:) How) it) is) done?& European&
Spatial&research&and&Policy)16(1):)9R22))
Avraham)E)(2002))Cities)and)their)news)media)images.)Cities&17(5):)363R370)
Bagaeen) S) (2007)) Brand) Dubai:) the) instant) city;) or) the) instant) recognizable) city.)
International&Planning&Studies)12(2):)173R197.)






Barthel) PA) &) Planel) S) (2010)) TangerRMed) and) CasaRMarina,) Prestige) Projects) in)
Morocco:)New)Capitalist)Frameworks)and)Local)Context.)Built&Environment,)36(2):)
176‑191)










Bénit) C,) Didier) S,) DorierRApprill) E) &) GervaisRLambony) P) (2007)) Fragmentations.) In)
DorierRapprill)E)&)GevaisRLambony)P)(dir))Vies&citadines.)Paris:)Belin.)))
BenRJoseph) E) (2009)) Designing) codes:) Trends) in) cities,) planning) and) development.)
Urban&Studies)46(12):)2691R2701.)
Ben) MahmoudRJouini) S) (2003)) Pratiques& de& projet& et& ingénieuries& Tome& III.& CoE
conception&et&savoirs&d’interaction.)Paris:)PUCA)
Bertrand) R) (2012)) Real) Estate) Bubble) and) Financial) Crisis) in) Dubai:) Dynamics) and)
Policy)Responses.)Journal)of)Real)Estate)Literature)20(1):)51R77.)
 201 
Boagert) K) (2011)) The) Problem) of) Slums):) Shifting) Method) of) Neoliberal) Urban)
Government)in)Morocco.)Development&and&Change)42(3):)709R731)
Boudreau) JA) &) Keil) R) (2006))La) réconciliation) de) la) démocratie) locale) et) de) la)





Brenner) N) &) Theodore) N) (2002))Cities) and) the) geographies) of) ‘’Actually) existing)
neoliberalism’’.)Antipode)34(3):)349R379)





of) risk,) hope) and) mistrust:) capturing) localised) impacts) of) boom/burst) cycles) of)
australian) mining.) Sustaining& Gondwana& Working& Paper& Series,) 21(November),)





Buckley)M)&)Hanieh)A) (2014))Diversification)by)Urbanization:) Tracing) the)PropertyR
Finance)Nexus)in)Dubai)and)the)Gulf.)International&Journal&of&Urban&and&Regional&
Research&38(1):)155R175.)
Burgess) R) (2005)) Technological) Determinism) and) Urban) Fragmentation:) A) Critical)
Analysis.) In:) 9th& International& Conference& of& the& ALFAEIBIS& Network& on& Urban&
Peripheries.)Pontificia)Universidad)







Carmona) M) (2006)) Designing) megaRprojects) in) Hong) Kong:) reflections) from) an)
academic)Accomplice.)Journal&of&Urban&Design)11(1):)105R124)
Carroll,)W.) (2009))Transnationalists)and)national)networkers) in) the)global)corporate)
elite,)Global&Networks,)9(3),)289–314.)
Chapuis)J)(2013))Villes&en&guerre&au&MoyenEOrient.)Paris:)L’Harmattan)
Chombart) de) Lauwe) P) (Dir)) (2012)) Le& projet& négocié,& Maîtrise& d’ouvrage& et&
équipement&public.)Paris:)PUCA.)
Christophers) B) (2008)) The) BBC,) the) Creative) Class) and) Neoliberal) Urbanism) in) the)
North)of)England.)Environment&and&Planning&A)30:)2313R2329))
Chu) Y) (2008)) Deconstructing) the) global) city:) unravelling) the) linkages) that) underlie)
Hong)Kong’s)world)city)status.)Urban&Studies)45(8):)1625R1646)
Clarke)J)(2008))Living)with/in)and)without)neoRliberalism)»,)2008|51:))135R147)
Crot) L) (2013)) Planning) for) sustainability) in) nonRdemocratic) polities:) the) case) of)
Masdar)City.)Urban&Studies)50(13):)2809R2825.)




Daher) R) (2008)) Amman):) Disguised) Geneology) and) Recent) Urban) Restructuring) ad)
Neoliberal) Threats.) In:) Elsheshtawy) Y.) (dir)) The& Evolving& Arab& City.) New) York:)
Routledge.)
Davidson) CM) (2008)) Dubai:& The& Vulnerability& of& Success.) New) York:) Columbia)
University)Press))




Dear) M) &) Flusty) S) (1998)) Postmodern) Urbanism,) Annals& of& the& Association& of&
American&Geographers)88(1):)50R72.)
 203 
De) Bruijn) H) &) Leijten) M) (2007)) Megaprojects) and) contested) information.)
Transportation&Planning&and&Technology)30(1):)49R69.)
Deslandes) A) (2013)) Exemplary) Amateursim:) Thoughts) on) DIY) Urbanism.) Cultural&
Studies&review)19:)216–227.)
Denis) E.) (2006)) Cairo) as) Neoliberal) Capital.) In:) Sigerman) D) &) Amar) P) (dir)) Cairo&
Cosmopolitan,)Cairo:)AUC)Press.)







Urban) Engineering:) The) Contribution) of) Distributed) Collaborative) Design) to) the)
Management)of)Urban)Projects.)Journal&of&Urban&Design)17:)255–277.))
Elsheshtawy) Y) (2004)) Planning& Middle& Eastern& Cities,& an& urban& kaleidoscope& in& a&
Globalizing&World.)London,)New)York:)Routledge.)
Elsheshtawy) Y) (2008)) The& Evolving& Arab& Cities,& Tradition,& Modernity& and& Urban&
Development.)London,)New)York:)Routledge.)
Elsheshtawy) Y) (2013)) Dubai,& Behind& an& Urban& Spectacle.) London,) New) York:)
Routledge.)















Faulconbridge) J) (2009)) The) regulation) of) design) in) global) architecture) firms:)
embedding)and)emplacing)buildings.)Urban&Studies,)46)(12):)2537–54.)





Florida) R) (2003)) The& Rise& of& the& Creative& Class& and& How& It’s& Transforming& Work,&
Leisure,&Community&and&Everyday&Life,)New)York:)Basic)Books.)












Gleye) P) (2014)) City) planning) versus) urban) planning:) resolving) a) profession’s)
bifurcated)heritage.)Journal&of&Planning&Literature)30(1):)3R17.)




Gutman) R.) (1988)) Architectural& practice:& a& critical& view.& New) York:) Princeton)
Architectural)Press.)
 205 
Halpern)C,) Lascoumes)P)&)Le)Galès)P) (2014))L’instrumentation&de& l’action&publique.)
SciencesPo:)Paris.)
Healey) P) &) Upton) R) (eds)) (2010)) Crossing& borders:& International& exchange& and&
planning&practices.)London:)Routledge.)
Hackworth) J) &)Moriah) A) (2002)) Neoliberalism,) Contingency) and) Urban) Policy:) The)
Case) of) Social) Housing) in) Ontario.) International& Journal& of& Urban& and& Regional&
Research)30(3):)510R27)









Harvey)D) (1989))From)manageriamism)to)entrepreneurialism:) the) transformation)of)








Hertog) S) (2007))GCC) and)Arab) economic) integration:) a) new) paradigm.)Middle& East&
Policy&14(1):)52R68)





Idt) J) (2009)) Le& pilotage& des& projets& d’aménagement& urbain:& entre& technique& et&
politique:&Une&analyse&basée& sur& les& cas&de&Paris,& Lille,& et&Chartres.) PhD) thesis) at)
Université)Paris)VIII)VincennesRSaint)Denis.)





Inlil) Z) (2011),) The& Neoliberal& Agenda& and& The& Changing& Urban& Form& of& Istanbul.)
Internationnal)Urban)Studies)16(1):)5R25)
Institut) d’Aménagement) et) d’Urbanisme) d’IleRdeRFrance) (2007)) Large& scale& urban&
development&projects& in& Europe:&Drivers& of& change& in& city& regions,& Les&Cahiers& de&
l’IAURIF.)Paris:)IAURIF.)
Iveson)K) (2013))Cities)within) the)City:)DoRItRYourself)Urbanism)and) the)Right) to) the)







Jia) G,) Yang) F,) Wang) G,) Hong) B) &) You) R) (2011)) A) study) of) mega) project) from) a))




Kanna)A) (2011))Dubai,& The& City& As& A& Corporation.) London:)University) of)Minnesota)
Press.)
Kanna)A) (2013))Dubai,) in)particular):)Anomalous) spaces)and) ignored)histories) in) the)
‘Superlative) City’.) In) Kanna) A) (ed),) The& Superlative& City,& Dubai& and& the& Urban&
Condition&in&the&Early&TwentyEFirst&Century,)Cambridge:)The)Aga)Khan)Program.)
 207 
Kim) JH,) Yoon) JY,) Kim) KH,) Kim) JJ) (2009)) A) Conceptual)Model) of) Intelligent) Program)









Krijnen) M) &) Fawaz) M) (2010)) Exception& as& the& Rule&:& HighEEnd& Development& in&
Neoliberal&Beirut.)Built)Environment)36(2):)245R259)
Larice)M)&)Macdonald) E) (2007)) Editors’) introduction.) In)The&Urban&Design& Reader.)
London:)Routledge)
Lascoumes)P)&)Le)Galès)P)(2004))Gouverner&par&les&instruments.)SciencesPo:)Paris)





Lavergne)M) (2002)) Dubaï) ou) la) métropolisation) incomplète) d’un) pôle) en) relais) de)
l’économie)monde.)Cahiers&de&la&Méditerrannée)64:)257R296.)
Lavergne)M) (2009)) Dubai,) utile) ou) futile?) portrait) d’une) ville) rêvée) à) l’heure) de) la)
crise.)Hérodote)133(2):)32R57.)
Lavergne) M) (2014)) Egypte:) L’aménagement& urbain& en& quête& de& pilotage.)
https://halshs.archivesRouvertes.fr/halshsR00965214)
Lehrer) U.) &) Laidly) J.) (2008),) Old) MegaRProjects) Newly) Packaged?) Waterfront)
Redevelopment)in)Toronto.) International&Journal&of&Urban&and&Regional&Research)
32(4):)786R803)
Leroy) S) (2000)) Sémantiques) de) la)métropolisation.) L’espace& géographique,) 1|2000,)
78R86)
 208 
Lévy) A) (2005)) Formes) urbaines) et) significations) :) revisiter) la) morphologie) urbaine.)
Espaces&et&Sociétés)122:)25R48.)
LeviRStrauss)C)(1962))La&pensée&sauvage.)Paris:)Plon.)




Lydon) M,) Bartman) D,) Garcia) T,) Preston) R,) Woudstra) R) (2012)) Tactical& Urbanism.)
Miami/New)York:)Street)Plans.)






Mangin) D) (2004)) La& ville& franchisée:& forms& et& sructures& de& la& ville& contemporaine.)
Editions)de)la)villette:)France)




McCann) E)&)Ward) K) (2011))Mobile& urbanism,& cities& and& policymaking& in& the& global&
age.)Minneapolis,)London):)University)of)Minnesota)Press.))
McFarlane)C) (2011))Assemblage)and) critical) urban)praxis:) Part)one.)City&15(2):) 204R
224.)
McNeill) D) (2005)) In) search) of) the) global) architect:) the) case) of)Norman) Foster) (and)
partners),)International&Journal&of&Urban&and&Regional&Research,)29(3):)501–15.)





Miller)R)&) Lessard)D) (2008))Evolving) strategy:) risk)management)and) the) shaping)of)
megaRprojects.) In:)Priemus)H,) Flyvbjerg)B,)Van)Wee)B.) (Eds.))DecisionEMaking&on&




Morris,) T.) and) L.) Empson) (1998)) Organization) and) expertise:) an) exploration) of)
knowledge) bases) and) the) management) of) accounting) and) consulting) firms.)
Accounting,&Organizations&and&Society)23)(5/6),)609–24.)
NavezRBouchanine) F.) (dir.)) (2002)) La& fragmentation& en& question:& des& villes& entre&
fragmentation&spatiale&et&fragmentation&sociale&?&Paris:)L’Harmattan)
Nye,)DE)(1994),)American)Technological)Sublime.)Cambridge:)The)MIT)Press.)
Olds) K) (2002)) Globalization& and& Urban& Change,& Capital,& Culture,& and& Pacific& Rim&
MegaEProjects.)Oxford:)University)Press.)










Peck) J) (2003)) Geography) and) public) policy:) mapping) the) penal) state,) Progress& in&
Human&Geography.)27:)222R32.)
Peck) J,) Theodore) N) &) Brenner) N) (2009)) Neoliberal) Urbanism):) Moments,) Models,)
Mutations.)SAIS&Review,)29(1),)49R66)
Peck)J)&)Brenner)N)(2011))To&the&City,)WileyRBlackwell))
Percival) T) and)Walev) P) (2012)) Articulating) intraRasian) urbanism:) the) production) of)
satellite)cities)in)Phnom)Penh.)Urban&Studies)49(13):)2873R2888.)
 210 




Priemus) H) &) Flyvbjerg) B) (2007)) DecisionEmaking& on& MegaEProjects&:& Cost& Benefit&
Analysis,&Planning&and&Innovation.)Edward)Elgard)Publishing)
)Priemus,) H) (2008)) How) to) improve) the) early) stage) of) decisionRmaking) on) megaR
projects.) In:)Priemus)H,)Flyvbjerg)B,)Van)Wee)B) (Eds.))DecisionEMaking&on&MegaE










Ramos) J) (2010)) Dubai) amplified,) the) engineering) of) a) port) geography.) Harvard)
University)USA:)Ashgate.)
Ramos)S)and)Rowe)G)(2013))Planning,)prototyping,)and)replication)in)Dubai.)In:)Kanna)
A) (ed))The& Superlative& City,&Dubai& and& The&Urban&Condition& in& the& Early& TwentyE
First& Century.) Harvard) University) Graduate) School) of) Design.) Cambridge,)
Massachusetts.)
Ren) X) (2011)) Building& globalization:& transnational& architecture& production& in& urban&
China.)Chicago:)University)of)Chicago)Press.)
Richards) G) and) Wilson) J) (2004)) The) impacts) of) cultural) events) on) city) Image:)
Rotterdam,)cultural)capital)of)Europe)2001.)Urban&Studies)41(10):)1931R1951.)
Riboulet) P) (1998))Onze& leçons& sur& la& composition& urbaine.) Paris:) Presses) de) l’école)
nationale)des)ponts)et)chausses.)
 211 
Rimmer,) PJ) (1991)) The) global) intelligence) corps) and) world) cities:) engineering)












Sager) T) (2011)) NeoRliberal) urban) planning) policies:) a) literature) survey) 1990R2010.)
Progress&in&Planning)76(4):)147R199.))
Salet,) W) (2007)) Trans) scalar) strategies) of) action:) comparing) experiences) of) mega)
projects)in)city)regions)in)Europe.)In:)Institut)d’Aménagement)et)d’Urbanisme)d’IleR



















Shatkins) G) (2011)) Planning) Privatopolis:) Representation) and) Contestation) in) the)
Development) of) urban) Integrated) Megaprojects.) In:) Roy) A) and) Ong) A.) (ed))
Worlding& & Cities:& Asian& Experiments& and& the& Art& of& Being& Global.) Blackwell)
Publishing)Ltd.&
Sklair) L) (2005)) The) transnational) capitalist) class) and) contemporary) architecture) in)
globalizing) cities,) International& Journal& of& Urban& and) Regional& Research,& 29) (3),)
485–500.)
Smith) B) (2010)) Scared) by,) of,) in,) and) for)Dubai,)Social&&& Cultural&Geography) 11(3):)
263R283)
Sorkin)M) (dir)) (1992),)Variations&on&a&Theme&Park&:& The&New&american&City&and& the&
End&of&Public&Space.)New)York:)Hill)&)Wang.&





Swyngedouw) E) (1996)) The) city) as) a) hybrid:) On) nature,) society) and) cyborg)
urbanization.)Capitalism&Nature&Socialism.)Taylor)&)Francis&
Thomas) MJ) (1982)) The) Procedural) Planning) Theory) of) A.) Faludi.) In:) Paris) C& (ed.))
Critical&Readings&in&Planning&Theory.)Oxford:)Pergamon)Press.)
Tore) S) (2011)) NeoRliberal) Urban) Planning) Policies):) A) Literature) Survey) 1990R2010.)
Progress&In&Planning)76(4):)147R199&
Turan)N) (2013)) The)Dubai) effect) archipelago.) In:) Kanna)A) (ed))The& Superlative&City,&




Van)Asshe) ) K,) Buenen) R)&) de) Jong)H) (2012)) CoRevolutions) of) planning) and) design:)
Risks) and) benefits) of) design) perspectives) in) planning) systems.) Planning& Theory)
12(2):)177R198.&
Van)Marrewijk)A,)Clegg)SR,)Pitsis)TS)and)Veenswijk)M)(2008))Managing)publicRprivate)
megaprojects:) paradoxes,) complexity) and)project)design.) International& Journal& of&
Project&Management)26(6):)591R600.)









Yiftachel)O) (1989)) Towards) a) new) typology)of) urban)planning) theory.)Planning&and&
Design.)16:)23R39)




cas) de) la) région) métropolitaine) de) Mumbai) (Bombay).) Revue& française&
d’administration&publique)107:)395.&
